Slam the book: the role of performance in contemporary UK poetics by McGowan, Jack
 warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/89799 
 
Copyright and reuse:                     
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. 
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Slam the Book: the role of performance in 
contemporary UK poetics. 
 
Jack McGowan 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English and Comparative 
Literary Studies 
 
University of Warwick  
Department of English and Comparative Literary Studies 
August 2016 
 
Contents 
Acknowledgements & Declaration                                                                        1 
Abstract                                                                                  2 
 
Introduction              3 
Chapter 1: Performance Poetry and the Academy                           35 
F. R. Leavis and F. O. Matthiessen       41 
Performance poetry in the contemporary UK academy                       61 
Community and Elitism in contemporary poetics    69 
Matthew Arnold; spoken word and the provincial spirit   87 
Two Cultures         94 
Spoken word and critical practice in I.A. Richards              107 
Spoken word; value and pedagogy                                        123 
 
Chapter 2: Affect and Performance Poetry                                       133 
Defining Affect                                  138 
Affect and the page / stage binary                   141 
Performance as persuasion                 158 
Barthes, Latour, and affective neutrality               164 
The Spinozist imperative                 174 
Brennan and the mechanisms of affect transmission                191 
Phenomenological enquiries                219 
 
Chapter 3: Space and Performance Poetry                  233 
Contemporary spaces for spoken word              239 
Space and Spectatorship                246 
Space: a critical frontier                255 
Spoken word, theatre, and heterotopia              266 
Nineteenth-century theatre spaces               282 
Traditional theatre and contemporary performance spaces            294 
Lefebvre, representation, and festival              310 
Heidegger and the festive space               328 
 
Conclusion                                                                                                              344 
Bibliography                                                                                                           352 
1 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements  
 
I would like to acknowledge and thank the kind, generous, and unwavering 
intellectual support of Professor Emma Mason and Professor David Morley, and the 
support of the Department of English and Comparative Literary Studies, particularly 
colleagues and friends in the Warwick Writing Programme who have made the 
place feel like a home. I would also like to thank my family, the friends and 
comrades I have made in the postgraduate community, and the students I have 
taught - all of whom have made my experiences infinitely richer. A final note, the 
Jug and the Jester deserves hearty acknowledgement.  
 
 
Declaration 
 
I declare that this thesis is my own work and has not previously been submitted for 
a degree at another institution.  
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the relationship between performance poetry and page-based 
poetry and the academic and non-specialist audience for performance poetry in the 
UK. Performance poetry in the UK is rapidly becoming a popular medium for 
experiencing poetry and I analyse the impact this has, and will have, in relation to 
the study of poetics, and the reading of poetry within the public sphere. I have 
identified three primary areas of research. First, I analyse the reception of 
performance poetry in the academy. Second, I assess the mechanisms of affect 
transmission in performance. Finally I interrogate the utilization of space through 
performance which contributes to the production of social spaces. Alongside an 
exploration of how these factors construct a different affective experience for the 
reader I analyse the critical position performance poetry holds in relation to the 
wider body of poetics. Performance poetry has been relatively absent from critical 
study of poetry and the formation of a poetic canon in the UK. I contend that there 
has traditionally been an opposition to performance poetry in the academy, defined 
along the lines of a ‘high’ and ‘low’ art binary. This is a contention I analyse with 
focus on the development of UK poetics in the mid-20th century. By assessing the 
value discourses inherent to an academic appraisal of spoken word I stage a 
discussion of the pedagogical potential of performance poetry. Combining both the 
affective capacities of performance and the role performance plays in renegotiating 
our experiences of social and shared spaces, I argue performance is an important 
tool for structuring a re-engagement with contemporary poetry. Tracing the 
potential pedagogical implications of performance poetry through each of these 
aspects brings the thesis to a conclusion regarding the value of contemporary UK 
performance poetry and the important pedagogical role it plays. Underpinning my 
analysis, I conduct interviews with various prominent UK performance poets in 
order to construct an accurate account of the contemporary performance poetry 
scene, and to facilitate predictions regarding its future development.  
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Introduction 
 
 
In the 2015 BBC 4 documentary Rhymes, Rock & Revolution: The Story of 
Performance Poetry, the British poet Lemn Sissay stated that: ‘the 1960s were 
probably the best time for poets as rock and roll pop culture icons – except for now 
– now poetry is stronger, more powerful, more present, more dynamic than it’s 
ever been since the beginning of time’.1 The claim, audacious though it may be, 
addresses a shift in the consumption of poetry, one of many which have 
accompanied developments in media and methods of reception. In this thesis I 
explore one particular method: the role of performance in contemporary UK 
poetics. In an article by Peter Howarth, published by The Independent on October 6, 
2015 (and roughly concurrent with Sissay’s remarks) Howarth claimed that: 
‘Performance poetry has come a long way since its alternative 1960s roots, but it 
still falls foul of traditionalists’.2 The essence of the disparity Howarth proposes 
articulates ‘a serious division between poets who write words for the page and 
                                                          
1 Lemn Sissay, Rhymes, Rock & Revolution: The Story of Performance Poetry, BBC4, 11 October 2015 
[accessed 12 October 2015]. 
2 Howarth, Peter, ‘National Poetry Day: The rise and rise of performance poetry’, The Independent, 
06 October 2015 <http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/features/national-
poetry-day-the-rise-and-rise-of-performance-poetry-a6683576.html Tuesday 6 October 2015> 
[accessed 23 October 2015]. 
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those who aim for the stage’.3 The page versus stage debate is a common resort for 
critics seeking to articulate how one can provide a frame of reference for 
understanding the differences, be they physical, emotional, or experiential between 
reading poetry from the page, and experiencing poetry through performance. 
Referring to the page versus stage debate, Howarth underlines the problematic 
question of value implicit in the opposition (‘The latter have long been dismissed as 
lightweight; too desperate for applause to say anything truthful’) and the question 
of the presence of performance within contemporary poetics (‘Yet poetry made for 
live performance now gathers audiences that page-poetry can only dream of’).4 
Both questions are vital to my discussion of the role of performance in 
contemporary poetics. 
Any study of the performance aspects of poetry is frustrated by the range of 
terms used to describe performance poetry. A study of performance in UK poetics 
first requires a delineation of the terminology used in relation to the complicated 
identity of performance poetry. For the contemporary audience performance 
poetry can and will be referred to variously as ‘Slam’, ‘Spoken Word’, ‘Open Mic’, 
and a host of other localized socio-cultural terms that depend on the context of the 
performance. Attempting to trace the deep oral traditions of poetry exemplifies the 
difficulty of the project.5 There are names, and there are many of them. For the 
                                                          
3 Howarth, ‘‘National Poetry Day’. 
4 Howarth, ‘National Poetry Day’. 
5 Projects which undergo research into poetry’s oral contexts (with varying success) can be examined 
in, for example: Viv Edwards and Thomas J Sienkewicz, Oral Cultures Past And Present (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1991); Ruth H. Finnegan, Oral Poetry: Its Nature, Significance and Social Context 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Beverley Whitaker Long, and Mary Francis Hopkins, 
Performing Literature: An Introduction to Oral Interpretation, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
1982). The relationships between oral traditions in poetry and contemporary performance poetics 
will be discussed in greater detail later in my thesis, however, as Long and Hopkins aver in the 
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purposes of my argument, I elucidate more prominent aspects of the nomenclature 
distinguished in the division of performance poetry, initially the term itself, 
followed by the distinctions which can be drawn between Slam and Spoken Word. 
These two forms constitute a large proportion of poetry that is labelled as 
performed, and speak most directly to the issues concerning ‘stage poetry’.  
The term ‘performance poetry’ originated from a 1981 press release in the 
Austin Chronicle Litera column. The press release was issued by the American 
avant-garde poet and artist Hedwig Gorksi, who was engaging in a number of 
theatre and performance projects, including a collaborative conceptual project that 
involved the performance of her own poetry alongside music performed by the East 
of Eden Band. Gorski’s intention was to separate the public performance of poetry 
from the cultures of performance art developing in the latter decades of the 
twentieth-century, and to indicate a distinction in the writing process whereby 
poetry was written for oral presentation rather than for traditional print 
publication. On Gorski’s own website, in ‘The Hedwig Gorski Glossaria of Terms 
Coinage’ she offers the following definition:  
Performance Poet(ry)- Originally used to describe Booby, Mama! (1977) 
a new verse drama before publication of the term in the Austin 
Chronicle Litera column (1981).  Text-dominated performance art. 
                                                          
introduction to their text: ‘The shared oral experience is likely to reveal insights to the audience that 
they overlooked, or enhance those they may not have appreciated fully in their own silent reading’ 
(Long, p.xiii). 
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Poetry written for or during performance instead of for print 
publication.6  
The above definition exposes the utility of the term through a clearly demarcated 
relationship with print poetry. The Gorskian definition of performance poetry is 
distinguished by its emphasis on intent; writing for print publication situated 
against writing for the voice. With this in mind, the fact that performance poetry 
often functions as an umbrella term in discussing stage versus page poetics is 
elucidating. It shapes the narrative of an analysis of performance poetics by firmly 
placing the generic term at one end of a media spectrum. 
  The title of my thesis ‘Slam the Book’ refers to the prominence and the 
salience of one particular medium of performed poetry, the poetry Slam, a 
burgeoning phenomenon which began in the US in the mid 1980s and now 
dominates much of the performance poetry scene.7 To the majority of people who 
have never experienced a poetry Slam (and no small number of initiated audience 
members) Slam is incorrectly deployed as a way to describe a particular style or 
genre of performance poem. The original definition of Slam poetry can be 
understood from the following quote from Slam veteran Buddy Wakefield: ‘“Slam 
poetry” is a term that seems to have evolved into a generalization, given to a style 
of delivery culminating in rapid, rhythmic, cathartic voice and presence[...] Poetry 
                                                          
6 Hedwig Gorski, ‘The Hedwig Gorski Glossaria of Terms Coinage’ 
<https://sites.google.com/site/hedwiggorskisite/> [accessed 14 May 2014]. 
7 Regarding the inception of Slam in the UK, in John Paul O’Neill’s 2012 article in The Huffington Post 
UK he claims to have held the first UK Slam in 1994: John Paul O’Neill, ‘Almost Eighteen Years On - 
How Poetry Slam Arrived in the UK!’, The Huffington Post UK, 15 February 2012 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/john-paul-o/poetry-slam-farrago_b_1153590.html> [accessed 2 
June 2016]. 
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Slam is an event. Slam poetry does not exist (not outside of its practical role of 
being any given poem entered into a Poetry Slam)’.8 The term in its original sense, 
the name of an event, has been appropriated to refer to the poetry that is 
performed and practiced at the event. To offer some justification, this 
misconception is not assisted by the vocabulary that surrounds the experience of a 
Slam Poetry event (slamming, slammers, slammasters)9 however it still facilitates a 
distinction that lies at the heart of Slam’s recognition, or lack thereof, within certain 
circles of the poetry world. The synecdoche echoes a tendency towards 
generalization, asserting homogeneity to the style of performance and the text of 
the poetry itself. 
Having established that Slam is a specific, contingent event, and that ‘Slam 
poetry’ is reliant on a Slam ‘event’ to exist, for the purposes of setting out the 
nomenclature a large and important aspect of the discourse of performance poetry 
has been addressed. However, because of this contingency Slam may be the most 
easily defined aspect of the vocabulary of performance poetry. Outside of Slam, 
one of the most common labels associated with contemporary performed poetry is 
‘spoken word’. From a semantic perspective there is of course overt reason to 
employ this terminology; it is transparent, it offers what one would expect from 
performed poetry, words (from the page) that are being spoken (on the stage). The 
origin of the appellation itself however does carry connotations that are not 
                                                          
8 Buddy Wakefield, ‘I Am Exploring the Distance: A Talk with Buddy Wakefield’, Used Furniture 
Review, 23 April 2012 <http://usedfurniturereview.com/2012/04/23/i-am-exploring-the-distance-a-
talk-with-buddy-wakefield/> [accessed 19 March 2014]. 
9 For a more detailed breakdown of this terminology see: Marc Kelly Smith and Joe Kraynak, The 
Complete Idiot's Guide To Slam Poetry (Indianapolis, IN: Alpha Books, 2004). 
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generically applicable; indeed, they often depart significantly from the tone and 
register of the poetry that is being offered up under the name. ‘Spoken Word’ first 
started being used in the early twentieth century to denote recorded and 
performed texts of radio broadcasts as a way of separating them from text based 
journalism and radio plays. What is important to note is that this is a denotation 
that exists as an aspect of the language of commerce. When the Grammy Awards 
were established in 1958 a category was created to reward ‘Best Documentary or 
Spoken Word Performance’.  As a result, the recording industry began a concerted 
campaign to latch on to spoken word, which had already developed a strong 
association with hip-hop in the US. The ability to quickly and bloodlessly link the 
already media-dominant hip-hop and its lucrative market to the emerging 
popularity of spoken word ensured an influx of new material and talent for the 
former and the guarantee of success to the latter. Though an encouraging sign for 
increasing the popularity of poetry in general, this new form of performance poetry 
was not accepted without issues. The label ‘spoken word’ is described by poet and 
performer Ray McNeice as ‘a talent agency ad-man’s camouflage of the P-word lest 
it drive away [the] audience in droves’.10 Engaging with what appeared to be a 
rebranding of the dull, lacklustre poetry market was often associated with selling-
out. Artists, poets and performers who, like Spoken Word itself, sat at the nexus of 
hip-hop and poetry (and who contributed most to the body of Spoken Word 
performances and recordings) were given short shrift by their peers, most notably 
those who had aligned themselves with the Slam movement.  
                                                          
10 Ray McNiece, ‘Just Call It Poetry’, Another Chicago Magazine 32-33 (1997), pp.69-70. 
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The origin of this label has somewhat lost its distinction for a contemporary 
audience. Spoken Word is used interchangeably to denote an event where one 
would expect to see some poetry being performed. The fact that the misperception 
exists is evidence to suggest that since its beginnings, spoken word has been re-
appropriated back into the milieu of performance poetry, no longer engendering 
the commercial denotations it once did. It is important to retain this information 
during any investigation into the motivations held by poets who are performing 
poetry. It sheds light on the interplay involved in a large aspect of the performance 
medium, as Susan B. A. Somers-Willett states in her 2009 critical study The Cultural 
Politics of Slam Poetry; Race, Identity and the Performance of Popular Verse in 
America: ‘the term spoken word has, unbeknownst to many of its practitioners and 
consumers, commercial origins’.11 
The provenance of the terminology itself is an interesting element of the 
discussion of the development of oral poetics. However, for the purposes of my 
investigation I recognize the cultural capital both ‘performance poetry’ and ‘spoken 
word’ possess as signifiers of a generalized poetics of performance. In the course of 
my analysis I will refer to both performance poetry and spoken word as descriptions 
of a medium of performance which is distinct from page poetry. While the origins 
of the two terms may have different connotations, the two are essentially 
interconnected and, as I discuss, my analysis is rooted in the significance of what 
they share: a mutual distinction from the page. Since its origin in Chicago in 1986, 
Slam remains a vital part of the US performance poetry scene, though the weight of 
                                                          
11 Susan B.A. Somers-Willett, The Cultural Politics of Slam Poetry; Race, Identity and the Performance 
of Popular Verse in America (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009) p.100. 
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its success has not necessarily translated to the UK.12 It is becoming increasingly 
difficult for Slam to hold on to its identity as a counter-cultural alternative with the 
rise of the commercialized spoken word artist; nonetheless, poets at National 
Poetry Slams are still held to rules established over two decades ago and venues 
like the Nuyorican Café are still treated with reverence by touring performance 
poets.13 It is easy to dismiss certain aspects of Slam as derivative and uninspired, 
with motivations more grounded in commercial success, but this is the nature of 
any medium that accedes to the conditions of popular and public visibility, and 
Slam’s difficult history demonstrates that beneath the flash and glamour of its 
current manifestation there is a distinct corpus of development.14 Any 
misappropriated critique of a ‘Slam style’ should be read in the context of the 
understanding that Slam is an event, the style having developed out of commonly 
observed traits and qualities in poems performed at such an event. By establishing 
this now, the tendency to view Slam Poetry simply as a label for a generic style of 
performance can be avoided, as can be the temptation to dismiss all performance 
poetry under a blanket devaluation of Slam based on its status as a particular form 
                                                          
12 Relative popularity is a difficult metric to assess, yet while US Slam and spoken word scenes 
demonstrate all signs of a healthy sedimentation in the contemporary cultural landscape, there has 
been a tranche of UK online reportage in the last five years exhorting the newness and the freshness 
of spoken word which is suggestive of a comparatively nascent scene in the UK. See, for example: 
Daisy Bowie-Sell, ‘Is poetry the new comedy?’, The Telegraph, 11 January 2013 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/authorinterviews/9789892/Is-poetry-the-new-
comedy.html> [accessed 17 July 2014]; or James Bunting, ‘Dean Atta – When Poetry Speaks Up’, The 
Huffington Post UK, 13 March 2012 < http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/james-bunting/dean-atta-i-
am-nobodys-nigger_b_1200145.html> [accessed 05 November 2014]; or Sam Wolfson, ‘Kate 
Tempest: the performance poet who can’t be ignored’, The Guardian Online, 10 April 2013 
<https://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/apr/10/kate-tempest-performance-poet-cant-be-
ignored> [accessed 16 May 2014]. 
13 A detailed discussion of the political elements of Slam’s grassroots origins can be found in the 
following article: Noel Urayoán, ‘Counter/public address: Nuyorican poetries in the slam era’, in 
Latino Studies, Volume 9. Issue 1 (2011), pp.38-61. 
14 For a further analysis of Slam see: Tim Clare, ‘Slam: A Poetic Dialogue’, in Stress Fractures: Essays 
on Poetry, ed. by Tom Chivers (London: Penned In The Margins 2010), pp.135-141. 
11 
 
of entertainment. This prevents the inclination to overlook its importance as a 
platform for encouraging development and experimentation within contemporary 
poetry. One must also recognize that Slam’s specific contextual identity as a 
competitive event prompts certain criticisms which are unique to it. Although 
Slam’s successes highlight its importance to the contemporary performance poetry 
scene in the course of my analysis I hold Slam poetry outside of the general 
category of performance poetry unless otherwise stated. 
Attempts to trace the beginnings of a contemporary performance poetry 
scene in the UK are frustrated by the very fact that the current performance poetry 
scene is arguably rather nebulous. One might be tempted to identify the 
International Poetry Incarnation, an event held at the Royal Albert Hall in London 
on 11 June 1965 as a site of origin.15 This event featured performances from 
prominent UK poets such as Adrian Mitchell, Michael Horovitz, Pete Brown, and the 
British Revivalist Christopher Logue, alongside an international gathering of poets 
and performers including Anselm Holo, Andrei Voznesensky, and a complement of 
some of the major Beat poets of the generation; Allen Ginsberg, William Burroughs, 
Gregory Corso, and Lawrence Ferlinghetti. The International Poetry Incarnation 
showcased the potential for emerging, dissident strands of UK poetics engaged 
specifically with performance. Although the writers who were present at the event 
all published for the page, the nature of the event itself gestured towards a 
widening space for the performance of poetry to occupy. The event also invigorated 
                                                          
15 Lydia Smith, ‘11 June 1965: Allen Ginsberg and the beat poets create a cultural storm at the Hall’, 
Royal Albert Hall Online, 04 January 2016 <http://www.royalalberthall.com/about-the-
hall/news/2016/january/11-june-1965-allen-ginsberg-and-the-beat-poets-create-a-cultural-storm-
at-the-hall/> [accessed 19 June 2016]. 
12 
 
a number of counter-culture movements in the poetry scene, including ranting 
poetry which developed in the late 1970s in line with punk lit.16 Additionally, the 
increased focus on spoken word and performance had great influence upon the 
1960s Liverpool poetry revolution, emphasized by the 1967 publication of The 
Mersey Sound.17  
The development of strands of poetry which diminish focus on page receipt is 
of course important when one considers the cultural significance of poetry. 
However, contemporaneous to the rise of popular performances of poetry, major 
figures in the British academy criticized these developments. In a Paris Review 
interview conducted in 1982 by Robert Phillips the poet Philip Larkin argued:  
I don’t give readings, no, although I have recorded three of my 
collections, just to show how I should read them. Hearing a poem, as 
opposed to reading it on the page, means you miss so much—the 
shape, the punctuation, the italics, even knowing how far you are from 
the end. Reading it on the page means you can go your own pace, 
taking it in properly; hearing it means you’re dragged along at the 
speaker’s own rate, missing things, not taking it in, confusing ‘there’ and 
‘their’ and things like that. And the speaker may interpose his own 
                                                          
16 For further information regarding ranting poetry and punk lit see: Greg Freeman, ‘Still angry after 
all these years: heroes of Ranting poetry keep the flame alive’, WriteOutLoud, 19 June 2015 
<http://www.writeoutloud.net/public/blogentry.php?blogentryid=49522> [accessed 02 July 2016]. 
17 Adrian Henri, Roger McGough and Brian Patten, The Mersey Sound (London: Penguin, 1967). 
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personality between you and the poem, for better or worse. For that 
matter, so may the audience.18 
Larkin’s uncharitable disposition towards the performance of poetry was by no 
means the idiosyncratic perspective of a notoriously solitary and dour poet in the 
twilight of his years. Larkin expressed a common academic mistrust of performance 
poetry19 which finds a more contemporary echo in the following statement made 
by the critic Harold Bloom in 2000 again in the Paris Review: 
I can’t bear these accounts I read in the Times and elsewhere of these 
poetry slams, in which various young men and women in various late-
spots are declaiming rant and nonsense at each other. The whole thing 
is judged by an applause meter which is actually not there, but might as 
well be. This isn’t even silly; it is the death of art.20 
Bloom’s criticism of the judging of a Slam poetry event, and specifically the 
competitive aesthetic Slam generates, indicates where exactly he draws up his 
battle lines with respect to the medium. Pre-supposing one overlooks the problems 
inculcated in Bloom’s mutual exclusion of popularity and artistic merit, it still 
appears that his fiercest issue with the medium is the simultaneous live 
amalgamation of audience with evaluator. He refers to the invisible clap-o-meter as 
                                                          
18 Philip Larkin, ‘The Art of Poetry No. 30’, The Paris Review, Issue 84 (1982) 
<http://www.theparisreview.org/interviews/3153/the-art-of-poetry-no-30-philip-larkin> [accessed 
15 March 2014]. 
19 For further criticism of performance poetry see: Roberta E. Berke, Bounds Out of Bounds (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1981); Albert B. Lord, ‘Homer as Oral Poet’, in Harvard Studies in 
Classical Philology, Volume 72 (1968), pp.1-46; Glenn Wilson, The Psychology of the Performing Self 
(New York: St. Martin’s, 1985); Cornelia Graebner, ‘Is performance poetry dead?’, in Poetry Review, 
Volume 97. Issue 2 (2007), pp.78-82. 
20 Harold Bloom, et al., ‘The Man in the Back Row Has a Question VI’, in The Paris Review, Volume 
42. Issue 154 (2000) pp.370-379 (p.379). 
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a delineator of continuing success in performance poetry – positing this as the 
driving factor that refines the future shape of this form of poetry, which he says will 
ultimately culminate in ‘the death of art’. I suggest that this speaks to a fear of 
cutting out the middle man of the critic, of Bloom himself, and of the academy in 
general, to arbitrate the quality of poetry. The ‘rant and nonsense’ Bloom identifies 
is a signifier of his position regarding the quality and the value of spoken word in 
general. Bloom’s is a fear of value dilution reflected in a distinction between high 
and low art. Any movement towards open access provokes a fear among elitist 
factions of the academy that high ‘educated’ literature will not be read or 
experienced, replaced by canon building that privileges a low art ‘people’s poetry’. 
In contrast to this position in his essay ‘Poetry into the Twenty-First Century’, 
published in Fire and Ink: An Anthology of Social Action Writing (2009), Miguel 
Algarin, a Puerto Rican poet, lecturer, and co-founder of the Nuyorican Poets Café 
(the birthplace of the New York Slam scene) outlined contemporary Slam practices, 
oral traditions, and relevance to contemporary society, subheading his essay ‘The 
Democratization of Verse’.21 Algarin, a key player in the early development of the 
Slam scene in the US22, has established himself as a fierce enemy of the kind of 
elitist rhetoric that critics such as Bloom level against Slam, offering a potent 
description of performance poetics as: ‘the reason why poetry and theatre are so 
                                                          
21 Miguel Algarin, ‘Poetry into the Twenty-First Century’, in Fire and Ink: An Anthology of Social 
Action Writing, ed. by Frances Payne Adler, Debra Busman, Diana Garcia (Tuscon: University of 
Arizona Press, 2009) pp.392-398.  
22 For a detailed account of Algarin’s role in the development of the New York Slam scene see: Cristin 
O'Keefe Aptowicz, Words In Your Face: A guided tour through twenty years of the New York City 
Poetry Slam (New York: Soft Skull Press, 2008). 
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intertwined, and why both are entering into the twenty-first century alive and 
well’.23 
The introduction of a binary between high and low art invites a 
consideration of the international perception of poetry in the latter half of the 
twentieth century. While the British public experienced popular factions of counter-
culture poets reacting against the academy’s disenfranchisement with spoken 
word, a debate raged in the US asking if poetry had value at all. Joseph Epstein’s 
seminal 1988 editorial ‘Who Killed Poetry?’ in the magazine Commentary argued 
that poetry was no longer being enjoyed by the public, trapped as it was in a 
vacuum created and perpetuated by the academy, and the swathes of MFAs and 
creative writing programmes spreading across the US.24 This attack highlighted 
questions regarding the status of poetry and its relevance to a modern audience. In 
1991 the US poet and critic Dana Gioia penned a response entitled ‘Can Poetry 
Matter’ in The Atlantic Monthly claiming that Americans had ‘a superabundance of 
poetry within a small class and [an] impoverishment outside it’.25 He further added 
that: ‘One might even say that outside the classroom- where society demands that 
the two groups interact – poets and the common reader are no longer on speaking 
terms’.26 The debate posited a turn of the century climate featuring an increasing 
number of discontented poets who were looking for a venue to read in without 
academic ‘supervision’ and of audiences who were looking for a way to engage and 
                                                          
23 Algarin, p.395. 
24 Joseph Epstein, ‘Who Killed Poetry?’, in Commentary, Volume 86, Issue 2 (1988) pp.13-20. 
25 Dana Gioia, ‘Can Poetry Matter?’, in Can Poetry Matter? Essays on Poetry and American Culture 
(Saint Paul: Graywolf, 1992) pp.1-24 (p.10). 
26 Gioia, ‘Can Poetry Matter?’, p.19. 
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reconnect with poetry. I posit that this offered fertile ground for performance 
poetry to be nurtured.  
Examining the value of performance poetry in the UK may suggest an 
increased awareness and participation in performance poetry, however it does not 
yet suggest a fully-fledged movement. This is due in no small degree to the fact that 
the spoken word revolution faces its own contemporary detractors. In an article for 
The Independent written in February 2013 and titled ‘Poetry slams do nothing to 
help the art form survive’ former performance poet Nathan A. Thompson contends 
that: ‘Like sipping a fine wine, reading poetry cannot be rushed. It reveals its 
pleasures over time, rewarding the careful reader with something new and 
beautiful each time. It runs bang against the grain of our quick-fix culture. It is 
already a lost discipline’.27 Thompson’s message is a divisive one, suggesting that 
spoken word unmasks the poetry consumer who has no investment in the poetry 
and would rather take the quick fix apparently offered by the performance poet: 
‘The only division in poetry is between those people willing to take the time to read 
it and those who will not’.28 Similar to Bloom, Thompson attacks the soft target of 
Slam, citing the danger of allowing an audience free reign over their own capacity 
to evaluate: 
A further nail in the coffin is the rise of poetry slams. I have performed 
at many slams and the audience is almost always half drunk and if you 
want to win you have to pitch your poem pretty low. The result is a 
                                                          
27 Nathan A. Thompson, ‘Poetry slams do nothing to help the art form survive’, The Independent, 01 
February 2013 <http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art/features/poetry-slams-do-
nothing-to-help-the-art-form-survive-8475599.html> [accessed 12 December 2014]. 
28 Thompson, ‘Poetry slams do nothing…’. 
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scene rife with the poetic equivalent of nob jokes – and plenty of actual 
nob jokes.29 
Thompson ends with a cautionary statement - ‘We cannot allow slam poetry to 
replace the role poetry plays in our lives. The threat is there’30 - the implications of 
which are clear: we cannot allow slam poetry to replace the role ‘real’ poetry plays 
in our lives.  
Thompson’s article is representative of a perspective regarding spoken word 
which is still prevalent in contemporary British poetics. However, despite the 
detraction there is a critical counter-point angled towards the potential role 
performance poetry may play. In a Paris Review interview with the British poet 
James Fenton conducted in 2012 Fenton stated: 
I do know that what happened to poetry in the twentieth century was 
that it began to be written for the page. When it’s a question of 
typography, why not? Poets have done beautiful things with 
typography—Apollinaire’s Calligrammes, that sort of thing. But now we 
are left with people who write only for the page, who feel that a poem 
is something very far from performance.31 
Fenton’s further comments: ‘I think it’s no shame for a poet to think of what 
performance involves and even to write something that’s beyond his capacity as a 
                                                          
29 Thompson, ‘Poetry slams do nothing…’. 
30 Thompson, ‘Poetry slams do nothing…’. 
31 James Fenton, ‘The Art of Poetry No. 96’, The Paris Review, Issue 202 (2012) 
<http://www.theparisreview.org/interviews/6166/the-art-of-poetry-no-96-james-fenton> [accessed 
18 March 2014]. 
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performer. When poets do readings, they benefit from the charitable nature of the 
audience’32 somewhat reveal a tacit recognition of the sentiment that pervades 
hierarchized impressions of the page versus stage division, however the fact that he 
presents the possibility of a different direction for contemporary poetics is itself of 
value. At the 2014 Northern Lights Writers' Conference held in Manchester, the 
author and critic Will Self argued that young people setting out as writers must 
explore new media in order to ensure their survival in the industry. Self was explicit 
in his appraisal of not only digital and e-media potentials, but also of performance, 
and the type of conceptual practice which can be seen in contemporary poetics. 
When speaking with Self after the event about the contemporary performance 
poetry scene he averred: 
Just as within music people are feeling that the only possible way they 
can add value to the experience of well-established forms of cultural 
capital (from a consumer point of view) is to attend a live cultural event, 
from the point of view of the producers it creates capital. But outside of 
the paradigm of capital and consumption, performance represents a 
fascinating and radical shift, which will certainly have impacts on the 
future.33 
Notably, the ideological presentation of capital production which lies at the 
heart of a performance event does not, for Self, attenuate the ‘radical shift’ which is 
the promise of performance poetics. The incumbent Oxford Professor of Poetry 
                                                          
32 Fenton, ‘The Art of Poetry’. 
33 Will Self, interviewed by Jack McGowan, 25 October 2014. 
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Simon Armitage’s inaugural lecture delivered on the 24th of November 2015 also 
offers a firm statement of support for performance in contemporary poetics. 
Armitage included reference to Claudia Rankine’s much feted Citizen: An American 
Lyric34 in a bid to outline how contemporary poetry had expanded its boundaries. 
However, it is Armitage’s later references to ‘signs of vitality, strength, and even 
popularity in the world of poetry, voices making themselves heard above the usual, 
low level background hum’ which are of particular note.35 Armitage referenced the 
developing performance poetry scene in the UK, recalling that ‘Over the last couple 
of decades or so a poetic movement has emerged or re-emerged through clubs and 
events, a movement which thrives in live environments’.36 It is hard to imagine 
Armitage’s inaugural lecture for the Oxford Professorship as being anything other 
than an attempt to outline his opinion of the purview of the role, particularly given 
a perceived imperative to defend the shifting cultural value of poetry. In this 
context the implication of Armitage’s acknowledgment of the audiences drawn by 
contemporary spoken word, ‘audiences of hundreds, sometimes thousands, with a 
huge hunger for unaccompanied language’,37 stands as a strong defense for 
performance poetics. Predictably Armitage rebukes a sample of spoken word: 
‘facile rubbish, cheap gags, vacuous life-affirming statements, the soliciting of 
instant response and the over –emoted serving of already over egged puddings’38 
                                                          
34 Claudia Rankine, Citizen: An American Lyric (London: Penguin, 2015). 
35 Simon Armitage, ‘Oxford University Professor of Poetry Inaugural Lecture’, Oxford University, 24 
November 2015 <https://audioboom.com/boos/3865399-simon-armitage-s-inaugural-lecture-as-
professor-of-poetry-at-the-university-of-oxford> [accessed 28 January 2016]. 
36 Armitage, ‘Poetry Inaugural’. 
37 Armitage, ‘Poetry Inaugural’. 
38 Armitage, ‘Poetry Inaugural’. 
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but this does not succeed in diminishing his faith in the potential of performance 
poetry, and of performance poets who exemplify the medium:  
Among those who have surpassed their contemporaries Kate Tempest is 
the most prominent. Once categorized and perhaps demeaned by the 
literati as a performance poet, Tempest’s reputation has burgeoned 
with the very force of her surname to the point where the poetry 
establishment has been unable to ignore her. Her across-the-board 
appeal has seen her appear on one of the main stages at Glastonbury 
Festival and receive the Ted Hughes award for new work in poetry in 
close succession.39 
Kate Tempest’s success extends further than Armitage’s recognition. In 2013 she 
received the Ted Hughes Award for Brand New Ancients40, a text which has been 
labeled a spoken word collection. This was a plaudit matched evenly by her 
nomination in 2014 as one of the Poetry Society’s Next Generation Poets, 2014 also 
being the year Tempest’s debut album received a Mercury Prize for best hip hop 
album. Despite Tempest’s work across various mediums Armitage gestures towards 
both the presence and the misconception of her detractors by highlighting the 
imbalance of poetic modes, an assumed correlative of the high versus low art 
binary: 
It would be easy to criticize Tempest on the basis that the visual, printed 
manifestations of the work fail to convey that winning combination of 
                                                          
39 Armitage, ‘Poetry Inaugural’. 
40 Kate Tempest, Brand New Ancients (London: Picador, 2013). 
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verbal dynamism and disarming innocence which has become her 
trademark and which has also won her so many admirers. But to 
demote her to a literary subset on that basis would be to insist that the 
printed form of poetry is its primary mode, with performed or spoken 
versions playing a supporting or secondary role; poetry having a day out 
as it were.41 
In the course of his hour long lecture the fact that Armitage devotes such time to 
defending spoken word is a telling sign of the potential (yet not realized) power it 
might exert over contemporary poetics. Armitage denounces those establishment 
poets who would seek to relegate performance poetry to a secondary or supportive 
role.42 In doing so he is offering a means to understand spoken word as both a fresh 
revitalization (the hitherto unobserved ‘signs of vitality, strength’ previously noted) 
and a re-substantiation of the heritage of poetry as oral performance. The tenability 
of this bifurcated vision of performance poetry is one of the questions that I 
address in the course of my investigation. A further line of inquiry is the physical 
dimensions of the performance, which help to shape an understanding of the 
distinctions between the modes of receipt. For Armitage, a poet like Tempest 
delivers an experience of poetry which stands resolutely separate from the 
                                                          
41 Armitage, ‘Poetry Inaugural’. 
42 Even more telling perhaps is the statement made at the close of the following excerpt: ‘A churlish 
position to take I’d argue, because even post-Caxton for a long while poetry continued to be a 
spoken or recited art, with an emphasis on sonic or acoustic properties. And even through its most 
bookish and mute phases there have always been performers and performances and before that, 
when it was conducted around a campfire, or at the temple, or in the amphitheatre poetry’s 
instinctive address was to the ear not the eye and writing was a means of warehousing and 
distribution rather than the product itself. So in those wider and longer terms we could even think of 
Kate Tempest et al as defenders of poetry’s original practices, traditionalists if you like’ (Armitage, 
‘Poetry Inaugural’). 
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traditions of the page, evoking the oxymora of air and ink in his description of her 
poetic craft:  
At another level Kate Tempest has put the body back into poetry, 
bestowing her work with a presence and physicality which, once seen 
and heard, goes on inhabiting the poems through to their printed 
iterations and delivering a tantalizing sense of human proximity when 
many other poets operate at a remote distance and from behind the 
fire curtain of the book, practitioners of a plastic art. Tempest’s poetry 
is made of squeezed air, not smeared ink.43 
Once again by remonstrating with the remoteness of the contemporary page poet 
Armitage is drawing upon the undeniable strength of performance poetry: its 
popular consumption. In doing so he redraws lines and re-presents schemas, the 
force of his rhetoric simultaneously denouncing the current divisions between 
poetry and the reader and casting spoken word as an avatar of the vox populi: ‘The 
numbers are staggering, millions upon millions of people have watched film clips of 
spoken word poets in action in quantities and at a frequency that the poetry world 
has never previously dealt with. Recalibration has been necessary, noughts have 
been added’.44 This comes in the wake of an announcement of his personal reading 
inclinations: ‘A preference for the speaking and singing voice in poetry over the 
written or cerebral voice… a predilection for poems commissioned by the mind but 
designed by the mouth’.45 Armitage’s final salvo, an analysis of Aracelis Girmay’s 
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‘Elegy in Gold’ from the widely acclaimed 2015 anthology The BreakBeat Poets New 
American Poetry in the Age of Hip-Hop46 is a firm indication of Armitage’s 
commitment to bringing together the disparate, previously dissociated elements of 
contemporary poetry. Armitage describes The Breakbeat Poets as ‘brusque in its 
stance and confrontational in its approach’47: one might intuit from this the sense 
that Armitage believes a bit of brusqueness or confrontation would not go amiss in 
the contemporary poetry scene. By this token a necessary space for spoken word 
might become more visible. 
How that space shapes itself, and the complications that arise from the 
attempt, form the basis of my investigation. The structure of my thesis is 
determined by three areas of research divided into the three chapters that follow. 
Chapter one analyses the relationship between the contemporary performance 
poetry scene and the UK academy. This is facilitated by an investigation of the 
relative absence of critical attention to performance poetry48, and the absence of 
performance poetry on UK HE syllabuses, as well as an analysis of what trends in 
twentieth century literary studies may have contributed to this absence. One does 
not have to look far to find examples of critical material which engages with voice in 
                                                          
46 Aracelis Girmay, ‘Elegy in Gold’, in The BreakBeat Poets New American Poetry in the Age of Hip-
Hop, ed. by Kevin Coval, Quraysh Ali Lansana, and Nate Marshall (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2015) 
p.151. 
47 Armitage, ‘Poetry Inaugural’. 
48 While there is certainly a discussion I participate in, extensive critical analysis of performance 
poetry is, I argue, lacking. Examples of contemporary critical approaches to performance poetry 
include texts such as: Don Cusic, The Poet as Performer (Lanham: University Press of America, 1991) 
which seeks to establish individuals who evince characteristics of both categories and from this 
extrapolate a notion of the ‘poet-performer’. However, this does not address the multiplicity of 
approaches to the notion of how a spoken word performer operates which I address in my thesis. 
Equally, Mark Robinson’s edited collection of essays: Mark Robinson, Words Out Loud: Ten Essays 
About Poetry Readings (Exeter: Stride, 2002) offers interesting avenues into the topic, but offers 
(intentionally) a collection of provocations rather than a concerted study.  
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poetics. One of the most prominent examples, Charles Olson’s 1950 manifesto 
‘Projective Verse’, attempts to articulate interlocutions between poetry for the 
page and representation of the voice or breath in the written medium.49 In doing so 
Olson acknowledges that ‘a poem is energy transferred from where the poet got it 
(he will have some several causations), by way of the poem itself to, all the over to, 
the reader’,50  thus opening a space to discuss the vitality of poetry (a vitality I 
discuss in terms of affective potential). Olson’s offers the breath as a vital antidote 
to the stagnation he perceives in the composition and the close reading of verse:  
If I hammer, if I recall in, and keep calling in, the breath, the breathing 
as distinguished from hearing, it is for cause, it is to insist upon a part 
that breath plays in verse which has not (due, I think, to the smothering 
of the power of the line by too set a concept of foot) has not been 
sufficiently observed or practiced, but which has to be if verse is to 
advance to its proper force and place in the day, now, and ahead. I take 
it that PROJECTIVE VERSE teaches, is, this lesson, that that verse will 
only do in which a poet manages to register both the acquisitions of his 
ear and the pressures of his breath.51 
Olson centrally positions the spoken word in the production of verse: ‘breath allows 
all the speech-force of language back in (speech is the ‘solid’ of verse, is the secret 
of a poem’s energy)’52 further offering printed text as an obstruction of sorts, 
                                                          
49 Charles Olson, ‘Projective Verse’, in Collected Prose, ed. by Donald Allen and Benjamin Friedlander 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1997) pp. 239-249. 
50 Olson, p.240. 
51 Olson, p.241. 
52 Olson, p.244. 
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separating reader and writer from the very origin of poetic composition: ‘What we 
have suffered from, is manuscript, press, the removal of verse from its producer 
and its reproducer, the voice, a removal by one, by two removes from its place of 
origin and its destination’.53 In doing so Olson appears to situate himself as a strong 
ally in the defence of performance poetics against a hegemony of the page. 
However, Olson’s theory of projective verse intimately and fundamentally retains 
its connection to the materiality of the page. Olson discusses the typewriter as a 
paradigm shifting invention which lends the poet the ability to materially represent 
orality (breath) through blank space on the page. This is a materiality which is 
coded clearly in terms which distance the poem from the actual bodily 
performance. Olson offers projective verse as a type of musical score: ‘for the first 
time the poet has the stave and the bar a musician has had’, one which acts ‘as a 
scoring to his composition, as a script to its vocalization’.54 The point at which Olson 
critically departs from my analysis of performance poetics lies in this attendance to 
the page. Critical material which recognizes breath, voice, or orality in terms of the 
page exhibits strong links to the sort of research I undertake. However, the 
aforementioned dearth of critical attention to performance is underscored by an 
absence of research focused specifically on the affective, bodily element of live 
performance and the ways in which performance renegotiates occupation and 
utilization of space, two constitutive elements of performance poetry which form 
the second and third chapters of my thesis respectively. As the critic Richard 
Bauman states in his text Verbal Art as Performance (1975) ‘A performance-centred 
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conception of verbal art calls for an approach through performance itself. In such 
an approach, the formal manipulation of linguistic features is secondary to the 
nature of performance, per se, conceived of and defined as a mode of 
communication’.55 From this description of a performance orientated critical 
enquiry I take strong justification for further exploration of the lacuna of 
performance in contemporary poetry criticism.   
Through a deconstruction of the dominant modes of literary criticism in the 
early twentieth century I contend a trajectory of academic attention to text analysis 
which relegated performance as an alternative medium for the study of poetry. The 
main critical focus points of this investigation focus on a comparative transatlantic 
assessment of the work of F. R. Leavis and F. O. Matthiessen.56 I argue that the 
rationale behind the academy’s lack of interest in performance poetry arises from 
the humanities’ complex relationship to value (in a loose binary between arts and 
sciences). I explore this relationship to value further by investigating elitist 
tendencies in academic reception of poetry with specific reference to the work of 
Matthew Arnold, more contemporary focus on poetry debates in the twenty-first 
century, and an investigation into the Two Cultures debate which, through an 
analysis of C.P. Snow, returns my investigation to F. R. Leavis. By positing value as a 
                                                          
55 Richard Bauman, Verbal Art as Performance (Rowley: Newbury House Publishers, 1977) pp.8-9. 
56 Allen Tate’s selected essays On the Limits of Poetry, first published in 1948: Allen Tate, On the 
Limits of Poetry - Selected Essays: 1928-1948 (New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1970) discusses 
the work of these critical figures with a specific contextual perspective on what poetry ought, or 
ought not to do: ‘poetry does not explain our experience. If we begin by thinking that it ought to 
‘explain’ the human predicament, we shall quickly see that it does not, and we shall end up thinking 
that therefore it has no meaning at all’ (Tate, pp.xiv-xv). While Tate’s analysis is at times astute I find 
his general intransigence and bellicose tone difficult to swallow: ‘Lessing says that poetry is not 
painting or sculpture; I am saying in this book, with very little systematic argument, that it is neither 
religion nor social engineering’ (Tate, p.xi). A more salient issue (for the purposes of my thesis) is my 
aversion to Tate’s complete lack of acknowledgment of performance, something of a theme in 
contempory criticism as shall be seen.  
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former, shaper and delineator of modes of textual analysis I advance the notion of a 
pedagogy of performance which holds a degree of value which has been 
fundamentally overlooked by current modes of textual receipt. Subsequently I 
identify potential grounds for this pedagogical framework in the practical theories 
of I. A. Richards. 
David Michael Levin’s Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision (1993) 
recognises the notion that close reading practices privilege the eye over other 
sensory methods of appreciating a poem, notably the ear.57 Sound plays a crucial 
role in the performance of poetry, and I examine this aspect of performance in this 
thesis,58 taking a number of different approaches, with a particular focus on the 
physiological relationship between receiving sound and meaning-making, as 
explored by Reuven Tsur’s What Makes Sound Patterns Expressive (1992)59, 
Brandon LaBelle and Christof Migone’s Writing Aloud: The Sonics of Language 
(2001)60, and David Applebaum’s Voice (1990).61 I believe that this role should not 
be overemphasized. To do so is to risk replacing a dominant mode of understanding 
poetry on the page, a hegemony of the eye, with a potentially equally 
circumscriptive hegemony of the ear. The methodology I utilize intends to extend 
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Stewart, Poetry and the Fate of the Senses (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 
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the understanding of how poetry is received outside of these problematic individual 
sensory fields, predicated upon a notion of the body as a whole as site of reception. 
The body as a site of reception anticipates an examination of affect and affect 
transaction, which forms the second chapter of my investigation. To outline the 
framework of my argument, I use affect to explore the feelings generated by 
spoken word performances in the context of both the performer and the 
recipients.62 Crucially, affect, which the critic Brian Massumi attempts to describe63 
in his 1995 essay ‘The Autonomy of Affect’ is determined as separate from emotion: 
‘Affect is most often used loosely as a synonym for emotion. But one of the clearest 
lessons… is that emotion and affect – if affect is intensity – follow different logics 
and pertain to different orders’.64 This distinction recommends affect as a tool for 
studying performance poetry in an academic context, since it detaches critical 
practice from the complications associated with using emotion as a metric for 
critique and evaluation.65 As Massumi argues:  
An emotion is a subjective content, the socio-linguistic fixing of the 
quality of an experience which is from that point onward defined as 
personal… It is crucial to theorize the difference between affect and 
emotion. If some have the impression that it has waned, it is because 
                                                          
62 I interview a number of spoken word artists throughout my thesis and in particular my enquiries 
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Helier, Jersey: Marc Goldring Books, 1996). 
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(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002). 
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65 See also: Isobel Armstrong, The Radical Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2000) in 
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affect is unqualified. As such, it is not ownable or recognizable, and is 
thus resistant to critique.66  
In the course of my analysis I engage with affect through the investigation of a wide 
range of scholars and critics whose research bisects with affect studies including 
Baruch Spinoza, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Roland Barthes, Bruno Latour, 
and notably Teresa Brennan, whose studies form the backbone of my analysis of 
the material processes of affect in the context of performance poetry. Fundamental 
to this context is the relationship between affect and body, which engages with 
performance on an intrinsic level. The specific value of spoken word is, I argue, 
negotiated through the body of the performer and the language of the poem. 
Poetry, the spoken word in particular, situates itself as a particularly appropriate 
enabler of affective experience because language retains a crucial relationship to 
affect, as Heather Yeung argues in her 2015 text Spatial Engagement with Poetry:  
Language itself, even without aesthetic pretensions, is an eminent 
producer of affect; affective engagement is the pre-eminent means by 
which we interact with the world. In poetry, affect is produced as much 
through our interaction and engagement with the figure of voice as it is 
through the material and thematic qualities of the poem itself… 
Through the mapping of this vocalic affective engagement we can begin 
to understand the complex feedback loop of aesthetic experience.67 
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The final chapter examines concerns relating to the experiential value 
predicated in my first chapter and the affective material processes articulated in my 
second chapter. The benefit of this methodological approach is that it facilitates an 
exploration of the spaces where performance poetry is enacted.68 Doing so allows 
an interrogation of the merits of performance in transforming the social contexts of 
public spaces. This necessitates a study of how contemporary performance spaces 
have been shaped. I contend that this study is informed particularly by the 
emergence of trends of performance shifting into public spaces during the latter 
half of the nineteenth century in response to the 1843 Theatres Act.69 This historical 
context evokes the complicity of key working class movements such as Chartism in 
bringing performance to wider and more varied audiences and is essential to 
shaping the space for contemporary performance poetry spaces. The critic Mike 
Sanders argues in his essay ‘The platform and the stage: the primary aesthetics of 
Chartism’ that ‘Whereas the Chartist archive contains more than one thousand 
poems and scores of works of prose fiction, it has next to nothing by way of 
dramatic literature’.70 Nevertheless, Sanders suggests a distinct performative 
element of the Chartist aesthetic regardless of this dearth of engagement with 
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traditional theatrical texts; an aesthetic which enables meta-links between 
performance and radical Chartist politics:  
In the case of Chartism, the general absence of a Chartist dramaturgy 
did not arise from an antipathy towards the stage… within Chartism we 
find evidence of an interest in the theatre a recognition of the utility of 
the drama as a means of promoting sociability and generating income at 
a local level and a readiness to use the physical space afforded by 
theatres for meetings where possible.71 
Shifting socio-political utilization of the stage exhibited during the mid-nineteenth 
century by movements such as the Chartists provides important historical context 
for the development of contemporary performance poetics. Sanders provides a 
concentrated comparison of Chartist practice and performance practice, paring 
down constitutive elements to identify a distinct likeness: ‘At a very basic level it is 
possible to identify four structural necessities which the theatre shares with the 
Chartist meeting: a space, a platform, performers and an audience’.72 This 
deconstruction of the traditional theatre space and the concomitant emergence of 
a new performance space is consonant with representations of contemporary 
performance, which also reduces the elements of traditional theatre to better 
enable an affective relationship between performer and audience. Of course there 
is a broken line between the kind of radical social use of performance space 
exhibited by the Chartists in the mid-nineteenth century and contemporary uses of 
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social space for poetry performance, a break I examine in more detail over the 
course of my investigation. Suffice to say that the waning of Chartism until the 
eventual emergence of radical performance may be understood, as Sanders argues, 
in the context of a shift against feeling: 
Both spectacle and melodrama are committed to an embodied or 
visceral form of politics, a politics of affect – politics as felt. In contrast, 
the emerging (and soon to be dominant) ‘liberal politics’ of the early 
Victorian period understands itself as primarily a rational contest, a 
struggle over meaning, and appears to champion a politics of rational 
persuasion: that is, a somewhat cooler and more cerebral politics of the 
mind… somewhere around the mid-nineteenth century there is a 
discernible shift in the forms of political oratory symbolised by the 
increasing importance given to the presentation of ‘evidence’.73 
Further to this, as I discuss in chapter three of my thesis, the mid-nineteenth 
century movement of performance from traditional theatre spaces to social spaces 
articulated by Jacky Bratton in her essay ‘The music hall’74 potentially carries 
inherent issues of class and capital. As Caroline Radcliffe suggests in her essay 
‘Theatrical hierarchy, cultural capital and the legitimate / illegitimate divide’:  
The music hall’s increasingly persuasive bid to obtain a ‘free trade’ in 
drama… as opposed to the dramatic theatre’s adamantly protectionist 
response, not only demonstrates the deep-rooted historical divide 
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between the ‘dramatic’ and the ‘popular’ theatres of the late 
nineteenth century but also further reveals an embedded cultural and 
ideological status based both on British hierarchical structures and the 
centrality of cultural capital to the dramatic theatre. The nature of the 
music hall as a nascent ‘mass’ entertainment led to further divisions 
within the popular and dramatic theatres, leading contemporary critics 
of the growing industry to question its authenticity and artistic validity 
in the light of its success as a contemporary viable entertainment.75 
Radcliffe’s discussion acknowledges the potentiality of sublimating performance 
poetics within means of production and consumption. However, I argue against 
such a materialist interpretation by foregrounding a phenomenological 
understanding of the experience of the poetry performance. My analysis 
undertakes to unpack the common presentation of the festival space in the work of 
key spatial theorists: Michel Foucault, Henri Lefebvre, and Martin Heidegger. 
Although these theorists adopt Marxist structures (in the case of Lefebvre in 
particular) I separate the presentation of the festive space as outside frameworks of 
consumption and thus capable of dis-alienating the everyday, a process which the 
performance of poetry abets in various fundamental ways.  
Through each of the three elements of my critical enquiry I hope to 
reconsider the ways in which performance poetry has been undervalued critically, 
underestimating the role it could potentially play in the contemporary poetic 
                                                          
75 Caroline Radcliffe, ‘Theatrical hierarchy, cultural capital and the legitimate / illegitimate divide’, in 
Politics, performance and popular culture: Theatre and society in nineteenth-century Britain, ed. by 
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landscape. Ultimately my intention is to present a body of research that will allow 
scholars to abrogate misgivings about the value and relevance of performance 
mediums within contemporary UK poetry, and establish their importance in shaping 
future UK poetics. This includes an investigation of the teaching of performance 
poetry in the academy in the UK, and an analysis of the merits of performance 
poetry as pedagogic methodology and as affective experience. 
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Chapter one 
Performance poetry and the Academy 
 
Establishing a clear picture of the contemporary academic reception of 
performance poetry requires an investigation of how poetry has been understood 
in the academy, particularly in the humanities, over the last few decades. My 
analysis of the reception of contemporary performance poetry in the UK in relation 
to both audiences and participants has revealed a number of suggestive binaries, 
including high/low, page/stage, and instrumental/intrinsic values. Of particular 
interest to the structural frame of a discourse between academic receipts and 
general receipts of spoken word is the relationship between ‘high’ and ‘popular’ art, 
and how this binary is represented by the consumers of performance poetry under 
the auspices of larger questions concerning value in the study of the arts. The 
Poetry Slam, as a forerunner of contemporary performance poetry, was cultivated 
as a way to allow poetry enthusiasts to view and to practice poetry outside of 
academia which was perceived by Slam practitioners to be elitist, restricting critical 
appreciation of poetry to a minority of qualified readers. Though simplified here, 
the extent of the non-mutuality between academic reception and public reception, 
and potential solutions to the problematic placement of performance poetry 
shapes my analysis in my first chapter.76 To outline this chapter in brief, I present a 
summary of the structure of my discussion. 
                                                          
76 The reason I designate this placement as problematic relates to a sense of the oddness of the 
lacuna of critical work surrounding performance poetry, a point acknowledged by the critic Don 
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In order to concentrate on the role and development of the discussion of 
performance poetry in the UK academy I contend that the British critic F. R. Leavis 
presents an effective point of first inquiry. Even if, as shall be seen, Leavis’s 
relationship with the performance of poetry may be problematic, Leavis 
acknowledged (and excoriated) the state of modern poetry in his 1932 text New 
Bearings in English Poetry:  
‘No one could be seriously interested in the great bulk of the verse that 
is culled and offered to us as the fine flower of modern poetry. For the 
most part it is not so much bad as dead – it was never alive[...] Even 
such genuine poetry as the anthologies of modern verse do contain is 
apt, by its kind and quality, to suggest that the present age does not 
favour the growth of poets’.77 
Leavis thus locates himself as an apposite point of reference in a discussion of 
difficulties and potential changes to the critical landscape of poetics. Following my 
analysis of Leavis’s 1969 text Revaluation78 exploring Leavis’s understanding of the 
work of Donne, Dryden, Eliot, Milton, and Swinburne I present a proposition (my 
own revaluation) regarding the influence of Leavis upon the English literary 
academy. These approaches, in response to Modernist experimentation (which 
notably includes the transformative potential of spoken word) were analogous to 
                                                          
Cusic in his text The Poet as Performer (1991): ‘It seems ironic that so much emphasis today in the 
criticism of poetry is placed on the written world while performances are basically ignored, 
especially since poetry comes from an oral tradition. Yet, though critics deal with the written word, 
poetry still must somehow keep touch with its oral tradition’ (Cusic, p.106). 
77F.R. Leavis, New Bearings in English Poetry (London: Faber and Faber, 2008), pp.11-12. 
78 F.R. Leavis, Revaluation: Tradition and Development in English Poetry (London: Chatto & Windus, 
1969). 
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the synchronic development of a study of literature in the US which was much 
more suited to representing the shifts and intercessions of Modernist influences 
upon the literary canon. In the case of the US academy I locate my analysis around 
the critic F.O. Matthiessen.79 Comparing Leavis and Matthiessen, and their 
respective approaches, I advance reasons for the disparity of representation of 
performance poetry in the UK and US academies. The notion of an influencing 
factor shaping the presence and role of performance poetry in the academy can be 
borne out both in an analysis of the lack of contemporary proponents of spoken 
word within the UK academy, and an analysis of the perspectives of some of the 
exemplars. I include my interview with Lucy English from Bath Spa University, who 
teaches a module entitled Performance Poetry to highlight the potential place 
performance could occupy within the UK academy.  
Once I have established an outline of the current engagement of 
performance poetry in the academy I address the indicative factors which 
constitute the high and low art binary. From the perspective of critic Marjorie 
Perloff, Modernist poetics introduces related questions of community and 
distribution, and the space Modernism affords for the exploration of performance 
poetry is intimately tied to these issues. In her 1991 text Radical Artifice80 Perloff 
deplores the prize-winning uniformity and tacit unoriginality that she believes to be 
a hallmark of the 21st century poetry scene in her 2012 article ‘Poetry on the Brink: 
                                                          
79 My reading of Matthiessen’s pedagogy focuses particularly on a close reading of his essay ‘The 
Responsibilities of the Critic’: F.O. Matthiessen. ‘The Responsibilities of the Critic’, in Michigan 
Alumnus Quarterly Review, vol. 55. Issue 24, (1949) pp.283-292. 
80 Marjorie Perloff, Radical Artifice: Writing Poetry in the Age of Media (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991). 
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Reinventing the Lyric’.81 This essay, and the debate generated by two responses: 
Matvei Yankelevich’s ‘The Gray Area: An Open Letter to Marjorie Perloff’ (2012)82, 
and Eileen Myles’s ‘Painted Clear, Painted Black’ (2013)83, form the locus of a 
discussion which directs my analysis towards the problematic relationship between 
the contemporary spoken word scene and the question of academic elitism. To 
reference a quote from Eileen Myles’s article; the current method for the 
assessment of quality in poetry becomes indivisible from the individual, quality 
becomes less an objective assessment, more a question of ‘the quality of ones 
feelers’.84 With this notion problematizing debates regarding contemporary elitism 
in the appreciation of the arts (and thus circumscribing meaningful discussions 
about the inclusion of performance poetry) I contend the importance of looking 
back to establish those points where one might identify changes in direction in the 
UK canon and academy which dictated its current shape. 
The subsequent element of my analysis of performance poetics in the 
contemporary UK academy is underpinned by attempts to articulate the possibility 
of a paradigm shift contingent upon the way value is identified. Beginning with the 
critic Matthew Arnold, I trace through Arnold’s elitist overtures in his text Culture 
and Anarchy85 a historical context for contemporary iterations of a high/low binary, 
                                                          
81 Marjorie Perloff, ‘Poetry on the Brink: Reinventing the Lyric’, in Boston Review, 18 May 2012 
<https://bostonreview.net/forum/poetry-brink> [accessed 19 February 2014]. 
82 Matvei Yankelevich, ‘The Gray Area: An Open Letter to Marjorie Perloff’, in Los Angeles Review of 
Books, 13 July 2012 < https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/the-gray-area-an-open-letter-to-marjorie-
perloff/#!> [accessed 19 February 2014]. 
83 Eileen Myles, ‘Painted Clear, Painted Black’, The Volta, May 2013 < 
http://www.thevolta.org/ewc29-emyles-p1.html> [accessed 19 February 2014]. 
84 Myles, ‘Painted Clear, Painted Black’. 
85 Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy: Rethinking the Western Tradition, ed. by Samuel Lipman 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994). 
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represented by a division between the ‘establishment’ and the ‘provincial’. Of 
particular importance, the rhetoric Arnold later employs in Culture and Anarchy 
may have been influenced by his famous late 1800s debate with the scientist 
Thomas Huxley. The Arnold/Huxley debate, situated in the wake of the Industrial 
Revolution, sought to negotiate the threat that the sciences and technological 
advancement posed to the arts both for the academy and for society as a whole. 
This debate was reflected almost a century later (under comparable atmospheres 
engendered by Modernism and the perceived deprivations of the institution of the 
academy) in the Two Cultures controversy; an argument held between the scientist 
and novelist C. P. Snow and F. R. Leavis. Returning thus to Leavis’s stewardship over 
the English academic canon, I contend that the influences and implications of 
questions which address the larger horizon of a division between the sciences and 
the arts blinds critical faculties to smaller questions of what constitutes the arts. 
Rather than interrogate the value and efficacy of methods of inclusion and 
exclusion within the arts, the academy settles for a particular hegemonic method in 
an attempt to foreclose the arts from the pervasive influences of technological 
development and scientific thought. To recall the paradigm shift I contended, 
where Leavisian criticism failed to acknowledge missed potentials, I argue a 
platform of poetics might have been offered by Leavis’s mentor I. A. Richards in his 
text Practical Criticism86, which may have more willingly accepted the possibilities 
inherent in the performance of poetry. Although Richards exhibited similar elitist 
tendencies to his protégé Leavis, Richards critically departed through the emphasis 
                                                          
86 I. A. Richards, Practical Criticism: A Study of Literary Judgement (London: K. Paul, 1929). 
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he placed on the value of the body in the appreciation of poetry, and of the 
affective education of feelings. Both questions of body and of education are central 
to the role performance poetry plays in contemporary poetics.  
The final aspect of my analysis is shaped by questions Richards raises. To 
restate a binary, value can be determined by two identifiers: things which have 
instrumental value and things which have intrinsic value. In the context of the Two 
Cultures divide, science has always claimed instrumental value, where the arts have 
always been held to exhibit intrinsic value. Contemporary criticism of both the 
value of humanities disciplines, and the role of academic pedagogy in the arts re-
inscribes understanding of this division by questioning the non-negotiation of the 
binary.87 This reflects upon the inclusion of performance poetics within the 
academy by explicit emphasis of the value of spoken word which engages both on a 
bodily (material level) through sensory experience, and holds pedagogical 
implications. These pedagogical implications do not simply relate to the dynamic 
and alternative platform for receiving poetry which spoken word provides, they also 
suggest the instrumental potential of educating our affective capacities, a 
discussion I take up in more detail in the proceeding chapter.  
 
 
 
                                                          
87 For example, see: Frank Donoghue, The Last Professors: The Twilight of the Humanities in the 
Corporate University (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008). 
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F. R. Leavis and F. O. Matthiessen 
 
A certain amount of hostility towards academia was expressed by those who 
developed contemporary spoken word. The father of Slam, poet Marc Kelly Smith, 
aligned himself in opposition to academia, which he considered to be venal and 
reductive in its approach to the appreciation of poetry.88 As Cristin O'Keefe 
Aptowicz more diplomatically suggests in her 2008 text Words in Your Face: A 
Guided Tour Through Twenty Years of the New York City Poetry Slam, ‘Smith did not 
think of poetry as something lofty, a refined ideal that people should strive to 
achieve. Rather, he believed that poetry should reflect the core of one's being, that 
it was a raw part of humanity, and that a poet had to be both fearless and dogged 
to tackle it properly’.89 Considering that the origins of the contemporary revival of 
performance poetry are distinguished by a reaction against academic restriction, a 
dialogue between high and popular art seems to be a justified approach, one 
further strengthened by the relative absence of serious and invested studies of 
poetry in a performance medium in academic institutions in the UK especially. 
What I highlight is the conspicuous paucity of genuine critical interest in the 
performance of poetry as a way to receive poetry. Concessions are of course made 
to the orality of poetry (as shall be explored) but the practice of canon construction 
in the West has privileged an examination of poetry that focuses on the long and 
                                                          
88 For a full evaluation of Marc Kelly Smith’s role and relationship with the Slam scene see his 
chapter (including examples of his work and a short essay) in The Spoken Word Revolution: Mark 
Eleveld, and Marc Kelly Smith, ‘Marc Smith’, in The Spoken Word Revolution: slam, hip hop & the 
poetry of a new generation (Naperville: Sourcebooks Inc., 2003), pp.116-130. 
89 Cristin O'Keefe Aptowicz, Words In Your Face: A guided tour through twenty years of the New York 
City Poetry Slam (New York: Soft Skull Press, 2008), pp.117-118. 
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close read, the deep micro-analysis of the poem as a text, as something to be read. 
My contention is that this is a perspective that mishandles the presence of 
performance in the traditions and the development of poetry.  
I believe that the contributions Leavis made to the study of English 
Literature, specifically in the UK, justifies his position as a key compass point for the 
analysis of the trends of critical study in the academy.90 His role as a critic operating 
in the mid-twentieth century positions him specifically as a major influence on the 
development of the UK academy. Further to this, I justify my focus on Leavis 
because of his particular treatment of the oral qualities he considers inherent to the 
construction of poetry. While maintaining the importance of the sound behind the 
poetic line, as will be seen in my analysis of his second major critical text 
Revaluation, he abdicates the responsibility of representing the product, the 
performance of poetry, out of the purview of English Studies, on grounds that this 
aspect falls within the province of the theatre.  
According to Leavis ‘[The critic] endeavours to see the poetry of the present 
as continuation and development; that is, as the decisive, the most significant, 
contemporary life of tradition’.91 The supposition of a dead history of poetry 
spanning back through literate society is for Leavis a misconstruction; poetry’s life is 
‘in the present or nowhere; it is alive in so far as it is alive for us’.92 Leavis proposes 
                                                          
90 For more evidence of this justification see, for example: S. Krishnamoorthy Aithal. ‘F. R. Leavis on 
the function of criticism’, English Studies, Volume 62. Issue 3 (1981) pp.299-309; R.P. Bilan. The 
Literary Criticism of F.R. Leavis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Dennis Ford. ‘F. R. 
Leavis: The Critic as Moralist’, Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Volume 65. Issue 2 (1982), pp. 
168-180. 
91 Leavis, Revaluation, p.1. 
92 Leavis, Revaluation, p.2. 
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thus that the aim of the critic is ‘to define, and to order in terms of its own implicit 
organization, a kind of ideal and impersonal living memory’.93 The critical method 
proposed could be accepted as a valid one, but only if one first accepts that the 
‘living memory’, this developing trajectory, the essential structure, could in reality 
be either ideal or impersonal. Though mindful of his own potential shortcomings, 
Leavis still posits his critical approach from a position that fails to accredit the 
relevance of performance in the practice and receipt of poetry.94 This is an absence 
which struggles to be accommodated by the necessary employment of self–
perception and the discrimination of relevance: ‘the rule of the critic is, or should (I 
think) be, to work as much as possible in terms of particular analysis- analysis of 
poems or passages, and to say nothing that cannot be related immediately to 
judgements about producible texts’.95 Though Leavis’s intention may not have been 
to highlight and to foreground the text as the sole communicator, the assertion 
betrays the conspicuousness of the absence of a committed ear to performance in 
the critical method. 
The concession, as offered above, is that the kind of critical approach taken 
by Leavis and other contemporaries96 writing in the tradition of ‘serious’ canon 
                                                          
93 Leavis, Revaluation, p.2. 
94 To treat Leavis fairly, he does not offer the pretence that the account contained in Revaluation is 
comprehensive, exhaustive, or without personal inflection: ‘I think it is the business of the critic to 
perceive for himself, to make the finest and sharpest relevant discriminations, and to state his 
findings as responsibly, clearly and forcibly as possible. Then even if he is wrong he has forwarded 
the business of criticism- he has exposed himself as openly as possible to correction; for what 
criticism undertakes is the profitable discussion of literature. Anyone who works strenuously in the 
spirit of this conception must expect to be accused of being both dogmatic and narrow, though, 
naturally, where my own criticism is concerned I think the accusations unfair’ (Leavis, Revaluation, 
pp.8-9). 
95 Leavis, Revaluation, pp.2-3. 
96 For other US and UK canon building see, for example: Yvor Winters, Forms Of Discovery (Chicago: 
Alan Swallow, 1967) or Harold Bloom, The Western Canon (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1994). 
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building does make allowance for the oral quality of words as a means to pursue an 
understanding of the poem as a text. However, this is by no means an impartial 
treatment of the importance of performance. There are times when Leavis offers a 
hint towards some awareness of the potentiality of poetry off the page, but these 
fleeting references to performance are always encoded under wide, vague 
intimations of ‘theatricality’, and of ‘public voice’. It is important not to forget that 
the notion reinforcing Leavis’s approach is that of a text-based study of poetry. 
Unsurprisingly Leavis reaches out to T.S. Eliot97 for support in a critique of the 
overly poetic Augustan Tradition, and in doing so, once again inadvertently 
underpins the absence of performance in his critical study: ‘And to have the virtues 
of good prose is the first and minimum requirement of good poetry’.98 The dialogue 
extant is between two written modes – the presence of performance does not 
figure in the negotiation. 
Leavis’s discussion of John Donne’s work in Revaluation brings into play the 
immediacy of the speaking voice to poetry: ‘Donne uses in complete dissociation 
from music a stanza-form that proclaims the union of poetry and music. The 
dissociation is positive; utterance, movement and intonation are those of the 
talking voice’.99 It would appear that Leavis offers support for performance in 
poetry, movement towards the talking voice is a positive step away from an 
unusual homogeneity of artistic forms. However, this is not a re-conquest of the 
                                                          
97 The maxim Leavis replicates can be found in Eliot’s introduction to a 1930 edition of Samuel 
Johnson, London: A Poem and The Vanity of Human Wishes (London: Etchells and MacDonald, 1930). 
98 Leavis, Revaluation, p.122. 
99 Leavis, Revaluation, p.11. 
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voiced performance of poetry as the assertion cannot escape the boundaries of 
Leavis’s preconceived categorizations:  
Indeed, the subtleties of Donne’s use of the speaking voice and the 
spoken language are inexhaustible – or might, by a reasonable 
hyperbole, be called so, if we were not reminded of Shakespeare. For of 
Shakespeare we are, in fact, notably reminded. Whether or not Donne 
did actually get anything from dramatic verse can only be a matter of 
speculation, but his own verse – the technique, the spirit in which the 
sinew and living nerve of English are used – suggests an appropriate 
development of impressions that his ear might have recorded in the 
theatre.100  
Spoken language, the insistence of a voice so pleasing to discover in Donne’s 
poetry, cannot be assessed without reference to the theatre and to dramatic verse. 
Contexts of performance do not belong to the world of poetry, but to the world of 
theatre, and only in the theatre might they find their ideal vessel. 
This analysis began in reference to a conflict of ‘high’ versus ‘popular’ art. The 
necessity of staging that dialogue becomes apparent when one considers Leavis’s 
treatment of the seventeenth century poets Edmund Waller and John Dryden. 
Leavis is critical of Waller’s refinement of the ‘line of wit’ to something 
comparatively lacking in finesse and sensitivity. Of Waller’s verse, Leavis suggests: 
‘The taste to which it appeals has limitations of the general kind intimated by “fine 
                                                          
100 Leavis, Revaluation, p.12. 
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ear”’.101 The fine ear Leavis refers to here is that of a poet such as Tennyson or 
Robert Browning.  The implication of a statement such as this seems to support my 
reading of Leavis as elitist, reserving the choicest of critical attention to the ‘finest’ 
poets. Leavis continues by positing a comparison between Dryden’s ‘slack and 
monotonous’ verse, and the ‘greater fineness and profundity of organization, a 
much greater intensity of art’ that can be observed in the poetry of Alexander 
Pope.102 Crucial to an investigation of performance, Leavis states the following: ‘The 
comparison, of course, is unfair: Dryden’s effects are all for the public ear – for the 
ear in public (so to speak)’.103 Here Leavis is explicitly conflating a lack of finesse to 
the poetic verse intended for public consumption, a move which can of course still 
be recognized in more contemporary critiques of performance poetry, for example 
Mark Edmunson’s 2013 article ‘Poetry Slam: Or, the decline of American Verse’: 
‘Still, it’s palpably the case that the poets who now get the balance of public 
attention and esteem are casting unambitious spells’.104 Once again, Leavis cannot 
discuss performance without reference to the theatre: ‘what more can one demand 
of dramatic verse than that it should be good verse of the theatre, giving nothing 
more than, well declaimed, can be appreciated on a first hearing?’105 Dryden, 
whose genius Leavis claims ‘comes out in a certain native English strength’106, a 
                                                          
101 Leavis, Revaluation, p.30. 
102 Leavis, Revaluation, p.31. 
103 Leavis, Revaluation, pp.31-32. 
104 Mark Edmundson, ‘Poetry Slam: Or, the decline of American Verse’, Harper’s Magazine, 6 July 
2013 <http://harpers.org/archive/2013/07/poetry-slam/> [accessed 6 July 2016]. Edmundson’s 
essay has recently been excoriated by the critic Ben Lerner in his 2016 text The Hatred of Poetry. 
Lerner deconstructs Edmundson’s criticism of popular and mainstream contemporary poetics such 
as performance poetry suggesting that ‘Edmundson lacks a perfect contempt for the actual 
examples he considers; he confuses the Poem you sing in the dream with the poem you sing by the 
fire’. Ben Lerner, The Hatred of Poetry (London: Fitzcarraldo Editions, 2016), pp.84-85. 
105 Leavis, Revaluation, p.32. 
106 Leavis, Revaluation, p.31. 
47 
 
capacity to manipulate the orality of the English language, is suited to certain tasks, 
to certain modes of writing. But for Leavis, these modes do not fall under the 
purview of fine poetry.107 The issue presented is the association Leavis makes 
between Eliot’s ‘dissociation of sensibility’108 and a mode of writing suited to the 
public, which, in Leavis’s own examples is notionally characterized by theatricality 
and by attention to the spoken voice in the composition of the poetic line. The 
subtext is the intimation that intellect can only be married to the emotional 
experience as per Eliot’s incitement, by a poetry that is aimed away from the public 
ear: ‘Something that might well be covered by the phrase is the development, in 
the spirit of Waller’s ‘reform’, of a verse that, as was loosely said, appeals only to 
the public- or, it might be better to say, social- ear’.109 
This is of course a simplification as Leavis turns critical attention against 
poets, Milton being chief among them, who fail to recognize the importance of the 
spoken voice in the context of the poem: ‘The extreme and consistent remoteness 
of Milton’s medium from any English that was ever spoken is an immediately 
relevant consideration’.110 In a reactionary move against the Miltonic ‘Grand 
Style’111, Leavis argues quite aggressively for the spoken language encoded within 
                                                          
107 Discussing Dryden’s public work Leavis suggests that: ‘Dryden’s satiric pamphlets were, we can 
see, magnificently effective for their purpose; and read in the appropriate spirit, they are 
magnificently effective now. But the appropriate spirit is not that which Pope demands; we are not 
to strain the inner ear (if the convenient expression may be allowed to pass) as if, behind the 
immediate effect, there were a fine organization’ (Leavis, Revaluations, p.32). 
108 T.S. Eliot, ‘The Metaphysical Poets’, in Selected Essays, 3rd ed. (London: Faber & Faber, 1951), pp. 
281–91. 
109 Leavis, Revaluation, p.33. 
110 Leavis, Revaluation, p.51. 
111 See Samuel Johnson’s famous apothegm: ‘Milton, Madam, was a genius that could cut a Colossus 
from a rock; but could not carve heads upon cherry- stones’ quoted in James Boswell’s The Life of 
Samuel Johnson first published in 1791. James Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson, Volume 4. 
(London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2008), p.305. 
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poetry: ‘subtlety of movement in English verse depends upon the play of the 
natural sense movement and intonation against the verse structure, and that 
‘natural,’ here, involves a reference more or less direct, to idiomatic speech’.112 
Once again, in a now familiar move, Leavis invokes the ‘theatricality’ of the 
Shakespearean tradition to justify his denunciation of Milton: ‘That is why even in 
the most lively books of Paradise Lost the verse, brilliant as it is, has to the ear that 
appreciates Shakespeare a wearying deadness about it’.113 There are, then, no 
totalizing implications for the manifestation of the spoken word in poetry, the 
doors to the canon are not closed to the oral, the voiced, embedded at the centre 
of the poet’s craft. However, the problem remains that Leavis singularly fails to 
offer even the suggestion of performed poetry as a medium worthy of approaching 
critically without a relationship to the theatre, and to dramatic verse. It is as if the 
notion of the spoken voice, outside of its contribution to an analysis of text, must 
be divorced from the business of the literary critic. Presentation of poetry as an oral 
form, a form to be performed, is undermined by an insistence on the minutiae of 
the close reading; the critic an arbiter of the written word. Here of course is the 
distinction between the close reading of the literary text and the performance of 
the poem. The performance is weighed in relation to its audience, and the audience 
is an indivisible part of that poem. Leavis, nose firmly buried in the book, disregards 
the potential emotional valences of a poem that act external to the lines on the 
page: ‘the elucidations of a poet’s soul that are not controlled by the literary critic’s 
                                                          
112 Leavis, Revaluation, p.53. 
113 Leavis, Revaluation, p.54. 
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attention to poetry will hardly, whatever they may be worth, turn out to be 
concerned wholly, or even mainly, with the soul of the poet’.114 
I pass through much of the chronological assessment of the movements of 
English poetry that constitutes Revaluation, to highlight a specific extract from 
Leavis’s brief analysis of the poetry of Algernon Charles Swinburne. Leavis offers a 
particular line from Swinburne’s Atalanta in Calydon (1865): ‘the brown bright 
nightingale amorous’115 and suggests that, in selecting ‘bright’ from a host of 
adjectives, Swinburne is displaying a tendency to privilege the sound of words over 
the sense of the line: ‘We have here a further justification for calling Swinburne 
‘verbal’; it is plain that, in his poetry, one word will bring in a train of others less 
because of meaning than because they begin with the same letter or chime with 
like sounds’.116 Whether or not it is reasonable to admonish Swinburne for a lazy 
inattention to the meaning of his poetry, the deployment of the word ‘verbal’ is, I 
believe, telling. This kind of critical approach denotes suspicion over the application 
of the spoken voice.117 Despite the arguments that Leavis makes, which hinge on a 
criticism of Swinburne’s enthusiasm for privileging sound over sense, establishing a 
frustration with poetry which evoked musicality but which held no serious meaning, 
                                                          
114 Leavis, Revaluation, p.242. 
115 Algernon Charles Swinburne. Atalanta in Calydon: A Tragedy (London: John Camden Hotten, 
1866), p.4. 
116 Leavis, Revaluation, p.240. 
117 Leavis is not alone in this mistrust of the musicality of Swinburne’s poetry, as the critic Edward 
Thomas notes in his 1912 text Algernon Charles Swinburne: A Critical Study: ‘Swinburne has almost 
no magic felicity of words. He can astonish and melt but seldom thrill, and when he does it is not by 
any felicity of as it were God-given inevitable words. He has to depend on sound and an atmosphere 
of words which is now and then concentrated and crystallized into an intensity of effect which is 
almost magical, perhaps never quite magical. This atmosphere comes from a vocabulary very rich in 
words connected with objects and sensations and emotions of pleasure and beauty, but used, as I 
have said, somewhat lightly and even in appearance indiscriminately. No poet could be poorer in 
brief electric phrases, pictorial, or emotional.’ Edward Thomas, Algernon Charles Swinburne: A 
Critical Study (London: M. Secker, 1912), pp.96-97. 
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it would be imprudent to deny the categorical position behind all literate art and 
culture that orality occupies. The critic must make concession to the importance of 
orality as a valuable aspect in the construction of the written line. However, beyond 
this, especially in an undertaking such as that of Revaluation, to shape and posit a 
definable canon from the hinterland of the history of poetry, the critic must divest 
himself of a pre-requisite attendance to that which doesn’t necessarily fit. For 
Leavis, the unsatisfactory poet has failed to attend to meaning as sharply as to the 
oral qualities or the mellifluousness of the poem. This is of course forbidden, the 
poet is denounced (as in the above case) as ‘verbal’ and suspicion of the motives of 
the poet is established.  
This is one model of poetry, a model limited in scope, by certain inhibitions 
that frustrate an open welcome of performance as a mode of critically thinking 
about and talking about poetry. It is of course paramount to recognize that 
although the sedimentation of a Western literary canon that underrepresents 
performance problematizes critical response, there have been developments that 
privilege interest in performance, though often tied implicitly to developments in 
oral theory.118 In his 1972 article Modernism and Postmodernism: Approaching the 
Present in American Poetry, David Antin posed the notion that the speech act has 
overwhelming poetic potential: ‘Poetry is made by a man up on his feet, talking’.119 
Shifting the admittedly problematic gendering of this statement to one side there is 
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patently a representation of the business of poetry that firmly privileges practice 
through performance. 
This conspicuous reluctance to attend to the performance aspects and 
practices of poetics is a tacit correlative of Leavis’s general disdain for the theatre. 
Revaluation offers evidence of this in his repeated attempts to disengage from a 
discussion of the relationship between poetry and theatre past a recognition of 
their contiguity. Michael Bell observes in his chapter in The Cambridge History of 
Literary Criticism entitled ‘F.R. Leavis’: ‘[Leavis’s] well known indifference to 
theatre, and his hostility to the histrionic character as he saw it in Joyce, Yeats, or 
Shakespeare’s Othello arise from a related concern for inwardness and authenticity 
of response’.120 As an explication for this stance, Bell offers the following: 
Criticism and interpretation, for Leavis, are subsumed into a sensitive 
reading. And the compelling image here is the theatrical performance of 
a dramatic text. But while Leavis’s reading is enactive, it is not 
histrionically projected. It is essentially his reading in the mind. He seeks 
to let us share an exemplary reading in which the functions of director, 
actor, and audience are all aspects of an imaginary re-enactment within 
a single consciousness. There is thus a tension between Leavisian reading 
and theatre proper, and the collaborative and vicarious nature of theatre 
must surely have been part of his unease with it. The problem with 
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theatre is that, as an act of reading, it is not only vicarious, it is literally 
directed by someone else.121 
Whether the ‘histrionic’ projection of theatre is a reliable value judgement when 
extended to poetic performance is a larger and more ponderous question. What is 
immediately clear however is that Leavis’s disregard for this aspect of the relation of 
poetry is a result of personal suspicions about the reason behind the work. Bell 
concludes that an inward reluctance to collaborate in the performance of a poem or 
a dramatic piece was a result of Leavis’s extreme antithesis toward ‘the corruption 
of critical and artistic values by those of class and careerism’122 a feature of the 
English academy which Leavis came to see as endemic later in his career. The spoken 
voice is critically absent from Leavis’s study as it offers an unregulated medium, one 
which threatens the closed space of a Leavisian critical approach – opening the poem 
to the threat of manipulation. Though Leavis’s interests were directed towards the 
creative sincerity of the artist he was ‘entirely committed to an inductive reading 
whereby all significance is found within the text’.123  
This highly controlled structure of reading addresses a fundamental aspect of 
Leavis’s close engagement with New Criticism. The formalist New Critical movement, 
which took its name from John Crowe Ransom’s 1941 text The New Criticism124, was 
particularly dominant in the US academy during the 1940s and 1950s. It must be 
stressed that Leavisian criticism cannot be considered directly equivalent to New 
Criticism, with some critics highlighting Leavis’s detachment from the notion of 
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established critical approaches altogether.125 However, there are certainly distinct 
contiguities to be found in a mutual, close critical focus on the text which has led to 
a firm association being drawn between Leavis and the New Critical movement. As 
Raman Selden writes in A Reader’s Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory, Leavis 
became ‘the major single target for the New Critical theory of the 1970s and 
beyond’.126 Whether Leavis’s critical approach specifically, or the New Critical mode 
in general, the revolution in literary criticism attended by the propagation of similar 
techniques of close reading came under significant scrutiny from figures such as 
Helen Gardner, C.S. Lewis, Paul de Man, and Graham Hough, arguing that such 
criticism threatened to be prescriptive.127 As Wallace Martin argues in his essay 
‘Criticism and the academy’ under this model the critic ran the risk of ‘trying to do 
the reader’s reading for him’.128  
The advent of New Criticism within the academy in the middle decades of the 
twentieth century is of paramount importance to the development of the oeuvre of 
Modernist poetics, and the role of performance therein. As stated, Leavis is by no 
means an exact analogue for New Criticism, nor indeed the sole exemplar of a similar 
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critical approach.129 However, his critical perspective, and the importance of his 
canonizing ‘Great Tradition’ to the development of the British academy is 
incontrovertible.130 This period also saw the critic afforded new responsibilities: 
‘Given the difficulties that modernism presents to readers, the critic’s task is to posit 
principles that will make texts accessible. It involves poetic interpretation, as well as 
evaluation and clarification of the bearing that modernist content has on modern 
life’.131 The awakening of New Criticism as a university discipline, and its subsequent 
period of hegemony in the academy was a response to the narrowness of vision 
perceived as a flaw in the traditional critical approach: ‘The refusal of the 
professoriate to admit that its purportedly factual scholarship and critical 
impressionism were based on unacknowledged ideological commitments was what 
proved so irritating to its critics – then as now’.132 New Criticism was a tool to examine 
the self-contained, self-referential body of the text, without the bias of a 
historiographical or a philological methodology, intent on categorizing, enabling a 
derivative progression of literary study. Leavis’s alignment with New Criticism is 
mediated by a joint obsession with close reading, and with the aesthetic experience 
of the poetry as experiences in and of themselves, without a prerequisite recognition 
of the history and the traditions that shaped the context of the writing. The 
development of a critical study of Modernist poetics paralleled the development of 
New Criticism in the academy. By the time that institutions were focusing on 
                                                          
129 For further prominent Anglo-American New Criticism see: William Empson, Seven Types of 
Ambiguity (London: Chatto & Windus, 1930); Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, 
Understanding Poetry (New York: H. Holt and Co, 1938). 
130 For a measured, yet ultimately persuasive account of Leavis’ importance see: Ian Gregor, ‘F.R. 
Leavis and “The Great Tradition”’, in The Sewanee Review, Volume 93. Issue 3 (1985), pp.434-446. 
131 Martin, p.294. 
132 Martin, p.290. 
55 
 
Modernist criticism as a dominant critical discourse, the orthodoxy of the New 
Critical approach was underway. Martin argues that this contiguity was a natural 
development:  
Although the complexity of much modern poetry makes it 
understandable that courses in the subject should have emphasized 
poetics and interpretation, this emphasis also gave professors something 
to teach. Simple lyrics that require no biographical or historical 
commentary leave all but the subtlest readers with little to say.133 
The freedom and the progression that Modernism engendered offered much needed 
reinforcement to the representation of spoken voice and performance in poetry.134 
However, its tentative alliance with this new mode of critical attention was not 
necessarily the productive relationship that it appeared to be. In his essay ‘The critic 
and society, 1900-1950’ Morris Dickstein highlights a distinction between 
Modernism’s principles, and the intended products of New Criticism as a 
methodological approach to unpacking a text: ‘The New Criticism built an exegetical 
bridge between the modern writers and their rejected audience, but it did so at the 
expense of some larger, less instructional aims of criticism’.135 Dickstein elucidates 
this shift by drawing attention to the critical work of American scholar F.O. 
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Matthiessen, who, by 1949, had reached a point of disenchantment with what he 
perceived as the dogmatism of the close reading approach:  
As we watch our generation producing whole anthologies of criticism 
devoted to single contemporary authors and more and more detailed 
books of criticism of criticism, we should realize that we have come to 
the unnatural point where textual analysis seems to be an end in itself.136  
The conclusion regarding New Criticism which Dickstein drew from Matthiessen’s last 
major essay The Responsibilities of the Critic (1949) before the latter’s suicide in 1950 
was that ‘A movement that had come to challenge the old undiscriminating 
journalism, caught up entirely in the hubbub of the present, and the old historical 
scholarship, which left the writers of the past safely immured in the past, had itself 
become pedantic, mechanical, predictable’.137 Matthiessen’s influence on studies of 
Modernism in the US is of critical importance when posited alongside the 
contributions made by Leavis in the UK.138 Indeed, the parallels between Leavis’s 
position in relation to the UK canon and Matthiessen’s exercises in the US are further 
concretized when we consider that, as Leavis had done for UK criticism, 
Matthiessen’s influence on the direction of critical attention in the US academy 
remained substantial for a significant period. From the late 1930s to 1940s, 
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Matthiessen, and later the aligned critical theories of Lionel Trilling, defined the 
academic syllabus in the US for over three decades.139 
Despite their contemporaneity, the formalist contention articulated in 
Matthiessen’s critical work is, I believe, a radical departure from the Leavisian close 
reading and the orthodoxy of New Critical approaches. A natural dissonance in the 
apparent fellowship of Modernism and a New Critical approach was that by 
eschewing a holistic knowledge of literary tradition New Critics were left ill-prepared 
for the predilection of Modernist writers to rely upon this knowledge. Martin furthers 
this argument:  
One paradoxical result of the emphasis on recent literature in the 
curriculum, at the expense of courses in earlier periods, was that it 
created a situation in which modernism was scarcely intelligible to 
students: an attempt to explain the allusions that puzzle them in Pound 
and Eliot becomes a pointless effort to reconstruct the entire literary 
tradition in brief. Desperate remedies, such as courses in world literature, 
the Bible, and the epic, merely add to the randomness of a curriculum 
already replete with attractive alternatives.140 
Modernist poetry could be opaque precisely because it frequently cited a specific 
literary tradition. It did so as oblique allusion or intertextuality, positioning itself as a 
participant in the continuation of a literary tradition, for which an encompassing 
awareness of said tradition was a prerequisite for understanding. A lack of 
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cognizance with the hypotext necessarily renders the hypertext to a greater degree 
inscrutable.141 The conclusion I contend is that the New Critical approach to literary 
studies was not the most suitable tool to use when analysing Modernist literature. 
The proposition that Matthiessen may present an American alternative to 
Leavis’s formalization of a canon in the UK may understandably come in for similar 
criticism, however the distinction lies in the significant rise of a new critical area: 
American Studies.142 Fed in part by dissatisfaction evident in the UK academies 
between New Criticism and the traditional mode, American Studies was: ‘an effort 
to overcome the hardening of disciplinary boundaries of literature and history and to 
see American culture as an organic whole’.143 Matthiessen was one of a number of 
critics who fostered this effort. American Studies also owes its successes to critics 
such as Vernon Louis Parrington, and Constance Rourke144, however Matthiessen 
proved the greater influence due in part to his flexibility and his ability to adapt to, 
or exceed the limits of New Criticism. One can see in Matthiessen a hybridization of 
formalist close reading and the less dogmatic aspects of biographical and critical 
attention, as Dickstein comments: 
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To a remarkable degree, Matthiessen created American literature as a 
subject for academic study. He did this by establishing the formal 
complexity and tragic seriousness of a few key writers in a way that 
appealed to the age of modernism – which was also an era of mass 
instruction, when the journalist critic and the ‘common reader’ were 
giving way to the academic expert and his classroom charges. Unlike 
some who followed him, Matthiessen had an extraordinary depth of 
feeling for the writers he discussed.145  
Matthiessen’s focus on both close reading (‘It will be interesting, therefore, to begin 
by seeing how much we can learn about Whitman just by examining his diction’146) 
and his investment in the context of literature situated outside the text (‘The first 
awareness for the critic should be of the works of art of our own time. This applies 
even if he is not primarily a critic of modern literature’147) provided a much more 
suitable tool to balance the catalogue of critical issues surrounding the appreciation 
of Modernist literature.  
The difference between Leavis and Matthiessen and their respective roles in 
shaping an academic canon alongside developments of Modernist poetics can be 
summarized quite simply. The dissonance between the New Critical or Leavisian 
methods and the complexities of a Modernist aesthetic which relied heavily on the 
cognizance of a literary tradition was negotiated more skilfully in the US than in the 
UK. During this period of complex, contrasting and contradicting critical 
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methodologies, Matthiessen proved a better guide. Modernism’s natural 
correlatives evidenced the problematic issue evident in Leavis’s reluctance to adapt 
in the same way Matthiessen had: ‘by the end of the sixties, the increasing 
dominance of Marxist analysis, the impact of feminist and minority ethnic writing, 
and the globalising of literary influence and creation, all made Leavis’s methods and 
concerns seem outdated and parochial’.148 Leavis’s professional isolation in later life, 
and his pronounced turn against Modernism - ‘As a critic of Modernity, Leavis gave 
voice to a deep, almost visceral, loathing’149 - may be evidence of a frustration that 
the rapidly changing face of literary material would not fit with Leavis’s stringent 
approach to criticism and canonization.  
Aligned with the idea of a guiding hand directing critical attention where New 
Criticism and Modernism bisects, the development of performance poetics can 
perhaps be reconsidered. I contend that the development of performance poetry in 
the US, from both an academic and a popular perspective was heavily influenced by 
this formative period of critical re-examination. Rather than mediating critical 
attention through the apparatus of the close reading (exclusive to words on the page) 
Matthiessen and American Studies offered a contextual understanding of the oral 
traditions of poetry in performance. By contrast, the close reading invited only the 
privacy of the reader and the text, where anything external to that dynamic was 
essentially uninvited. Ultimately, the contemporary predilection to provide a 
platform for performance in the US far above any similar opportunities available in 
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the UK may very well have its roots in the conditions fostered by different critical 
approaches in the mid-twentieth century.  
 
 
Performance poetry in the contemporary UK academy 
 
To support my analysis of the current paucity of performance poetry in UK academia 
my research has led me to investigate the small number of academic institutions 
where spoken word is explicitly included on the syllabus.150 Throughout my 
investigation the majority of instances of UK spoken word pedagogy I encountered 
were English or Theatre departments noting performance poetry in passing on syllabi 
for creative writing modules. Concerted study of performance poetry, or of modules 
developed to explore performance practice, even alongside text-based study, was 
conspicuously absent. Leeds Beckett University’s BA (Hons) English with Creative 
Writing course webpage stated that a core module ran entitled Poems: Page & 
Performance. However, on contacting the module convener, Dr. Lucy Burnett (an 
academic with a background in spoken word)151 I was informed that the module titles 
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were only proposed titles, and that the particular module had been retitled: Writing 
Poetry: Voice & Audience.152 Dr. Burnett explained that: ‘The module will involve a 
small amount of consideration of performance poetry but only as a small component 
within a broader context’.153 
Although studies in HE of performance poetry within wider contexts certainly 
gestures towards a recognition of performance poetics in the UK I contend that 
performance poetics as an aesthetic and conceptual medium deserves a more 
established academic platform. During my research I hoped to discover a more 
rigorous pedagogical framework exploring performance poetry in a fuller capacity. 
To this end, my research yielded two particular case studies: Bath Spa University’s BA 
(Hons) Creative Writing, which offers an optional module entitled Performance 
Poetry154, and Goldsmith’s Spoken Word Educator training programme offered as an 
element of its MA Writer/Teacher provision.155 Focusing my analysis initially upon 
Bath Spa University’s Performance Poetry module, on contacting the module 
convener Dr. Lucy English I discovered that alongside her teaching and her position 
as an RLF consultant, she was appointed to the board of governors for Apples and 
Snakes in 2012, one of the largest spoken word collectives in the UK. I interviewed 
English about her teaching practices and the emphasis she places on spoken word, 
pursuing the development of performance poetry practice in the UK academy. I 
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present an explanation of the module as offered by English in order to provide a 
comparative frame of reference: 
The module runs throughout the whole year and has a bi-weekly 
timetable.  In week one we look at some of the current influences on 
spoken word poetry in the UK, starting with the bardic tradition and 
moving forward in time. In the second week we workshop student writing 
which has been inspired by the topic of that week. In the workshops we 
assess work in terms of performance quality, quality of writing, and 
relationship with the audience. Students have four items of assessment, 
a critical study of a poet, a review of events they have attended, a folder 
of creative writing and a live performance. All items are worth 20% of the 
final mark.156 
The inclusion of a weighted, qualitatively assessed element of performance practice 
within the module structure raises questions over the complications of providing a 
frame of reference to assess performance in an academic context. When queried 
whether the lack of a defined structure for qualitative assessment (such as the 
industry surrounding publication) prevented performance poetry from securing a 
place within the academy English responded: 
I get fed up with the academy resistance to performance poetry! There 
are already plenty of models for assessing spoken word poems that can 
be adapted from other art forms, such as theatre, drama and even dance.  
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I have drawn up a set of marking criteria for the module that I would be 
willing to share with you, if you want. I am adamant that quality of writing 
is as important as quality of delivery. The academy tends to regard 
performance poetry as a lesser form of poetry, which is a shame. I have 
also noted than many so called 'page' poets are now adopting techniques 
used by the spoken word posse.157 
Certainly the presence of a set of assessment criteria is an attractive prospect in my 
own development of a more rigorous platform for spoken word pedagogy, however 
it also impinges on the potential necessity to address changes to the academy 
through a loosening of the reliance upon such structures (or a different approach 
altogether which might perhaps combine the two). In response to my enquiries 
regarding the level of experience or familiarity students demonstrated with spoken 
word (particularly in more recent cohorts) English explained that:  
I usually have a mixture of students who have seen or been exposed to 
plenty of performance poetry both live and via Youtube and others who 
have less experience of it. This can vary from year to year. We have an 
energetic spoken word scene amongst the students with an open mic 
night once a month on campus and one in Bath. There are also plenty of 
opportunities to see live poetry in the Bristol/Bath area.  We also run 
'traditional' poetry modules so students who don't like performance 
would not chose my module.158 
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The invocation of traditional poetry (the familiar page and stage binary) invites a 
discussion of the utility of drawing the two apart in an academic context in 
particular. English stated that in her experience ‘Some students find the process of 
performing, rather than 'reading' their work more challenging than others’.159 The 
suggestion was that a tacit relationship between the page and a more conventional 
sense of the reading (out loud) of poetry was distinct from the performance of 
poetry, under the category of performance poetry, or spoken word. When 
questioned whether she thought that the distinction between page and stage 
poetry was helpful or unhelpful in her performance poetry pedagogy English 
responded:  
The way I present it to the students is that there are different audiences 
with different expectations. A 'page' audience does not expect poets to 
jump about, but a poetry 'reading' can be killed dead by bad delivery. 
Stage poetry is also a piece of writing. It is not just funny faces and 
gestures. I expect my students to pay as much attention to the writing 
of their poems as they do to the performance of them.160 
What is particularly cogent in English’s outline of her approach to performance 
pedagogy is the notion of expectation, which forms a correlative with her later point 
about the equal weighting of writing and performance on her module. One could 
easily imagine that the expectations of different audiences are aligned with notions 
which relate to the high versus low art binary. The weighting of performance as equal 
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to the qualitative condition of the writing encourages value to be found in both. This 
of course alludes to the central question in an exploration of the place of 
performance poetry within the academy: can performance poetry be considered 
valuable. When asked whether she thought changes in the way society receives 
poetry (such as a move towards spoken word) needed to be reflected in the way 
poetry is taught, English affirmed: ‘Yes, I do think this. The speaking aloud of poetry 
is not new. Chaucer! Damn it, poetry is meant to be heard as well as read!’.161  
Of course, the potential complication of establishing such a page stage binary 
around the notion of a ‘traditional poetry module’ invites a dangerous conflation of 
tradition and reading from the page. There are certainly examples where poetry is 
read aloud in the context of traditional academic study. In his text Distant Reading 
(2005) the critic Peter Middleton cites a number of occasions where the poetry 
reading played an important part of university life in the UK both inside and outside 
the classroom.162 Indeed, the value of spoken word has been recognized in a number 
of academic contexts, including as a teaching aid in foreign language classes, or re-
interpreting the page canon. 163 However, the argument English articulates does not 
attempt to suggest that the reading aloud of poetry is exclusively a feature of 
performance poetry pedagogies, but to bring performance to prominence as an 
object of study. This point bears a distinct similarity to the practice and ethos of 
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Goldsmith’s Spoken Word Educator training programme. In his October 2013 article 
for the Guardian entitled ‘The rise of spoken word educators in UK schools’164 the 
poet and spoken word educator Jacob Sam-La Rose claimed that until September of 
that year there was perhaps only one spoken word educator in the world: Peter Khan. 
Sam-La Rose encourages his reader ‘not to forget the [spoken word] workshops run 
by a range of individual teaching poets in schools, PRUs and other educational 
institutions across the country’ but establishes an important distinction through the 
role of ‘spoken word educator’.165 This distinction separates the pedagogy of the 
spoken word educator from the virtues of simply including spoken word and poetry 
readings within a more page-based pedagogy. The particular role he refers to is a 
position offered through Goldsmith’s Spoken Word Educator training programme 
established by Khan in 2012, which now employs Sam-La Rose as a programme 
director. Sam-La Rose articulates the benefits of the programme stating that: 
Each spoken word educator is both a practising poet skilled in the writing 
and performance of poetry, and a trained educator with their own body 
of lessons, resources and pedagogical strategies. As educators, they're 
valid members of staff, aware of what does and doesn't work in a 
classroom, able to work in a range of different lessons on the timetable, 
even beyond English and drama, and challenge the perception that 
poetry is an exclusive pursuit. As embedded poets, they're recognised as 
active practitioners of the craft they're imparting, they can focus 
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completely on their students' needs and are less susceptible to the range 
of other drains on a teacher's time.166 
Khan himself, who was interviewed in 2014 by Stephanie Lane Sutton in the Chicago 
Literati (Chicago being the location of Khan’s first Spoken Word Educator initiative, 
and the birthplace of Slam poetry) states that: 
Research on Expressive Writing points to the emotional and physical 
benefits of writing personal narratives. Teaching the craft of poetry 
writing and performance develops a variety of ‘transferable skills,’ from 
written literacy, oral literacy, analytical skills and social-emotional 
literacy. It also builds self-confidence and academic engagement, thus 
building hope and academic investment.167 
Discussing secondary education, Sam-La Rose notes the missed opportunities of the 
pedagogical framework which employs spoken word poets for one-off experiences, 
with poets ‘arriving as if by magic at the start of a school day and often disappearing 
as quickly’.168 He further articulates the potential of longer term projects, offering 
more robust experiential practice:  
If a one-off or short term intervention can have a life-changing impact on 
a student, what would the potential benefits of a sustained, long-term 
commitment look like? How much more impactful could those 
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experiences be if embedded in a larger number of student's school 
careers?169 
I contend that in this concentrated aspect the value of performance poetry 
pedagogy is made clear. Certainly the ‘traditional’ methods of teaching poetry 
which English referred to may include elements of performance. However, it is the 
kind of distinct, long-term study which English, Sam-La Rose, and Khan operate - a 
concerted experience of performance poetry pedagogy - which I believe requires 
further development in the contemporary UK academy.170 
 
Community and Elitism in contemporary poetics 
 
Though the above case studies offer a suggestive movement towards the study of 
performance poetry within various strata of education there still remained and 
remains a lack of critical and public attention to performance poetry and spoken 
word. As the critic Dana Gioia observes:  
Without doubt the most surprising and significant development in 
recent American poetry has been the wide-scale and unexpected re-
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emergence of popular poetry – namely rap, cowboy poetry, poetry 
slams, and certain overtly accessible types of what was once a defiantly 
avant-garde genre, performance poetry. These new forms of popular 
verse have seemingly come out of nowhere to become significant forces 
in American culture… And all these new poetic forms have thrived 
without the support of the university or the literary establishment.171  
Gioia refers not only to the potential of these new forms but the lack of anticipation 
regarding their success: ‘In a literary culture that during most of the twentieth 
century declared verse a dying technique, no one would have predicted this vastly 
popular revival… verse has changed into a growth industry, though its rehabilitation 
has happened mostly off the printed page’.172 Gioia exhibits a reticence to declare 
the value of these forms - ‘Please note that while admiring the energy of the 
revival, I do not maintain that these new forms of popular verse represent the best 
new poetry of the period’ - however he acknowledges their importance in a shifting 
poetic landscape: ‘Collectively, however, the work has enormous implications on 
the future of poetry. Not only does it call into question many contemporary 
assumptions about the current state of poetry, but the new popular poetry also 
reflects the broad cultural forces that are now reshaping all the literary arts’.173As 
for the critics, Gioia discusses the gap between ‘high’ and ‘low’ assessments of 
poetics, suggesting that: 
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While the new popular poetry has received immense coverage from the 
electronic media and general press, it has garnered relatively little 
attention from intellectuals and virtually none from established poetry 
critics. One can understand the reluctance of academic critics. If they 
have noticed the new poetry at all, they immediately see how little it 
has in common with the kinds of poetry they have been trained to 
consider worthy of study. It does not grow out of the long-esteemed 
and meticulously studied high-art traditions of Classicism, Romanticism, 
Modernism, or Post-Modernism that informs most literary scholarship. 
In fact, in general it hardly seems to connect to any conventional 
academic notion of literary poetry.174 
Identifying what exactly Gioia’s ‘literary poetry’ constitutes, and how this type 
of poetry compares to contemporary performance poetics is a necessary next step. 
A prominent poetic of the 1960s (especially in America) was Imagist poetry, intent 
on delivering an unmediated, authentic moment.175 The effect Robert Lowell 
describes as ‘the grace of accuracy’176 is derived from a conception of the poem as 
an act of witnessing. However, as Marjorie Perloff notes in her text Radical Artifice 
(1991), this witness is always starkly detached: ‘The observer remains outside the 
picture frame[…], a seemingly impassive observer, even as everything that is seen 
and felt is filtered through his consciousness’.177 Though this kind of deep image 
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poem is performative in the sense that it offers a scene, and apportions the reader 
the role of ‘audience’, it also denies the intimacy of the performance as a shared 
space for mutual and communal understanding. Perloff argues quite convincingly 
that ‘’Perfect’ as such small ‘deep image’ poems are, they are also oddly 
unambitious’.178 She ascribes this lack of ambition to a fear of confronting larger 
degrees of experience, and a reluctance to consider ‘the implications of using what 
has become a fairly standard free-verse form (a set of short, irregular lines 
surrounded by white space) and a fixed subject position in a world that increasingly 
questions the validity of such conventions’.179 What one anticipates in performance 
poetry is precisely not to be limited by the experiential structure but to interrogate 
it for its value and for its authenticity. Rather than the fixed subject position, the 
performance poem is an interlocution, a question, not an answer. The performance 
itself anticipates a communal response, inviting the audience to react without 
expecting a prescribed reply. Even a sceptical audience may become a community 
when faced with the prospect of a collaborative response. The distinction that may 
be drawn between much ‘naturally voiced’ Modernist poetics, not just Imagist 
poetry, and performance poetry is the desire to actually achieve a unity between 
poetry and its audience: ‘the glut, for example, of ‘aspirational’ writing… can be 
overcome, not by finding books in the library that will talk about community, but by 
ways to actually have it happen’.180 
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Perloff’s critical corpus invests heavily in an examination of what can be 
contained within a broad notion of post-modern art and aesthetics.181 As such, 
inviting discussion of Perloff necessitates a discussion of a post-modern aesthetic 
that accepts various public media (the billboard and advertisements, the logos, the 
jingles, the theme tunes) as art, which in turn compels an acknowledgment that 
performance poetry maintains a complicit association with such avant-gardism, 
equated as it is with the soap box.182 A published poem may move thousands, but 
rarely more than one at a time, a performance poem may move thousands at the 
same time. This association with publicity and with distribution is an association 
with a changing, technologizing world. Perloff, borrowing from Charles Bernstein’s 
essay183 on the challenges post-modernism poses to the traditional values of the 
academy, offers the following: ‘The most cursory survey of contemporary poetics 
would show that, at least as far as what Charles Bernstein calls ‘official verse 
culture’ is concerned, technology, whether computer technology or the video, 
audio, and print media, remains, quite simply, the enemy, the locus of 
commodification and reification against which a ‘genuine’ poetic discourse must 
react’.184 The contention Perloff makes shies more towards the business of the 
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advertising company or the television soap opera, however I believe that the same 
defensive moves can be detected in the dismissal of performance poetry as a valid 
medium for critical study. A reaction against, or a dismissal of performance poetry 
is an interpolation of the same quality of mass distribution and unmediated public 
dissemination that ‘technologized’ media exhibits.185 However, the communality 
engendered in the live experience of a performance poem is a means to transform 
the individual into a community not simply by an impersonal transfer of data down 
information channels, but by shared communal feeling via a shared experience of 
affect. The point is certainly argued more eloquently by Perloff:  
the very aggressiveness of the new demand for a free-verse and speech-
based poetics testifies to a growing anxiety about the viability of the 
‘natural style’ in a world where nature is increasingly subject to the 
hitherto unimaginable operations of the various ‘quiet’ revolutions of 
our time, especially that of the information revolution.186  
It is reasonable to posit that the association between performance as a distribution, 
the stage as a platform for advertising oneself, and the commodity climate of 
screen and radio media offers some critics certain grounds for closing the doors to 
performance. It is also reasonable to posit that the public culture that has 
developed around performance poetry may be guilty of facilitating ego-boosting 
and self-aggrandizement. But this is true of any mode, indeed Leavis’s treatment of 
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Byron throughout his writing offers at times only thinly disguised contempt for 
what he perceives to be an inferior and misplaced reputation as one of the ‘great’ 
poets.187  
Perloff’s comments regarding the manifestations of community in the face of 
quiet revolutions of our time prepare the platform of contemporary poetic 
discourse. This discourse explores the distinction between a community of poetry 
and a poetry of the community, a disparity which once again invites questions of 
‘high’ art versus ‘popular’ art. Though Perloff is an advocate of poetry as a 
collaborative endeavour, she has been criticized for possessing an elitist filter which 
demarcates poetic involvement and proposes a hard, evaluated core of 
contemporary poetics. Her May 2012 Boston Review essay ‘Poetry on the Brink: 
Reinventing the Lyric’ is foregrounded by an epigraph recalling comments made by 
poetry critic Jed Rasula offering a cautionary evaluation of the surfeit of US 
institutions purveying creative writing degrees and qualifications. As an opening 
gambit in Perloff’s subsequent discussion of the current state of poetry and poetics, 
this appears rather bold. Perloff’s first sentence: ‘What happens to poetry when 
everybody is a poet?’ is a question which leaves little doubt over her probable 
response.188 The article provoked a number of rejoinders from poets and critics, 
chiefly Matvei Yankelevich’s open letter to Perloff: ‘The Gray Area’, first published 
in the Los Angeles Review of Books in July 2012, and Eileen Myles’ ‘Painted Clear, 
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Painted Black’, published in May 2013 on The Volta, an online multimedia project of 
poetry, criticism, poetics, video, conversation (audio), and interview (text). Dealing 
chronologically with these responses, Yankelevich’s salvo is ponderous, reducing 
Perloff’s suggestion of a distinction between Conservative and Conceptualist 
poetics to a binary elitism that ultimately fails to recognize the fertility of a middle 
ground between the two poles: 
What I’m pointing to here is a whole swath of writing between 
Conceptualism and Conservatism — what I call the gray area, in which, 
buttressed by home-grown American tendencies and European 
Modernism, ‘traditional’ ideas of formal/aesthetic quality are still the 
background for interesting things (among some not so interesting 
things) to be happening.189 
Yankelevich accuses Perloff of a false presentation of the contrast between 
contemporary poets who follow safe and formulaic practice, and those who 
embrace the new methodologies of Conceptualist practice: ‘For [Perloff], 
Conservatism resists, denies, or forgets ‘the word as such,’ whereas Conceptualism 
acknowledges, foregrounds, and celebrates it’.190 For Yankelevich, however, both 
fail to address the issue of a reinvented lyric: the binary is established by Perloff in 
order to enable her elitist conception of contemporary poetics. The correlative is a 
gross simplification of transparency, categorizing the Conservative as a lesser mode, 
in favour of the intellectual rigour of Conceptualist poetics. Yankelevich’s 
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accusation contends that this argument is a misconception of the state of poetic 
practice: ‘for both models the materiality of language is of secondary concern’.191 
By reconstructing the argument, or rather a deconstruction of this binary, 
Yankelevich presents the alternative conclusion of a middle ground, a grey area of 
complex poetry that enables both practices, neutralizing the elitist, hierarchical 
associations inherent to Perloff’s presentation of the structure. 
Perloff’s riposte ‘A Response to Matvei Yankelevich’ also published in the Los 
Angeles Review of Books disarms Yankelevich with the simple contention that ‘this 
binary is Yankelevich’s, not mine’.192 She further argues that the alleged 
transparency associated with both poles is inaccurate. Yankelevich’s determination 
to label poetic models is an unnecessary evocation of a problematic practice of 
categorization: 
perhaps it’s time to forget about movements and isms and read 
carefully particular poets… Whether we call such work Conceptualist or 
Post-Conceptualist really doesn’t matter. The point is to come out 
openly against the self-regarding sludge that passes for poetry in the 
commercial and media world, and to look closely at the alternatives.193 
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Indeed, within Yankelevich’s initial attack, there is an overt predilection for 
generating assumptions based on category. Yankelevich broadly asserts a suspicion 
regarding the role of performance in Conceptual poetry:  
Does the fact that performance (and the development of charismatic 
personae) plays such a key role in the advancement of these poetic 
projects suggest anything about the status of the texts themselves, 
about their dependence on context, or on the charismatic posing of the 
authors?194 
Yankelevich’s discussion of the bisection of performance and Conceptual poetics 
concludes with a series of rhetorical questions which seem to indicate that he is 
uncomfortable with his own argument. As tacit as the assumed answers may be, 
they are not convincing, revealing bias in the incongruity of Yankelevich’s treatment 
of poets with performative inclinations:  
Is it that, in the absence of formal indicators, this performance of poet 
as professional, expert, or entertainer is how the Conceptualist poet 
marks her or his text as ‘poetry’? Is it that, without a public image, 
Conceptualist poets would not succeed in attaining a desired canonicity 
or (to put it plainly) popularity?195 
As a response to Perloff’s elitist contentions regarding the avant garde in poetics, 
Yankelevich reveals his own disregard for certain aspects of poetry. Rationalizing 
Perloff’s argument as a binary where neither poles are exemplars of good poetic 
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practice is not a sufficiently constructed response to the hierarchies of poetry that 
Perloff suggests. Yankelevich attempts to restate the argument as a question of 
competing models of poetry, which he then proposes to be flawed, both subject to 
equal transparency. His solution, the middle ground, a fertile grey area of 
complexity, occasioned and ascribed to by both Conservative and Conceptual poetic 
discourse, has been fabricated by Yankelevich. It is subject to his regulation, with 
errant practice (performance for example) written out.196 In her reply Perloff 
dismisses attention to the process of categorizing and evaluating modes and 
models of poetry, discriminating based on taxonomy, in favour of attention to a 
critical assessment of the threat presented by homogeneity. Perloff’s initial 
contention in ‘Poetry on the Brink: Reinventing the Lyric’ is that contemporary 
poetics operates a marketplace of standardized, unoriginal material: 
What makes Rasula’s cautionary tale so sobering is that the sheer 
number of poets now plying their craft inevitably ensures moderation 
and safety. The national (or even transnational) demand for a certain 
kind of prize-winning, ‘well-crafted’ poem—a poem that the New Yorker 
would see fit to print and that would help its author get one of the 
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‘good jobs’ advertised by the Association of Writers & Writing 
Programs—has produced an extraordinary uniformity.197 
The elaboration Perloff offers in her response to Yankelevich is that he has made 
the mistake of translating a criticism of the big tent into a criticism of the small 
tents: 
From his own perspective, as publisher on the downtown New York 
poetry scene, where a congeries of young experimental poets are 
producing a great variety of texts — visual poetry, performance texts, 
serial poems, documentary — that can’t be pigeonholed, he objects to 
what he takes to be the binary opposition between Conservatism and 
Conceptualism in my essay.198 
Perloff’s criticism is not aimed at readdressing the specifics of a particular model of 
poetic practice, nor is it interested in creating a taxonomic model of avant-garde 
elitism. Perloff is arguing for an avant-garde practice that will destabilize the 
current trend of reproduction inherent to mainstream poetics.199 Her arguments 
are elitist, but they centre on the general tropes that constitute (in her mind) 
unoriginality, seeking to support a new critical method of identifying these tropes 
rather than assigning this homogeneity to a particular pre-existing model.  
The second major criticism of the elitism inherent to ‘Poetry on the Brink: 
Reinventing the Lyric’ is presented by Eileen Myles. Myles’s article, entitled ‘Painted 
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Clear, Painted Black’ is in part prompted by explicit reference made by Perloff in her 
response to Matvei Yankelevich: ‘Transparency, even a feigned transparency, can 
be associated with the Beats and the New York poets: Eileen Myles would be a 
contemporary case in point’.200 This representation of Myles as a poet of 
transparency is translated by Myles as commentary on the framework of emotional 
control inherent in the construction of her poetry: ‘[Perloff] bothers to declare me 
to be a contemporary example of ‘transparency or feigned transparency’ in poetry 
and I think if what she means is that my front story (unlike hers) is mourning she is 
absolutely right’.201 Transparency and, more directly, quality of emotion is in fact 
the crux of Myles’s response to Perloff. She begins her article: ‘I feel like the back 
story of Marjorie’s avant garde mandate is mourning’.202 Myles launches her attack 
based on the premise that Perloff’s avant-garde elitism is framed by her desire to 
administrate the quality of representative emotions: 
I’m feeling wary now because I’m about to be told about the avant 
garde way of mourning. And we’ve already learned that avant garde 
poetry might initially exclude certain people, certain kinds of direct 
statements, certain bodies and later by means of appropriation, 
pastiche all of which everyone has been using for decades but now 
Marjorie tells us that Conceptual poets are really using these tools.203 
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For Myles (as we might anticipate) this is prohibited. Perloff’s elitism is exposed as a 
dictum of feeling, ‘the avant-garde way of mourning’204, which stands in contrast to 
Myles’s conception of poetry: 
I think Perloff has sustained an enormous amount of loss in her life and 
along with her championing of avant garde practice in her criticism she’s 
also deeply engaged in controlling the emotional climate of the room 
she’s in. Who gets to feel what when, and how! And that’s a problem 
because poetry is a community not an institution.205 
Myles reveals her hand here. By attacking Perloff, through the epigraph to Perloff’s 
article borrowed from Jed Rasula, Myles insists on an alternative conception of the 
model of contemporary poetry: 
When [Perloff] opens her piece with Jed Rasula’s assertion of the 
problem of there being too many poets I wonder why neither of them 
notice that in the mainstream there aren’t any poets. We’re mainly 
hearing that no poets are being read. That there’s no understanding of 
poetry today[...] The enterprise that all of us take part in is for all intents 
and purposes absent in public life today.206 
Myles’s insistence on a poetry absent from the community reveals (in contrast to 
her arguments that poetry itself is community, not institution) her own avant-garde 
allegiances. Myles’s comments may be read as a call to arms for poetry, an 
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insistence on the re-edification of the public and the community. However, when 
coupled with her objections to Perloff’s elitism on the grounds of a faux-orthodoxy 
of feeling the tacit corollary is that, in Myles’s opinion, poetry is precisely not 
community. For poetry to exist within the community rather than the institution (a 
confluence of mainstream concepts) it must implicitly express that which can 
already be felt by everyone, and therefore has no fear of falsification or 
misconception. However, because Myles posits the reality of a threat posed by 
Perloff’s governance of feeling, she unconditionally places poetry inside the non-
universality of the avant-garde, rather than the mainstream or the community.  
In this respect, Myles’s proposition that Perloff’s elitism is accentuated by 
her belief in a unique understanding of mourning can be read as an attempt to 
connect Myles’s version of the avant-garde (the grounded, affective, humanist 
aspect of the avant-garde) to Perloff’s calculated, theoretical, elitist avant-garde. 
Myles offers affect, mediated through Perloff’s sense of mourning, a universal 
experience, as a bridge between the two. Myles’s arguments represent a cautious 
attempt to construct a rhetoric which will accommodate both senses of the avant-
garde. Perhaps anticipating the response to potential criticism of her reconstitution 
of Perloff’s avant-garde conditions, Myles presents her own conception of the 
avant-garde in ‘Painted Clear, Painted Black’: 
To reflect on my own writing I arrived on the scene in New York in my 
20s (okay I already wrote a book about this) landing very deliberately in 
the avant garde where it seemed everyone I met took it upon himself to 
pass on to me ze avant garde canon as he saw it. There were so many 
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approaches and rightnesses and because I already came from a 
doctrinaire catholic background I wasn’t so open to learning from some 
man of my age or older ‘the truth.’ My avant garde then & now was 
composed of a shaky imagined grid holding a multiple of approaches.207 
For Myles, the avant-garde is an open forum for experimentation, as capacious as it 
is tolerant. She represents the typical pluralism of an avant-garde which is 
constructed in opposition to elitist rhetoric, predetermined by a theoretical 
framework, and dedicated to exclusivism. However, this theoretical pluralism she 
champions is precisely the critical article which prevents the avant-garde from 
fulfilling any capacity for genuine universal accessibility. The multiplicity of 
approaches Myles posits is a construct which denies the poetry of community, 
presaging its failure before it can begin. In a pluralist structure of poetics, 
conceptions of poetry as a universally accessible medium must still exist alongside 
elitist doctrine, to which it is not simply a poor bedfellow, but utterly incapable of 
defending itself. Myles, who it should be remembered is criticizing Perloff based on 
her elitist resistance to alternative approaches to poetry, reveals the difficulty of 
maintaining her pluralism by problematically declaring her rejection of an avant-
garde mediated to her by ‘some man’.208 In this respect, just as Perloff’s elitism 
problematizes the framework, Myles equally articulates the difficulty of 
representing the avant-garde as accessible to the universal community. 
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The relationship between Perloff’s elitism and the arguments articulated by 
Yankelevich and Myles suggest a conclusion about the current state of the critical 
place of poetry. As Yankelevich attempts to corral elitist rhetoric into a binary that 
can be subsequently circumscribed and managed, Perloff’s counter arguments 
present the ultimate failure of such an undertaking. Yankelevich’s structure 
mishandles Perloff’s real criticism; the inherency of the unoriginal in all 
substructures of contemporary poetics, subject only to a critical appraisal of the 
individual. Perloff’s elitism is more enduring. In Myles’s argument the consequence 
of this is explicitly underlined, avant-garde practice is indefatigable. Myles’s 
conclusion can only recapitulate this bind: 
The need for feeling in poetry is of utmost importance to Perloff, but 
what I come away with is that it’s the quality of the feelers (meaning 
whose) that’s the thing most important and true. Which is very 
postmodern, incredibly elitist and certainly transparent to boot.209 
Myles may make a case for the universality of her own ‘feelers’, but as concerted as 
this may be, she is still compelled to sacrifice true plurality to the status quo, and 
the status quo dictates that a common and universal poetics is exactly where the 
avant-garde cannot compromise. Poetry no longer exists in the mainstream or the 
community. The hegemony of the institution, mediated through the academy, has 
proselytized a structure of poetics that is inaccessible to the mainstream. The 
critical mode, directing intellectual study, is the status quo, and has constructed an 
impossible tension between our capacity for complete creative freedom and our 
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capacity to write a kind of poetry which, by definition, corrupts that creative 
freedom.  
To return to Perloff’s comments regarding a poetic community: ‘the glut, for 
example, of ‘aspirational’ writing… can be overcome, not by finding books in the 
library that will talk about community, but by ways to actually have it happen’.210 
Some elaboration is required. Perloff’s community may ultimately be constructed 
around the premise of a body of writers and writing that dispenses with the bad 
practice framing her impression of the homogenous, unoriginal elements of 
contemporary poetry. Poets may rail against this edict of elitism, for elitist it 
certainly is. However, it may well be that no model of contemporary poetics which 
is prepared to face up to the truth; the unworkability of a pluralist approach, can 
fail to accede to the dominance of institutional elitism present in the contemporary 
avant-garde, and in contemporary poetics in general. 
As a working proposition, this explicates the complications which construct 
the division between high and low art. Without framing the dialogue as pre-
constructed binaries, which may simplify the picture, the division between the two 
is characterized by a status quo which prevents a correspondence between what is 
universal and accessible and what is institutionally accepted. Perloff’s desire to 
reclaim poetics, winnowing out the homogenous and unoriginal in an attempt to 
recast a structure of poetics that will intelligently reflect the wider community is 
laudable only in so far as the readership she will accede to. Conversely, a truly 
pluralist construction of contemporary poetics is doomed to fail precisely because it 
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must accede to, and incorporate, the current status quo, one which is negotiated by 
the institution. Both approaches assure a mutual incompatibility.  
Perhaps then a solution lies not in reshaping the current, intransigent 
structure, but by introducing a paradigm shift in the study and appreciation of 
poetics. The paucity of academic study of performance poetry, negotiated in the 
critical tendency to relegate performance to the business of theatre studies, might 
present fertile ground for a re-assessment of the methods delineating critical 
attention to poetics. 
Of course, this is a solution with a number of problematic conditions, chiefly 
the efficacy of ‘paradigm shift’ as anything more than a floating signifier for what is 
already apparent; the necessity for change. What that change constitutes is a 
question that requires an investigation of how the framework of what is included in 
the academy is constructed. Recalling Elaine Myles’ remark that: ‘what I come away 
with is that it’s the quality of the feelers (meaning whose) that’s the thing most 
important and true’, the functional principle of selection implies a question of 
value.211 Value is the guiding element dictating academic association, the context 
under which Leavis, New Critics, Perloff, and executives of contemporary academies 
seek to hierarchize material. In order to assess what is meant by ‘value’ I propose in 
the first instance an analysis of the critical theories of the nineteenth-century critic 
Matthew Arnold.  
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Matthew Arnold; spoken word and the provincial spirit 
 
It may seem curious to propose an examination of contemporary academic 
practices with a non-contemporary focal point, especially considering the radical 
changes the academy has undergone throughout the twentieth century, as 
presented in my earlier analysis. However, Arnold’s influence on literary criticism 
and theory is vast. In the opening lines of his introduction to Arnold’s Essays 
Literary and Critical (1906), G.K. Chesterton claims that ‘Our actual obligations to 
Matthew Arnold are almost beyond expression. His very faults reformed us’.212 As 
the introduction to Matthew Arnold’s works in The Broadview Anthology of British 
Literature: The Victorian Era claims, the reach of Arnold’s influence remains 
prominent: ‘While few have unanimously agreed with Arnold’s pronouncements on 
literature and society, he has influenced almost every significant English-speaking 
critic since his time, including T.S. Eliot, F.R. Leavis, Lionel Trilling, and Raymond 
Williams’.213 Suggestively, both the Broadview introduction and Chesterton’s 
remark acknowledge Arnold’s faults as well as his influences: if it could be said that 
Arnold inspired such fervour in his advocates, it must also be recognized that 
Arnold suffered greatly from his detractors, with criticism focusing particularly on 
his elitism. It is this elitism (and its attendant relationship to questions of value) 
which I investigate specifically in reference to his essays exploring the 
‘establishment’, Arnold’s expression for the wider set of cultural institutions of 
                                                          
212 Matthew Arnold, Essays Literary and Critical, ed. by Ernest Rhys (London and Toronto: J.M. Dent 
& Sons Ltd, 1906), pp. ix-xiv (p.ix). 
213 Joseph Laurence Black, The Broadview Anthology Of British Literature: The Victorian Era 
(Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2006). p.433. 
89 
 
which the academy is a member, and the ‘provincial’; that which falls outside the 
proper governance of the establishment, and as such suffers a deficiency of true 
cultural value. 
Arnold’s preface to Culture and Anarchy (first published as a series of essays 
in Cornhill Magazine between 1867 and 1868) proposes the objectives of his 
assessment of culture as ‘the great help out of our present difficulties’.214 To 
unpack this assertion, Arnold provides a definition of his concept of culture as ‘the 
best which has been thought and said in the world’.215 Arnold acknowledges the 
problem of relying upon an incomplete and unfulfilling knowledge of one’s position 
in relation to the greater structures of society. By refreshing one’s understanding 
with a better knowledge, informed by the better elements of culture, improvement 
can be effected by:  
turning a stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and 
habits, which we now follow staunchly but mechanically, vainly 
imagining that there is a virtue in following them staunchly which makes 
up for the mischief of following them mechanically.216 
Already the element of value, signified by a notion of selective qualification (the 
best which has been thought and said) situates Arnold’s rhetoric in an appeal for 
inclusions and exclusions to be made. As if in response to a predictable assault on 
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his elitism, he introduces a caveat to the dialectical structure of valuable and 
valueless literary culture, asserting the importance of reading in and of itself:  
And yet, futile as are many bookmen, and helpless as books and reading 
often prove for bringing nearer to perfection those who use them, one 
must, I think, be struck more and more, the longer one lives, to find how 
much, in our present society, a man’s life of each day depends for its 
solidity and value on whether he reads during that day, and, far more 
still on what he reads during it.217 
Certainly Arnold still avows his selective processes, as indicated in the final remarks 
of the above statement. However, he goes on:  
If a man without books or reading, or reading nothing but his letters and 
the newspapers, gets nevertheless a fresh and free play of the best 
thoughts upon his stock notions and habits, he has got culture. He has 
got that for which we prize and recommend culture; he has got that 
which at the present moment we seek culture that it may give us. This 
inward operation is the very life and essence of culture, as we conceive 
it.218 
As an organizing structure, this appears to situate Arnold uncannily close to a 
pluralistic notion of literature within culture. As long as value can be found by the 
reader, value is present in the text. However, Arnold’s sentiment may appear to be 
a concession, he is in fact reframing his elitism as a qualification of the ‘feelers’ 
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rather than the literature. ‘If a man’ is an implicit separation of the body of 
‘readers’ into a hierarchy of qualified participants. Arnold guilefully offers us the 
suggestion that the ‘inward operation’ of reading, of extracting value, is an 
objectively positive process, but he then suggests the opposite: 
Nevertheless, it is not so easy to frame one’s discourse concerning the 
operation of culture, as to avoid giving frequent occasion to a 
misunderstanding whereby the essential inwardness of the operation is 
lost sight of.219 
Concession successfully orchestrated, Arnold returns to familiar elitist ground. In 
seeking to re-establish a dialectic of value, Arnold offers an opposition between 
Establishment and Non-Conformists, who represent for Arnold a quality of the 
provincial: 
The great works by which, not only in literature, art, and science 
generally, but in religion itself, the human spirit has manifested its 
approaches to totality, and a full, harmonious perfection, and by which 
it stimulates and helps forward the world’s general perfection, come, 
not from Nonconformists, but from men who either belong to 
Establishments or have been trained in them.220 
There is no ambiguity regarding the false dilemma Arnold seeks to construct. In his 
essay ‘The Literary Influence of Academies’, Arnold asserts that: ‘The less a 
literature has felt the influence of a supposed centre of correct information, correct 
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judgement, correct taste, the more we shall find in it this note of provinciality’.221 
He further highlights the remarks of the French critic Ernest Renan: ‘“All ages,” says 
M. Renan again, “have had their inferior literature; but the danger of our time is 
that this inferior literature tends more and more to get the upper place. No one has 
the same advantage as the academy for fighting against this mischief”’.222 Arnold 
makes common cause with this line of rhetoric. The primary function of the 
academy is one of quality control, and a movement out of the stricture of the 
academy constitutes for Arnold a surrender to our lower, provincial nature. There is 
of course no doubt that Arnold is engaging in wilful controversy. He recognizes the 
unpopularity of such distinctions: ‘Such an effort to set up a recognised authority, 
imposing on us a high standard in matters of intellect and taste, has many enemies 
in human nature’.223 For Arnold, intransigence is a hallmark of the Nonconformist, 
an argument he proposes in the abstract as a human condition, but which he leaves 
no doubt that he, and right minded readers have eluded: ‘We like to be suffered to 
lie comfortably in the old straw of our habits, especially of our intellectual habits, 
even though this straw may not be very clean and fine’.224 
Nonconformity, which manifests for Arnold in a vulgarized provincialism, has 
become so because of the particular situation the Nonconformists finds themselves 
operating in. Comments in his essay ‘The Function of Criticism at the Present Time’ 
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first published in 1865 (here quoted from The Broadview Anthology of British 
Literature) paint the Nonconformist, the ‘practical man’ as stubborn, intransigent:  
For the practical man is not apt for finer distinctions, and yet in these 
distinctions truth and the highest culture greatly find their account. But 
it is not easy to lead a practical man – unless you reassure him as to 
your practical intentions, you have no chance of leading him… Where 
shall we find language innocent enough, how shall we make the purity 
of our intentions evident enough.225  
The critical element here is Arnold’s evocation of an ‘innocent language’ – language 
being operative to the question of a practice of poetry which relies upon 
communication. This is a point I will return to. For now, as an explication of the 
disparity in quality, Arnold suggests that the Nonconformist is ‘not in contact with 
the main current of national life, like the member of an Establishment’.226 However, 
the national life, as Arnold proposes, assumes an objectivity over distinctions of 
quality which simply does not exist. For Arnold, the Nonconformist is circumscribed 
by his audacity in assigning his own sense of value: 
the precious discoveries of himself and his friends for expressing the 
inexpressible and defining the undefinable in peculiar forms of their 
own, cannot but, as he has voluntarily chosen them, and is personally 
responsible for them, fill his whole mind. He is zealous to do battle for 
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them and affirm them, for in affirming them he affirms himself, and that 
is what we all like.227 
The dubiousness of Arnold’s sublimation of his own need for affirmation to a 
persuasively grandiose notion of ‘national life’, the unacknowledged complication 
of assuming that his idea of the Establishment deserves such a label, is 
conspicuously absent. Arnold further reinforces the necessity of great literature 
(and its provisions as offered by the Academy) to the spirit of the nation a 
convincing argument which serves the dual purpose of tacitly adding its credibility 
to the false construct Arnold has created of his particular concept of national life.228  
Value then, is an element that must be assigned judiciously, and by a select 
body: ‘The provincial spirit, again, exaggerates the value of its ideas for want of a 
high standard at hand by which to try them’.229 Arnold attempts to further castigate 
the provincial spirit, making direct reference to the association with, and 
admiration of, the newspaper: ‘the provincial spirit likes in the newspaper just what 
makes the newspaper such bad food for it’.230 It is perhaps telling that the essay, 
published in the Cornhill Magazine in August 1864, predated Arnold’s remarks 
regarding the inherent value of reading, even if it be ‘nothing but… the newspaper’ 
(as quoted above) by only a few years.  
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Two Cultures 
 
Arnold’s remarks regarding the provincial spirit are undeniably assertions of a 
general cultural elitism: ‘The mass of mankind will never have any ardent zeal for 
seeing things as they are; very inadequate ideas will always satisfy them. On these 
inadequate ideas reposes, and must repose, the general practice of the world’.231 It 
would be germane of me at this point to admit that such a pronounced assertion of 
said elitism is in response to Arnold’s position as staunch defender of literature and 
the humanities. Arnold’s investment in the question of value, particularly regarding 
the conflicting relationship between humanities and sciences disciplines in a larger 
sphere of social education, could be read as beneficial, given the context of a 
poetics of performance trying to find its place within the academy. As Francis 
O’Gorman argues in his essay ‘Making Meaning: Literary Research in the Twenty-
first Century’:  
Science, Arnold said, provided hard, objective knowledge. But what of 
the moral or aesthetic faculties… The arts and humanities, to use the 
modern labels, addressed the fullest conception of the human being 
and responded to, and shaped, what ought to be their best desires.232 
Situating an analysis of value within a wider debate regarding cultural and social 
practice errs towards a re-interpretation favouring questions of utility alongside 
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structural, target orientated questions of inclusion and exclusion. The modern 
question of value in the context of the humanities cannot be separated from a 
distinction between arts and the sciences:  
But literary criticism, like the humanities in general, has entered a newly 
intensified relationship with science’s role in culture, broadly defined. 
Against those branches of the hard sciences with their potential for 
direct intervention in material life… Where, indeed, can the advanced 
practice of literary criticism, especially that which is primarily – as in the 
UK at present – sustained by public funds – begin to have a place amid 
the buoyant claims of such disciplines?233 
Arnold’s role in this debate is, regardless of his elitism, one of importance: ‘Arnold’s 
notion has remained consequential for educational theory, and the place of the arts 
and humanities within it. Indeed, it is hard to shake off Arnold even if one knows his 
argument will no longer quite do’.234 O’Gorman calls into question Arnold’s 
relevance to contemporary academia but the assumption that he forms a keystone 
for the developing relationship between the humanities and the sciences is not 
unfounded. A salient element of this discourse of binaries can be recognized in two 
speeches delivered at two separate Royal Academy of the Arts annual banquets, 
one by Arnold in 1881, and its response from a peer and contemporary of his, 
Thomas Henry Huxley, in 1883. The speeches, each delivered after the Academy’s 
customary toast to ‘Science and Literature’235 attempt to delineate what 
                                                          
233 O’Gorman, p.273. 
234 O’Gorman, p.273. 
235 Whence a man ‘of the Sciences’ and a man ‘of Literature’ are invited to speak for each. 
97 
 
components of education are necessary for the foundation of true culture. 
Although this was certainly not the only occasion that Arnold and Huxley traded 
comments regarding their respective roles as champions and spokesmen for their 
disciplines, these speeches formed the core of the larger debate between the two 
men and the discourse between the arts and the sciences in general in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century.  Arnold’s opening remarks in his 1881 speech 
determined the temperature of this engagement: ‘I suppose everybody must be in 
some degree conscious that the general estimate of literature, of its powers and 
value, is not at present quite what it once was’.236 In response to Arnold’s 
conjectures237 Huxley’s argument skirted across Arnold’s rhetoric of dominance 
between disciplines: 
I am unable to understand how anyone with a knowledge of mankind 
can imagine that the growth of science can threaten the development 
of art in any of its forms. If I understand the matter at all, science and 
art are the obverse and reverse of Nature's medal, the one expressing 
the eternal order of things in terms of feeling, the other in terms of 
thought.238 
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In this respect both academics attempted to find common ground. However, 
although Huxley’s defence of the sciences attempted to argue that they did not 
present a threat to the balance between the disciplines, Arnold had only to invoke 
what appeared to be received knowledge – that the arts were fighting a losing 
battle. This kind of rhetoric of course proved fertile ground to cultivate an 
argument which heedlessly pushed forward under the peril of defeat. It is precisely 
from this carelessness that I argue a binary can be established between arts and 
sciences which further excludes that which elitists such as Arnold do not 
accommodate within the arts, the non-conformism of performance poetry and 
spoken word being the relevant example.  
The common ground between the arts and sciences which Huxley and Arnold 
both gesture towards articulates a distinct disparity between the exclusions and 
inclusions within the disciplines. Huxley closed his 1883 lecture by offering the 
relationship between the sciences and the arts as a necessary deployment of two 
cooperating sides of human nature: 
When men no longer love or hate; when suffering causes no pity, and 
the tale of great deeds ceases to thrill; when the lily of the field shall 
seem no longer more beautifully arrayed than Solomon in all his glory, 
and the awe has vanished from the snow-capped peak and deep ravine, 
then, indeed, science may have the world to itself. But it will not be 
because the monster has devoured art, but because one side of human 
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nature is dead, and because men have lost half of their ancient and 
present attribute.239 
The key to Huxley’s position relies on the presentation of human nature, and the 
‘ancient and present attribute’ which the arts fulfil. In this context Huxley offers the 
arts as a public good – an irreducible element of the human. Huxley offers this in 
response to Arnold’s 1881 speech where Arnold presents the case for unity 
between the disciplines as a seemingly open-ended reminder that the sciences and 
the arts are on the same side: ‘But there is one consoling thought which in this 
Royal Academy of Arts can hardly fail to visit the man of letters; it is that we and 
you are, if I may venture to say so, in the same boat.’240 Though this may seem as 
generous spirited as Huxley’s grander appeal to the twin sides of human nature it is 
followed by a tract of such vigorous self-congratulation that it leaves no question as 
to whom Arnold means to share his boat with:  
From you, at least, when Science is bidding us to stand on one side, we 
may hope for sympathy. And the same thought of your sympathy comes 
to my aid, too, when I turn to your other guests, even more splendid 
than the men of science; when I survey this brilliant company of Princes, 
Ministers of State, noble and wealthy patrons of art, whom you have 
collected round you, and wonder what can have induced you to import 
among them such an inutility as a poor man of letters. After all, with us 
you have sympathies which you cannot have with these grander guests. 
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Their functions are high and honourable, their sympathy with art and 
literature is refining and precious; yet how remote is their experience 
and career from ours. Take one part only. Our struggle-yours and ours-
what do they know of it? What do they know of it, these favourites of 
fortune, for whom existence, at any rate, has been always secure and 
easy, and who, so far as the great first needs of our poor mortality are 
concerned-lodging, food, and raiment-never passed an anxious hour, 
what do they know of the struggle through which even the most gifted 
and successful artists and authors have often to pass at the outset, and 
from which many and many a one among us never emerges?[...] They 
know nothing of it, they can know nothing of it.241 
I include this rather lengthy extract in full in order to best explicate the trap that 
Arnold arranges by assuming that the distinction between the ‘poor man of letters’ 
and the wealth of the patron satisfies suspicions regarding his elitism. A declaration 
of some small unity against the material elitism of the bourgeois does not assure a 
denouncement of elitism in general – quite the opposite. Arnold seeks to induce 
the man of science into a boat of shared struggle, which is to say the conspiracy of 
the academic, regardless of their discipline: ‘Before their sister, Science, now so full 
of promise and pride, was born, there were Art and Literature, like twins together…  
If we are not necessary, you are not necessary’.242 This should not be a new 
revelation when we consider Arnold’s habitual evaluation of establishment and 
non-conformity.  Although Arnold is depicted as a champion of value in the arts this 
                                                          
241 Roos, p.319. 
242 Roos, p.319. 
101 
 
depiction risks blindness to the issues of inclusion and exclusion in the face of 
science. For science is offered as an opponent of such horizon dominating 
magnitude that it cannot but contribute to the formation of a problematic dialectic 
which has shifted focus away from the still necessary conversation: what, exactly, 
comprises the arts. 
Necessary though it may be to have this conversation, the debate between 
humanities and the sciences is still important - even more so in a contemporary 
context as the terrain, particularly in education, shifts towards a more 
homochromatic insistence on utility. This itself produces further problems. The kind 
of elitism which is anticipated by an incompatible high and low dynamic within the 
arts stymies the necessary paradigm shift which would bring performance poetry 
into the academy. In addition, so too might the radically destabilizing presence of 
an unwieldly arts-science binary circumscribe any meaningful discussion of value in 
the humanities. Arnold may certainly have been a touchstone for the debate as it 
began to take shape in the nineteenth century, but alongside shifts accompanying 
the development of Modernist and New Critical practices the discourse has taken 
on a different shape: ‘On the old issue of the relation between arts and sciences, 
the debate has certainly moved on (Arnold was hardly describing it accurately in his 
own day). Few are now persuaded of the former claims that the sciences offer 
objective knowledge and arts subjective’.243 One strongly articulated contemporary 
iteration of the question which surrounds value and its relationship to arts is made 
by Helen Small in The Value of the Humanities (2013).244 Small, who favours Arnold 
                                                          
243 O’Gorman, p.273. 
244 Helen Small, The Value of the Humanities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
102 
 
with a more sympathetic treatment, posits his discourse with Huxley as the 
foundation of a more contemporary debate between the British chemist and 
novelist C. P. Snow and F. R. Leavis: ‘Many will know that Snow/Leavis was a 
reworking of a famous but less sharply antagonistic series of encounters between 
Thomas Huxley and Matthew Arnold during the early 1880s’.245 C. P. Snow’s ‘The 
Two Cultures’ Rede lecture delivered in 1959 gathered attention for its stark 
presentation of the division between the arts and the sciences:  
I believe the intellectual life of the whole of western society is 
increasingly being split into two polar groups. When I say intellectual 
life, I mean to include also a large part of our practical life, because I 
should be the last person to suggest the two can at the deepest level be 
distinguished… at one pole we have the literary intellectuals, who 
incidentally while no one was looking took to referring to themselves as 
‘intellectuals’ as though there were no others… Literary intellectuals at 
one pole – at the other scientists, and as the most representative, the 
physical scientists.246 
One may imagine that this suggests ground gained. Certainly the assertion that a 
division between intellectual and practical life cannot be achieved indicates a shift 
in momentum away from the kind of literary elitism which, for the sake of self-
preservation, sought to maintain such a division. Snow’s thesis has been roundly 
criticised for the simplification it manufactures, something it would be only fair to 
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remark that Snow himself recognized: ‘The number 2 is a very dangerous number: 
that is why the dialectic is a dangerous process. Attempts to divide anything into 
two ought to be regarded with much suspicion’.247 However – the critical backlash it 
engendered rightly pilloried the problematic presentation of the two poles, and 
especially a bias fulfilled by the contention that the sciences were somehow the 
truer and more valuable of the two cultures: ‘If the scientists have the future in 
their bones, then the traditional culture responds by wishing the future did not 
exist’.248 This bias is doubly confirmed when read alongside Snow’s allusions to the 
events and aftermath of the Second World War as noted by the critic Guy Ortolano: 
‘Behind Snow’s lamenting of the gap between the sciences and the humanities lay a 
clear message: the implications of the literary culture in the worst atrocities of the 
twentieth century had rendered it morally bankrupt, while scientists held the keys 
to progress in the technical know-how of industrial advance’.249 Even Snow’s 
apparent plurality encounters trouble when, flying in the face of his own admirable 
attempts to avoid becoming a proponent of exclusion, he states that ‘This 
polarisation is sheer loss to us all. To us as people, and to our society. It is at the 
same time practical and intellectual and creative loss, and I repeat that it is false to 
imagine that those three considerations are clearly separable’.250 He then tacitly 
reaffirms the link between value and exclusion: 
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A good many times I have been present at gatherings of people who, by 
the standards of the traditional culture, are thought highly educated 
and who have with considerable gusto been expressing their incredulity 
at the illiteracy of scientists. Once or twice I have been provoked and 
have asked the company how many of them could describe the Second 
Law of Thermodynamics. The response was cold: it was also negative. 
Yet I was asking something which is about the scientific equivalent of: 
Have you read a work of Shakespeare’s?251 
Whereas the original debate between Arnold and Huxley, couched as it was in the 
context of the respective Royal Academy of the Arts speeches maintained an 
element of civility, the vituperative riposte Leavis levelled at Snow in his 1962 
response Two Cultures? The Significance of C. P. Snow252 reframed the vitality of the 
discourse. As Helen Small notes: ‘With Snow/Leavis what had been a friendly 
contest of priorities within a context of more important shared commitments… 
became a far more rivalrous exhibition of distinct commitments (opposing politics, 
conflicting attitudes to history and modernity)’.253 The role Leavis played in 
representing the politics of the two cultures debate must be recognized as it was 
his political position which implicitly nourished his stewardship of the academy and 
the canon. In his Richmond lecture, delivered at Downing College Cambridge in 
1962, Leavis described Snow as a portent of a degenerating modern public, 
displacing literary standards as the central and guiding principle of the academy. If 
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not excessive, Leavis’s tone and behaviour has been considered extreme. Helen 
Small suggests that, taken in the context of Arnold/Huxley, Snow/Leavis changed 
the shape of academic debate from an ethos of gentlemanly civility to one more 
clearly defined by ideas of the academy as profession, the academic as professional: 
Looking at the progression of two cultures antagonisms across the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it is clear that the social contexts, 
not least the class contexts, that contained them in the high Victorian 
period could no longer be relied upon by the 1960s, even if the 
predominant response to Leavis was dismay at his abandonment of 
politeness (‘an impermissible tone’, in Lionel Trilling’s much repeated 
phrase). But it is equally clear that when the two cultures conflict came 
back to prominence in the 1990s it was to a degree contained by an 
alternative ethos that had (and has) some of the same constraining 
features as Victorian ‘gentlemanly’ debate – namely, the ethos of 
professionalism.254 
It is of particular interest that Small evokes professionalism in categorizing the 
Snow/Leavis debate, for this suggests that the defence of the values of the 
university, indeed the question of value itself is rather more a political than a moral, 
or an aesthetic one.255 This political element is reinforced by critic Guy Ortolano as 
                                                          
254 Small, pp.35-36. 
255 Small also offers further explicit gestures towards the wider political contexts surrounding 
Snow/Leavis as markers for deconstructing the argument: ‘It is a standard, and correct, observation 
on the most famous and fractious of two culture encounters that it tells us very little about the kinds 
of work the participants’ university colleagues were doing at the time but a great deal about the 
wider social, cultural, institutional, and political factors that had a bearing on the argument. 
Successive historical re-readings have pointed to the influence on both men of early 1960s debates 
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the motive behind Leavis’s aggression in his article ‘Two Cultures, One University: 
The Institutional Origins of the ‘Two Cultures’ Controversy’: 
Not only was Snow the product and advocate of the modernization that 
Leavis had long identified as the threat to an embattled culture, but his 
Rede Lecture assaulted the position of the English School as the defence 
of that culture. It was in response to both the intellectual and the 
institutional challenges that The Two Cultures posed to Leavis's program 
that he reached for his revolver in the Richmond Lecture.256 
The defence of value in the university reframed as a political and professional 
struggle characterizes the difficulty of underscoring value objectively. By accepting 
this difficulty one is forced also to accept the correlative relationship between 
subjectivity and exclusion. What can be seen in the conflict between Perloff, 
Yankelevich, and Myles is that debates centred on value struggle to elude the 
problem of elitism when it is levelled as a counter-argument to any attempts to 
define value. One may argue that a potential paradigm shift posed as a release from 
the current structure of the criticism of poetry was in fact attempted through 
Leavis’s response to the problem of the two cultures. However, in my analysis of 
Revaluation and New Critical approaches I can find no evidence that such a release 
was effected. Leavis certainly occupied an important place in the English academy, 
but as I have proposed in my comparison to the US academy, there existed and 
exist exclusions, chiefly performance as a critical medium. Despite concerted 
                                                          
over social class, culture, meritocracy, university expansionism, democracy, and the relation 
between technological progress and political progress’ (Small, p.35). 
256 Ortolano, pp.623-624. 
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interest in the elements which constitute the performance of poetry, in the 
Leavisian model of literary criticism it finds no purchase. In order to fully explore 
the reasons for this exclusion it is necessary to consider not only the operation 
Leavis and New Criticism undertook as a response to the perceived cultural, social, 
and intellectual degradations of the two cultures, but the influences which guided 
its establishment.257  
 
 
Spoken word and critical practice in I. A. Richards 
 
The aversion Leavis had towards what he perceived as the debasing influence 
of technological advances bears striking resemblance to, and was doubtless 
fostered by, the influence of I. A. Richards on Leavis’s early career as a critic. 
The following quote from Richards’s seminal text Practical Criticism: A Study 
of Literary Judgement, first published in 1929 when Richards and Leavis were 
contemporaries at Cambridge, articulates the similarity: ‘It is arguable that 
mechanical inventions, with their social effects, and a too sudden diffusion of 
                                                          
257 Ortolano refers to the respective Snow/Leavis defences as part of a grander mission to restore 
and restructure the academy: ‘Snow and Leavis clashed in their contradictory notions of that 
mission. To Snow, the university served as an engine of economic and social change. The rise in 
student enrolments meant the extension of the social mobility that had propelled him into the 
upper echelons of the establishment, and the shift in the emphasis of the universities from the arts 
to the sciences fostered the continued economic advance that science and technology promised. 
Leavis, on the contrary, believed that the university must serve as a refuge from such ‘progress.’ He 
had long maintained that the industrial advance Snow trumpeted subordinated literary standards to 
the whims of the market, resulting in the absence of the capacity for critical thought. Leavis insisted 
that the English School stand at the centre of the elite university, secure from-and in defiance of-the 
debasement of mass society’ (Ortolano, p.623). 
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indigestible ideas, are disturbing throughout the world the whole order of 
human mentality’.258 As with Leavis, Richards’s writing emphasised a solution 
to the problems of social and cultural degradation through a pronounced 
exclusivity of reading practice. In two of Richards’s most famous works, 
Principles of Literary Criticism and the aforementioned Practical Criticism, 
Richards delineates the problems of what he perceives as inferior critical 
faculties and reading practices.259 Because he interrogated the hermeneutic 
process rather than engage with the results of readings Richards’s closer 
focus on the relationship between reader and text gave root to some of the 
fundamental principles which Leavis would develop further.260 As would be 
seen in Leavis’s later writing, a similar weight of conviction can be observed in 
Richards’s critical disconcertment with modernization. The threat posed by 
‘social effect’ and ‘sudden diffusion of indigestible ideas’ seems to position 
the performance of poetry in a perilous crosshair. In Richards’s critical 
deconstruction of the relationship between poetry and the individual the 
exclusivism which hallmarked Leavisian reading is self-evident: ‘We cannot 
avoid the material of poetry. If we do not live in consonance with good 
poetry, we must live in consonance with bad poetry. And, in fact, the idle 
hours of most lives are filled with reveries that are simply bad private 
                                                          
258 Richards, Practical Criticism, p.320. 
259 I.A. Richards. Principles of Literary Criticism (London: K. Paul, 1924). 
260 The critic John Constable attests to this in his introduction to the collected essays I.A. Richards: 
Selected Works 1919-1938. Volume 10: I.A. Richards and his critics: ‘the importance of Richards in 
Leavis’s early published writings is beyond doubt. The opening pages of Mass Civilization and 
Minority Culture (1930) quote Richards’s Principles of Literary Criticism in support of Leavis’s 
contention that a critical elite stands to general population as gold does to paper currency. A letter 
to the Spectator of the 9th of April 1932 remarks that everyone concerned with literary criticism, 
and especially at Cambridge, has incurred a debt to Richards’. John Constable. I.A. Richards: Selected 
Works 1919-1938. Volume 10: I.A. Richards and his critics (London: Routledge, 2001), pp.52-53. 
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poetry’.261 Ortolano identifies Richards as the benefactor of Leavis’s mission 
in this regard: 
Richards argued that it was the literary critic who must maintain 
standards. He positioned the new English School at the centre of this 
mission, and he took the lead in establishing the study of English in 
Cambridge as a serious and rigorous field of study. As the 1920s wore 
on, however, Richards became increasingly uncomfortable in the role of 
champion of English. He was frequently absent from Cambridge, and 
eventually left altogether for Harvard in 1939. Having established the 
credentials of Cambridge English, Richards left its guardianship to a 
circle of enthusiasts centred around Leavis, and it was in Leavis that the 
fusion of the campaign against mass society and the mission of the 
English School reached its fullest expression.262  
As Ortolano avers, the political elements which became the fuel for Leavis’s 
bloodlust in his response to Snow were, for Richards, a more complicated burden. 
Richards’s withdrawal is all the more pertinent considering his acrimonious fall out 
with Leavis in the mid-thirties following the latter’s review of Richards - among 
other factors explored in Constable’s I. A. Richards & His Critics.263 I contend that 
this resistance to engaging in some of the more dogmatically political elements of 
the mission resulted from the fact that, unlike Leavis’s attendance to the page, 
Richards’s practical criticism was possessed of a sensitivity to elements that Leavis 
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262 Ortolano, p.615. 
263 See particularly Constable, pp.426-434. 
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overlooked in his subsequent development. Although Richards firmly believed in a 
poetics of exclusion his criticism suggests a temperament more flexible to certain 
currents of change brought about by Modernity. Propitiously in the case for an 
engagement with the performance of poetry this temperament stems 
predominantly from an attention to affect, and to the material world. Returning to 
Richards’s Practical Criticism and in particular his section devoted to a general value 
of poetry, the context of his statements regarding the role of the academy come 
with a caveat: ‘Doubtless to some degree poetry, like the other arts, is a secret 
discipline to which some initiation is needed. Some readers are excluded from it 
simply because they have never discovered, and have never been taught, how to 
enter’.264 For Richards the entry point into poetry is not a retreat into the page but 
a refined sensitivity to the world: ‘For there is no such gulf between poetry and life 
as over-literary persons sometimes suppose. There is no gap between our everyday 
emotional life and the material of poetry’.265 Richards’s description of the active 
processes whereby he posits poetry as a representation of the everyday world 
paints a very clear picture of how he believes poetry operates. One cannot fail to 
recognize in this operation the implied relationship between poetry and not only 
the spoken (verbal) lyric266, but the chiromatic, performed gestures which are 
foregrounded and enabled by the importance of a bodily reception of poetry: 
‘Poetry translates into its special sensory language a great deal that is given in the 
                                                          
264 Richards, Practical Criticism, p.319. 
265 Richards, Practical Criticism, p.319. 
266 The element of ‘voice’ inculcated in Richards’ practice stands particularly distinct from New 
Critical modes of textual analysis as the critic Heather Yeung avers: ‘For the New Critics, the difficulty 
in pinning down the provenance of poetic voice led to an elevation of the idea of a neutral, 
fictionalized, “speaker” of the poem, an entity apart from the author, which often produced the 
dramatic monologue readings of a poem that Jonathan Culler so fears’. (Yeung, p.64). 
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ordinary daily intercourse between minds by gesture, tones of voice, and 
expression’.267 This sublimation of poetry as a material process representative of 
and engaged with everyday emotional life appears far more suited than a formalist 
close reading to addressing the development of a performance poetics. However as 
with Leavis, so with Richards also we must acknowledge the undercurrent of 
exclusion implicit in the fact that in his critical discourse Richards maintains firm, 
value-driven academic boundaries between the intended art and the everyday: ‘The 
verbal expression of this life, at its finest, is forced to use the technique of poetry; 
that is the only essential difference’.268 Distancing himself from a more generalized 
idea of poetry as bodily and material, Richards remains complicit with critical 
faculties which gesture towards the academic position: 
No psychological dissection can do harm, except to minds which are in a 
pathological condition. The fear that to look too closely may be 
damaging to what we care about is a sign of a weak or ill-balanced 
interest. There is a certain frivolity of the passions that does not imply a 
greater delicacy, a more perfect sensibility, but only a trifling or flimsy 
constitution. Those who ‘care too much for poetry’ to examine it closely 
are probably flattering themselves. Such exquisites may be pictured 
explaining their objections to Coleridge or to Schiller.269 
Questioning this argument risks undermining the case for performance poetry. 
Critical engagement is no bad thing, and of course it would be ridiculous to suggest 
                                                          
267 Richards, Practical Criticism, p.319. 
268 Richards, Practical Criticism, p.319. 
269 Richards, Practical Criticism, pp.322-323. 
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performance poetry exists on a rarefied plane where analysis damages the integrity 
of the work (indeed, arguments for the pedagogical potential of performance 
poetry categorically oppose this). But fear of two cultures thinking and the 
industriousness of science threatening the values of the arts all too often results in 
the questioning of value, even as the critic attempts to protect it. The fact that this 
critical separation occurs between poetry and the material at the very point of 
value is problematic, as it creates the exclusions which push performance poetry, 
and other alternative (non-traditional) approaches to poetry out of the light. 
However, in the case of Richards, the focus on the relationship between language 
and material is a redeeming one, as he accedes to the argument that even the 
educated individual fails under the current critical mode: ‘Not a tenth of the power 
of poetry is released for the general benefit, indeed, not a thousandth part. It fails, 
not through its own fault, but through our ineptitude as readers. Is there no means 
to give the ‘educated’ individual a better receptive command of these resources of 
language?’.270 What Richards calls for in defence of the rapid encroachment of the 
sciences ‘disturbing throughout the world the whole order of human mentality’271 is 
a practical, dynamic method of reconnecting poetry to language and thus to the 
body: 
If there be any means by which we may artificially strengthen our 
minds’ capacity to order themselves, we must avail ourselves of them. 
And of all possible means, Poetry, the unique, linguistic instrument by 
which our minds have ordered their thoughts, emotions, desires… in the 
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past, seems to be the most serviceable. It may well be a matter of some 
urgency for us, in the interests of our standard of civilization, to make 
this highest form of language more accessible. From the beginning 
civilization has been dependent upon speech, for words are our chief 
link with the past and with one another and the channel of our spiritual 
inheritance. As the other vehicles of tradition, the family and the 
community, for example, are dissolved, we are forced more and more 
to rely upon language.272 
What then would this mean for a reorientation of poetics? For Richards this 
necessarily entails a practical element, language stemming from practice: ‘The 
understanding of speech is an art which we are supposed to acquire chiefly by the 
light of nature – through the operation of sundry instincts – and to perfect by dint 
of practice’.273 This linguistic practice is implicitly connected to the spoken, and to 
the dimensions of affect enabled by language: ‘The actual arousal in ourselves 
either of the feeling or of the complimentary attitude may take place directly or 
through our awareness of sense or intention… The cadence of a phrase may 
instigate a feeling without any intermediaries. Tone, also, we seem to understand 
sometimes directly’.274  
Significantly, the key to Richards’s assertions lies in the relationship between 
intellectual and emotional instruments: ‘The most elaborate feelings develop in us, 
however, only through thought and intention’.275 In certain vital ways this mirrors 
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273 Richards, Practical Criticism, p.324. 
274 Richards, Practical Criticism, p.332. 
275 Richards, Practical Criticism, p.331. 
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the general struggle of the two cultures debate. In Richards’s defence against the 
dangers of an increasingly dominant scientific academia suffocating the arts he 
suggests a way to readdress the binary:  
Inquiry cannot be stopped now. The only possible course is to hasten, 
so far as we can, the development of a psychology which will ignore 
none of the facts and yet demolish none of the values that human 
experience has shown to be necessary. An account of poetry will be a 
pivotal point in such a psychology.276 
What Richards proposes as a response to the two cultures divide in Practical 
Criticism published in 1929, and what his protégé Leavis distanced himself from in 
Revaluation published in 1936 less than a decade later, seem less similar when cast 
in this light. The idea of the academic ‘trying to do the reader’s reading for him’277 
stands in contrast to Richards’s gambit of a liberating, language-centred poetics 
which sought to position ‘[t]he verbal expression of this life, at its finest’278 as 
culturally prominent. The performance of poetry, and the multi-directional 
collaborative platform provided by the performative act engages with the root of 
Richards’s necessary alignment of intellectual and emotional instruments. Speaking 
aloud, performing to an audience emancipates the exchange, the best possible 
engagement with language as practice: ‘Language is primarily a social product, and 
it is not surprising that the best way to display its action is through the agency of a 
group’.279 Richards’s association with Leavis had a profound influence upon the 
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subsequent development of a Cambridge school. However, though Leavis moved 
closer to the text by engineering an antipathy to emotional engagement with 
poetry, in Practical Criticism Richards offers a practice based approach to literary 
criticism which I venture cannot be detached from a nascent acceptance of the role 
played by affect in the reading experience. It must be noted that Richards presents 
a looser sense of affect, his depiction of emotion circles around a distinction he 
draws between sense and feeling, and it is the latter which Richards uses in a 
somewhat vague fashion to stand as an oblique signifier for general emotional 
response. However, although Richards may not make the finer distinctions which 
could be identified in a more stringent study of affect and affect transaction his 
observations are nonetheless of interest to a study of performance poetry as they 
suggest a great deal of comprehension of performance poetics.280 
Far from the notion of an individualist, internalized, narrow attention to text 
Richards advertises the correlation of both sense and feeling through attention to 
emotional response. Richards repudiates the reader who feature-spots without 
questioning the value of the emotional experience: ‘Readers who take up a poem 
as though it were a bicycle, spot its metre, and pedal off on it regardless of where it 
is going, will naturally, if it is a good poem, get into trouble. For only a due 
awareness of its sense and feeling will bring its departures from the pattern metre 
into a coherent, satisfying whole’.281 One might contend that, for Richards, the 
                                                          
280 In his introduction to Practical Criticism Richards foregrounds his belief in the performance 
behind the text: 
‘Parallel to, and not unconnected with, these difficulties of interpreting the meaning are the 
difficulties of sensuous apprehension. Words in sequence have a form to the mind's ear and the 
mind's tongue and larynx, even when silently read. They have a movement and may have a rhythm’ 
(Richards, Practical Criticism, p.14). 
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emotional experience appears almost distinct from its critical exegesis: ‘The sincere 
feeling, it may be suggested, is one which has been left in its natural state, not 
worked over and complicated by reflection. Thus strong spontaneous feelings 
would be more likely to be sincere than feelings that have run the gauntlet of self-
criticism’.282 Here, as in all iterations of the argument, the question of value 
threatens to overbalance a concerted poetics of performance as Richards offers a 
somewhat inadequate explanation of good poetry’s ‘mysterious glory’ and ‘peculiar 
satisfaction’: 
How, then, are we to explain this apparent superiority in the sound of 
good poetry if we admit that on the recording drum its curves might be 
indistinguishable from those of rubbish. The answer is that the rhythm 
which we admire, which we seem to detect actually in the sounds, and 
which we seem to respond to, is something which we only ascribe to 
them and is, actually, a rhythm of the mental activity through which we 
apprehend not only the sound of the words but their sense and feeling. 
The mysterious glory which seems to inhere in the sound of certain lines 
is a projection of the thought and emotion they evoke, and the peculiar 
satisfaction they seem to give to the ear is a reflection of the 
adjustment of our feelings which has been momentarily achieved.283  
In defence of spoken, or performed poetry Richards seems on the surface to be 
quite enthusiastic here. However, the argument contains within it a paradoxical act 
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of distancing implicit in the suggestion that the activity of apprehending the feeling, 
rich or poor, is a mental activity. The mental act in this context requires the reader 
of poetry to establish the distinction between ‘mysterious glory’ and ‘rubbish’. As 
well as feeling generating a bodily, material engagement, the reader must also 
denude the experience as a mental detection. Assessing this engagement one is 
forced to reacquaint oneself with the exclusivist tendencies which lie behind 
Richards’s criticism. As he states in a later comment: ‘Such an explanation has this 
incidental advantage, that it accounts for the passionate admiration sometimes 
accorded to stray lines that seem of a mediocre manufacture’.284  
For all this, however, Richards’s attention to feeling is distinct from Leavisian 
detachment. In privileging traditional hermeneutics this detachment threatens to 
isolate the reader from the importance of poetry, which Richards firmly places in its 
capacity for generating feeling: ‘But here we are concerned very little with logical 
consequences and almost exclusively with emotional consequences. In the effect of 
the thought upon our feelings and attitudes, all its importance, for poetry, lies’.285 
As noted, Richards’s exploration of the role of affect in the experience of poetry is 
far from complete, a gap Richards himself attests to286, but Practical Criticism 
captures a very specific part of the interaction undertaken through the reading 
experience, an interaction which exemplifies itself through performance: the idea 
that there is an emotional transference between poet and recipient: 
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286  In the course of his analysis Richards explicitly states that: ‘no one knows yet what attributes a 
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(Richards, Practical Criticism, pp.217-218). 
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There are two important senses in which we can ‘understand' the 
feeling of a passage. We can either just ourselves undergo the same 
feeling or we can think of the feeling. Often in witnessing a play, for 
example, we think of the feelings of the characters, but undergo the 
feeling the whole action conveys. Obviously we can and do make 
mistakes in both forms of understanding. Much the same is true of the 
apprehension of tone, our appreciation of the speaker's attitude 
towards us.287 
In his analysis of Richards’s work entitled ‘The Practical Criticism of I. A. 
Richards and Reading Comprehension’ (1970) the scholar Robert E. Shafer identifies 
Practical Criticism as ‘one of the first major contributions from a literary critic to the 
study of the reader’s comprehension of imaginative literature’.288 Shafer distinctly 
underscores the pedagogical implications of Richards’s text, citing Richards’s 
intention in the introduction to Practical Criticism ‘to prepare the way for 
educational methods more efficient than those we now use in developing 
discrimination and the power to understand what we hear and read’.289 Once again, 
what may be highlighted in this analysis is the attention to practice over theory: 
The last reader’s pitfall Richards identified was ‘general critical 
preconceptions.’ These are ‘prior demands made upon poetry as a 
result of theories – unconscious or conscious – about its nature and 
value’ which intervene endlessly between the reader and the poem, as 
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the history of criticism well shows. His discussion of this particular pitfall 
develops the concept of a critical point of view operating as reader 
interference.290 
Of course, where affect engages with pedagogy in Practical Criticism it is 
important to recognize that Richards does not shy away from highlighting the 
potential difficulty of overvaluing emotional responses. As Shafer suggests: ‘The 
sixth pitfall for readers which Richards noted is sentimentality’.291 Yet Shafer 
expands on this point: ‘Richards concluded his discussion of sentimentality with the 
notion that the poet should not shy away from arousing the emotions but should 
attempt to give ‘enough nearness, concreteness, and coherence to the situation to 
support and control the response that ensues’.292 When Richards discusses the 
negative aspect of sentimentality he distinguishes between the excessive and the 
precise, maintaining that certain sounds such as trumpets or nightingales readily 
evoke certain emotional responses. In this respect he is engaging very clearly with 
the notion of affect and the semi-agency of our bodies in their emotional 
transactions.293 One of the most striking elements that Shafer retains from his study 
of Richards’s Practical Criticism is the potential it has as an instructive text; a 
pedagogical tool for establishing a critical framework based on practice: ‘We must, 
if possible, gain some power of diagnosis, some understanding of the risks that 
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Practical Criticism, p.268). 
120 
 
interpretations run, and some capacity to detect what has occurred’.294 What this 
foregrounding of practice entails might well be the antithesis of New Criticism’s 
definitively self-contained methodology, one which seeks to present a stable 
exegetical truth by exorcising everything outside of the material artefact of the text. 
The singularity that this method requires exposes the problem of the lineage from 
Richards to Leavis. Richards’s notion of practice in its comprehensive sense is not 
simply the educative practice of reading as an abstract skill, but reading as practice 
itself.  
Practice for Richards is an active process of reading, one which does not settle 
for a singular perspective on a text based on an assumed interpretation but which 
constantly fluctuates based on the practice of new, dynamic readings of a text. The 
inference of Richards’s approach grants permission to this kind of performative 
engagement with the act of reading. Subsequently the singular analysis of reading 
for the sake of a sense of objectivity which presents itself not only in Leavis and in 
New Criticism but in all iterations of the value debate is replaced by an 
accommodating framework which is grounded in the live, and living, being.295 Just 
as Richards’s fascination with the emotional resonances of certain sounds 
indicated, the ‘living’ basis of Richards’s practice is perfectly suited to the spoken 
word. In performance poetry the dynamic potential for a practice-based approach, 
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each ‘reading’ exploring alternative, fluctuating dimensions of feeling resonates 
with Richards’s argument regarding the notion of a value inherent to subjectivity. 
As a solution to the problem of ascribing value in the humanities, and the 
academy as a whole, the idea of an inherently valuable subjectivity finding purchase 
in the dynamic potential of spoken word is fertile only insofar as it can escape the 
ludic, insubstantial characterizations touted by Richards’s ‘intellectual defeatist’. To 
do so one must establish a distinct and robust methodology behind the value of 
subjectivity as a means to constantly expand practice, and by doing so engage 
meaningfully with feeling. The potential I see in Richards for informing and 
promoting performance poetics is the attention he paid to establishing a rigorous 
pedagogical structure to the business of practical criticism. Richards highlighted 
practical education of feeling as the objective of his theory, and nascent though it 
may have been - ‘No one would pretend that the theory as it is propounded in this 
book is ready, as it stands, for immediate and wide application’296 - it anticipated a 
shift in analytical focus towards accepting the value of emotional education. For 
Richards the consequences of this shift needed to be felt first and foremost in the 
academy: 
However incomplete, tentative, or, indeed, speculative we may consider 
our present views on this subject, they are far enough advanced to 
justify some experimental applications, if not in the school period then 
certainly at the Universities.297 
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This being said, as I have suggested, Leavis moved away from this affective 
dimension. John Mullan’s 2013 article ‘As if Life Depended on It’ in the London 
Review of Books argues that the Leavisian critical mode was not devoid of a strong 
pedagogical framework:  
Admirers and antagonists agree that, more than any other major 
literary critic, Leavis’s influence was exerted through teaching. His 
classes were mostly devoted to the close analysis of particular passages, 
the purpose being to detect sincerity, vitality – as Byatt has it, 
‘authenticity’.298 
However, as Mullan elaborates (and here it must be noted that, though the article 
shifts between praise and condemnation Mullan ultimately professes his fondness 
for the Leavisian method), ‘Leavis owed much to I.A. Richards’s advocacy of 
‘practical criticism’, but gave it a special moral intensity. Telling the difference 
between real wit and mere stylistic facility, or discriminating verbal originality from 
formulaic phrasing, was a moral imperative’.299 The fact that the hegemony of 
Leavis surpassed that of Richards rests for Mullan in Leavis’s attention to his moral 
obligation to excoriate the bad. This of course is not a particularly surprising 
signature of Leavis’s exclusivism, a quality which permeated his pedagogy as well as 
his critical work: ‘He was entirely open about his priorities, his circular for teachers 
announcing that in Practical Criticism candidates would be expected to compare a 
good passage with a bad one, detecting where qualities such as ‘sentimentality or 
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insincerity’ lay’.300 Behind this vein of moral obligation sits Leavis’s own subjectivity. 
The moral intensity Mullan addresses can be exposed as an exclusion of the sort of 
material or practical approaches to poetics that Leavis had a personal disinclination 
towards: ‘Leavis’s dislike of mass or commercial culture was sustained by many of 
his disciples. His training in reading was a training in resistance to the modern 
world, including much that we have come to call popular culture’.301 Within this 
framework of popular culture the provision of an affective dimension through 
performance certainly finds its place. Here it may be prudent to recall Leavis’s 
criticism of Dryden, whose effects he stated were: ‘all for the public ear – for the 
ear in public (so to speak)’.302 But through criticism of popular culture or resistance 
to the modern world the Leavisian method displays its own downfall. Accepting the 
recalcitrance behind this method is a covert acceptance of its temporariness. 
Though for a time it offered an edifice of critical practice, the emergence of 
modernist and later post-modernist experimentation in poetic practice ultimately 
necessitated its outgrowth.303  
 
Spoken word; value and pedagogy 
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303 Ortolano summarizes this neatly, arguing that: ‘The ideas of Leavis, arch-critic of the 
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Where then might this leave performance poetry? Interpreting Leavis’s moral 
intensity as a subjective judgement recalls the core interrogation of value that sits 
behind inclusions and exclusions within the academy. For the critic Rónán 
McDonald, the question of value has currency within the academy insofar as it 
describes the relationship between the individual subjective expression and the 
structure of evaluation: ‘[Values] differ from statements of fact and observation in 
that values are not inherent in the object that is valued but rather come from the 
person doing the valuing’.304 The implication of this is not to suggest that value as 
subjective measure can only be reduced to subjective whim, but to resituate value 
in the interaction between individuals: ‘values are a matter of culture not nature, of 
ideology and not fact, of history not timeless reality’.305 Value is discerned by the 
relativity of individual perceptions rather than an objective measure, and thus to 
determine what is valued individuals must communicate these perceptions, an act 
of communication which occurs in the performance space. Summoning the spirit of 
the two cultures division McDonald affirms the role played by the interrogation of 
value in the academy specifically in the arts and humanities disciplines: 
Science tells us about the ‘what’ and the ‘how’, but seldom the ‘why’. 
This is the domain, rather, for the humanities whose values lie, self-
reflectively, in the articulation of what ‘value’ means.306 
By deriving value through the examination of what constitutes value McDonald 
presents the distinction between intrinsic values and instrumental values: ‘those 
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which are good as something and those that are good for something’.307 Not 
exclusive to the academy but to the cultural identification of value, McDonald avers 
a bias against the instrumental when discussing the arts: ‘The arts may well have 
social and economic benefits but defenders of artistic or educational innovation are 
often unhappy about understanding artistic value solely in these instrumental 
terms. There is a lingering notion in our culture that art is, or should be, intrinsic’.308 
I contend that this distinction between values or modes of evaluation 
surpasses other concerns over the relativity of value within the arts. Leavisian value 
centres around (as Mullan suggests) a ‘moral intensity’ which, though debunked as 
subjectivity, can clearly be located within the remit of intrinsic value. For Perloff, 
Myles, and Yankelevic, squaring the circle of plurality between the inclusions of the 
communal and the exclusions of the avant-garde becomes a difficult task, one 
underpinned by the same mechanisms of suspicion which keep the intrinsic and the 
instrumental apart. Good ‘for’ the unification of a community (instrumental) 
frustrates and is frustrated by good ‘as’ the best education of the cultural psyche 
and the avoidance of Perloff’s illicit unoriginality (intrinsic). Without doubt this 
bears out Arnold’s vilification of the provincial, in particular the distinctions 
between the fineness of literature versus the banal utility of, for example, the 
newspaper: ‘the provincial spirit likes in the newspaper just what makes the 
newspaper such bad food for it’.309 In Richards perhaps, one might posit the 
beginnings of a third way. Where Richards claims in Practical Criticism that ‘If there 
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be any means by which we may artificially strengthen our minds’ capacity to order 
themselves, we must avail ourselves of them. And of all possible means, Poetry, the 
unique, linguistic instrument by which our minds have ordered their thoughts, 
emotions, desires… in the past, seems to be the most serviceable’,310 one might 
understand ‘serviceable’ in this context to hold instrumental potential. Indeed, as 
Richards maintains, ‘There is no gap between our everyday emotional life and the 
material of poetry’,311 there may be a narrowing of the distinction between 
instrumental utility (the everyday) and the intrinsic. Insofar as he proffers a 
pedagogical framework for exploring the practice of poetry, by extension he offers 
the idea of practical benefits. But of course, Richards is reluctant to fully relinquish 
his elitism for the very reason that to do so might renegotiate the identity of poetry 
and art as instrumental, and by doing so lose the quality of the intrinsic; the 
lingering notion that this is what poetry ‘should’ be.  
Much like the binary between high and low art, the binary between page and 
stage poetry, this new binary between intrinsic and instrumental requires 
interrogation. The attractiveness of Richards’s critical position is that it offers a 
practical basis for exploring poetics, and by doing so opens a space for performance 
poetry, and the importance of the performance of poetry in shaping our poetic 
understanding.312 But corralling practice into a tight relationship with 
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instrumentality, circumscribing the merit of practice because of its disassociation 
with the intrinsic presents certain complications. As Richard Howells argues in his 
essay ‘Sorting the Sheep from the Sheep: Value, Worth and the Creative Industries’, 
the assumption of a non-negotiation between the intrinsic and the instrumental in 
the arts may be a false dichotomy.313 Howells extends the discussion of an 
instrumental / intrinsic binary by negating the consequences of modes of practice in 
the arts which engage exclusively with either. He evokes education to make explicit 
this dynamic, and it is in arts education that I contend that value through 
performance can be made manifest. In his seminal 1996 text The University in Ruins 
the critic Bill Readings writes of the state of the University at the turn of the 
century, arguing that:  
In the face of student critiques of the contradiction between the 
University’s claim to be a guardian of culture and its growing 
commitment to bureaucracy, the University has progressively 
abandoned its cultural claim. Forced to describe itself as either a 
bureaucratic-administrative or an idealist institution, it chose the 
former.314 
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Richard Howells, ‘Sorting the Sheep from the Sheep: Value, worth and the Creative Industries’, in 
The Public Value of the Humanities, ed. by Jonathan Bate (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011), 
p.238. 
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However bleak this may seem, Readings posits that resistance to this discourse of 
bureaucracy is possible, and that this resistance is constructed through pedagogies: 
‘This resource will emerge in the scene of teaching’.315 Readings situates his 
approach to pedagogical resistances in a language which is couched in a very similar 
manner to the instrumental versus the intrinsic. Of the question of value in relation 
to pedagogy, Readings insists that the individual keep themselves open, ‘which 
means neither accepting the accounting logic of the bureaucrats nor simply 
ignoring it in the name of a transcendental value to education’.316 As Howells 
similarly offers, the importance Readings places is on keeping oneself open to both, 
accepting neither exclusively. This mode of thought follows from Readings’ earlier 
analysis of the place of culture in the higher education institution in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Recalling C. P. Snow, Readings suggests that the 
development of literary studies, as opposed to philosophy, signalled the beginning 
of the two cultures division: ‘From being philosophical, culture becomes literary. As 
we shall see, it is the invention of the category of literature that causes the split C. 
P. Snow notes between scientific culture and literary culture. For the literary is 
opposed to the scientific in a way philosophy is not’.317  
Readings further circumscribes the development of the literary canon in an 
attack on the value of the status of knowledge within such a structure, ascribing the 
continued presence of the canon to its necessity for the teaching of a literature 
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reliant upon definition within a curricular structure.318 The correlative of this 
perspective is of course that distinctions are made to occur through the 
categorization of knowledge into discreet fields which have little to do with the 
notion of value as an organizing principle: ‘The canon therefore gradually comes to 
function as the arbitrary delimitation of a field of knowledge (an archive) rather 
than as the vessel that houses the vital principle of the national spirit’.319 This 
description of a vital principle of the national spirit, later interpreted as a cultural 
spirit, seems to be implicitly indicative of the absence of experiential modes such as 
performance poetics. In the context of performance poetry specifically, this is a 
thing which Readings makes explicit in the course of his analysis of the category 
‘literature’ as a problematic element of the exclusive structure of the University: 
‘the notion of literature emerges when writing is analysed in terms that leave public 
oratory behind, a rephrasing of textual production that is intimately linked to the 
rise of the bourgeois public sphere’.320 Readings posits a task, one which might 
begin to invest in the potential available through an open pedagogy. The task is 
delineated by the necessity to accept the breadth of the academy’s audience: 
Making an audience for this kind of pedagogy ‘happen’ is the task that 
faces those of us who find ourselves in the contemporary University – 
teachers and students alike… Creating and addressing such an audience 
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will not revitalize the University or solve all our problems. It will, 
however, allow the exploration of differences in ways that are liberating 
to the extent that they assume nothing in advance.321 
Methods of addressing value in the academy through a renaturing of audience are 
underpinned by Readings’ final statement in the above argument. The exploration 
of differences which ‘assume nothing in advance’ open the academy to practical 
and pedagogical approaches previously excluded. The convocation of a diverse 
body of individuals, an audience, also neatly anticipates the necessity of structuring 
pedagogy around identity and evokes a material, experiential frame of reference. 
To clarify, when one imagines the literary canon one perhaps evokes the 
manifestation of an increasingly non-material division of texts. Rather than the 
sense that a text’s value came from the bodily, material impact it offered to its 
reader, the inclusion of the text in the contemporary university canon seems to be 
delineated by something more abstract, something separated from the audience or 
the manner by which it may be experienced. I contend then, that the re-situation of 
a pedagogy within the academy which focuses on the bodily experience rather than 
excluding the bodily experience is not only prudent, but a necessity. This pedagogy 
of the body, in the context of a focus specifically on the receipt and evaluation of 
literature, finds clear purchase in the study of performance poetry, and the 
acceptance of modes of performance as valid (valued) mediums for exploring 
literary texts. 
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Re-situation of the body in the pedagogic experience offered by the literary 
academy may not, as Readings avers, solve all our problems however it may 
present a platform for exploring other absences, not only the absence of 
performance poetry. Readings is not alone in highlighting the necessity of this work. 
In his 2004 essay ‘Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to 
Matters of Concern’322 the critic Bruno Latour discussed the renatured role of the 
academic in the context of twenty-first century global and social information 
structures. Latour signals the potential dangers of an academy which has grown out 
of touch by allowing its criticism to fail in meaningful dialogue, and to construct and 
deconstruct social issues in ways which affirm neither its own value nor the value of 
objectivity as fact.323 In response Latour counsels the contemporary academy to re-
evaluate its critical tools - ‘there is no greater intellectual crime than to address 
with the equipment of an older period the challenges of the present one’324 - and a 
product of such re-evaluation is that absences previously acknowledged may be 
examined and resolved. Accepting the centrality of the physical, bodily experience 
in performance poetry, arguments for a pedagogical platform of spoken word and 
performance are analogous to Latour’s insistence that ‘the question was never to 
get away from facts but closer to them, not fighting empiricism but, on the 
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contrary, renewing empiricism’.325 These arguments find particular resonance 
considering that, as I discuss in my next chapter, Latour privileges the importance of 
the body as an interface to engage, process, and learn from affective experiences. 
The powerful potential of engagement with (rather than suppression of) the body 
opens academic discourse to degrees of value which have been hitherto 
circumscribed.326 In the context of such increased attention to new avenues of 
critique, a productive rather than a restrictive act, my next chapter investigates 
how the body may be educated through the performance of poetry, and 
subsequently the roles that affect and bodily experience play in this education. 
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Chapter two 
Affect and Performance Poetry 
 
My analysis of affect in the proceeding chapter discusses the transmission of affect 
between bodies during the performance of poetry, as well as the advantages this 
presents for a defence of performance as a medium of receiving poetry. In line with 
my presentation of a pedagogy of performance poetry in my previous chapter I 
submit that a critical implication of performance poetry is the education of our 
affective drives. Spoken word, and the attendant transmissions and transactions, 
actively benefits its audience by providing a locus for the education of our bodies. 
To expand: the dialogue between the body of the performer and the body of the 
recipient, or recipients, can be reconstructed by the performer’s body once 
established that the performer’s body is an exemplary site of affect negotiation.  
To outline the structure of my analysis, I introduce the notion of affect, the 
force which: ‘arises in the midst of inbetween-ness: in the capacities to act and be 
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acted upon’327 and shapes how individuals manifest emotional responses to stimuli. 
In the context of performance poetry two things must immediately be addressed. 
First, that affect transmission does not solely originate from the performer rather it 
involves both the performer and the audience acting in correspondence. Second, 
that the notion of a live, bodily, material engagement with poetry immediately 
recalls the page and stage binary evoked in my previous chapter. In response to the 
latter query I discuss the work of Peter Kivy, specifically his 2006 text The 
performance of reading: an essay in the philosophy of literature.328 Kivy posits that 
the experience of private, silent reading is as much a performance as the oral 
performance of poetry encountered in spoken word: rather than an engagement 
between performer and audience it is a performance to oneself. I contest Kivy’s 
presentation of performance as it fails to encompass affect which I believe to be a 
necessary element of all performances of poetry. To counter his assertions I analyse 
Walter Ong’s 1980s critique of primary and secondary orality329, and Gilbert Ryle’s 
suggestion that the notion of performing to oneself is a category mistake, 
articulated in his 1949 text The Concept of Mind.330 Ultimately I assert that Kivy’s 
attempts to renegotiate the dialectic between page and stage, or the poetry 
performance and the reading of poetry, by creating one single ontology (reading as 
performance) are frustrated by the fact that there can be no complete parity 
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between the two. What sits between them and maintains the distance is the 
structural vitality of affect in performance. 
To consider the distinctions between page and stage poetry in the context 
of affect studies is to encounter other complications which surround contemporary 
spoken word, namely that awareness of affect is often the most criticized element 
of performance poetics. But to accept the trivialization of performance poetry as 
uncomfortably confessional or polemical soap-box rhetoric is to obviate interest in 
understanding the mechanism of affect in performance. Adopting C.M. Bowra’s 
critique of the relationship between politics and poetics331 I contend that all 
performance is an act of persuasion, however this need not be the didacticized 
persuasion that is commonly associated with spoken word. Rather this is a nuanced 
persuasion which relies on affect. Crucially this posits affect not as a blunt, one-
sided tool of emotive persuasion but a neutral site of potential. Failing to take into 
account this negotiating element of neutrality would be arguing solely from the site 
of affect’s consequences, and by positing a logic independent from the process, 
misinterpreting the role of affect. In defence of affect’s neutrality, I discuss the 
work of Roland Barthes332 and Bruno Latour333 engaging with the complex, multi-
faceted role affects play in the bodily engagement between individuals, 
foregrounded by the inclusion of comments taken from an interview I conducted 
with a contemporary performance poet discussing the potential negative 
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consequences of un-managed affective transmission. The first-hand evidence that 
can be taken from accounts of negative experiences of spoken word performance 
tacitly supports my argument for an increased attendance to a pedagogy of 
performance poetry as outlined in my first chapter. 
Having established a position whereby one can accept the presence and the 
value of affect in spoken word performance beyond a simplified understanding of 
emotional excess I pursue the notion of affect as a pedagogical tool. In doing so I 
invoke the work of the seventeenth-century philosopher Baruch Spinoza.334 Spinoza 
is widely regarded in the field of affect studies to be a touchstone for the 
contemporary affective turn.335 His dictum that we have not yet determined what 
the body can do has been taken by affect theorists as a maxim for understanding 
affect’s educative potential. Antonio Damasio’s text Looking For Spinoza first 
published in 2003 identifies the various different approaches to Spinoza that have 
shaped scholarship about him, but ultimately foregrounds Spinoza’s ‘attempt to 
comprehend human beings and suggest ways in which their lives could be lived 
better’.336 The relevance of this avowal of betterment to the performance of poetry 
is the explicit, active presence of affective transmission that encompasses the 
entire experience of the performance. Exploring more contemporary approaches to 
affect, particularly the theories of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (themselves 
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influenced by Spinoza) emphasises the importance of the role of affect in shaping 
our interactions: ‘A body affects other bodies, or is affected by other bodies; it is 
this capacity for affecting and being affected that also defines a body in its 
individuality’.337 This rhetoric affirms the importance of performance poetry as a 
medium for better educating the body. 
This pedagogical potential must of course be grounded in a clearer 
understanding of how exactly affect can transmit new experience or educate the 
emotions. In the final part of my chapter I investigate the mechanisms of 
transmission which shape our understanding of affect, and propose how these 
mechanisms intimately relate to the performance of poetry. This element of my 
analysis offers an in-depth study of Teresa Brennan’s theories in her 2004 text The 
Transmission of Affect.338  Not only does Brennan ground an understanding of 
transmission, but she offers ways to approach criticism of affect transmission which 
elucidates an understanding of its application in the context of performance poetry. 
I submit that resistance towards the transmission of affect is delineated in 
Brennan’s critical analysis in three forms: vagueness regarding the structure and 
definition of the ‘crowd’; boundaries presented by sight-oriented conditions of 
objectivity; and fears of self-containment and threats to the subjective self. Of 
these three resistances it is the final, the threat to the subjective self, which most 
radically highlights the pedagogical implications of affect transmission. The capacity 
affect has to challenge the self-contained ego is determined by its pervasion. 
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Against the weight of information affect provides the body, the ego must constantly 
struggle to retain self-containment, and against the pervasion of affect transmission 
and entrainment, the individual is forced to accede to the fact that their own body 
is not a contained article, but a structure constantly present to and within a social 
world. Evoking concepts of the ego facilitates an understanding of the role 
performance poetry plays in affective pedagogies. The experience of the spoken 
word performance is constituted affectively by the negotiations of the ego in the 
struggle against affective transmissions. In this respect, to recall my assertion that 
all performance is an act of persuasion, I posit a notional comparison between the 
way the poet persuades through performance, and the persuasions of affect upon 
the self-contained ego. Reinforcing the context of performance poetry’s affective 
dimensions, experiential education is facilitated by the poetry performance, which 
offers a distillation of wide degrees of affect- allowing the body to interact with 
various affective forms and drives. Performance poetry thus presents itself as an 
exemplary tool for developing a pedagogy of affect. 
 
Defining Affect 
 
When one considers the performance of poetry in the context of poetry as a wider 
whole it is inevitable that a distinction occurs between participation in a 
performance of poetry and the solitary reading of poetry.339 Arguments against the 
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value of making distinctions tend to question whether it is healthy practice to 
establish lines within and between poetry and poetics, bolstered by a belief that 
everything lying within the expanse of poetry is an indivisible part of the whole. 
These arguments are not without worth, and certainly the lack of fixity resulting 
from a reasonably vague and abstract definition of what poetry is affords the poet 
(a term which enjoys a similarly fuzzy designation) a space without nominal 
boundaries in which to pursue creative work. However, as important as preserving 
this freedom is for creative development, there is a practical necessity to identify 
distinctions between modes of poetry when there are clear differences in the way 
one receives them. These distinctions can be delineated experientially, and the 
differences that are raised can be understood by their impact upon both mind and 
body of the receiver. This impact is affective; it concerns the shifting field of forces 
and drives which direct our emotional associations with the world around us. As 
Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg articulate in their short but seminal essay 
‘An Inventory of Shimmers’:  
Affect, at its most anthropomorphic, is the name we give to those 
forces- visceral forces beneath, alongside, or generally other than 
conscious knowing, vital forces insisting beyond emotion – that can 
serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought and extension, 
that can likewise suspend us (as if in neutral) across a barely registering 
accretion of force-relations, or that can even leave us overwhelmed by 
the world’s apparent intractability. Indeed, affect is persistent proof of a 
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body’s never less than ongoing immersion in and among the world’s 
obstinacies and rhythms, its refusals as much as its invitations.340 
Affect is the body and the mind’s engagement in the world341, it is simultaneously 
operating as a latent force and an active force which: ‘arises in the midst of 
inbetween-ness: in the capacities to act and be acted upon’.342 The impact of 
performance poetry, the force which emotionally colours our experience as 
recipients, is created by harnessing and directing affect to achieve the contextual 
intentions of the poem. It is a simple matter to commit the effects of performance 
poetry to this process, however it is critical to understanding the importance of 
affect within the transaction that the process not be relegated simply to a 
performance poet wielding affect as a blunt tool which leaves a specific, intended 
impact on their audience. To begin with, the range and intensity of affect is vast and 
totalizing.343 Inclination to understand it simply as an apparent, observable force 
misses the point of its absolute pervasion: ‘it is quite likely that affect more often 
transpires within and across the subtlest of shuttling intensities: all the miniscule or 
molecular events of the unnoticed. The ordinary and its extra-. Affect is born in in-
between-ness and resides as accumulative beside-ness’.344 To argue that the 
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of Sympathy (Library of Conservative Thought), trans. by Peter Heath (Piscataway: Transaction 
Publishers, 2008). Scheler argues that affects are foundational to our value judgments; forming a 
crucial part of our phenomenal experience of the world. 
344 Seigworth, p.2. 
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performance poet harnesses affect does not mean that the performance poet is 
solely responsible for generating the emotions felt by their audience. Affect is 
generated by both performer and audience participating in the stream of affect 
that operates within the space. The accumulation of affect through the 
performance, engaging with the social and spatial conditions which provide the 
performance context, is comprised of the exchanges of affect between performer 
and audience. These exchanges, or transmission are physical and bodily 
manifestations of affect felt or received as emotional reactions. Of course, 
performance poetry is an act of persuasion with the performer engaging rhetoric in 
an attempt to establish a certain emotional reaction. However, the way in which 
that reaction manifests is negotiated by both the performer and the audience, who 
jointly participate in the shifting structure of the affect, and the ways in which it 
enters the body and the mind.345 
 
Affect and the page / stage binary 
 
Establishing a binary between page and stage poetry (compounded by the inherent 
divisions in the structures of the mediums) is problematized by too sudden and too 
certain assertions regarding the role (or non-role) of affect in silent, personal 
                                                          
345 Seigworth outlines this relationship by describing affective transactions as related ‘force-
encounters’ passing between bodies: ‘affect accumulates across both relatedness and interruptions 
in relatedness, becoming a palimpsest of force-encounters traversing the ebbs and swells of 
intensities that pass between ‘bodies’ (bodies defined not by an outer skin-envelope or other 
surface boundary but by their potential to reciprocate or co-participate in the passages of affect)’ 
(Seigworth, p.2). 
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reading. Regarding these assertions, I refer to the theories of Peter Kivy in his text 
The performance of reading: an essay in the philosophy of literature: 
I intend to pursue analogies between reading and performance: in 
particular, between reading to oneself novels and stories, and 
performing or experiencing performances of musical works. In doing so I 
hope to discover some things about our appreciation of silently read 
literary works, and, in the end, to show that reading and performance 
have more in common than common sense suspects.346 
The common sense Kivy alludes to is the binary I identify between page and stage. 
Disassociating the performed poem from the page poem locates their alterity in the 
manner by which the two are received. I contend that this differentiation hinges on 
the role of affect in performance poetry; however, before this may be elaborated 
the value of Kivy’s approach to renegotiating the comparative relationships 
between performance and silent reading must be assessed.347 
Kivy’s approach to reinterpreting the reading process begins with an attempt to 
resituate the language of performance within the act of reading.348 In the context of 
                                                          
346 Kivy, p.1. 
347 I have elected to analyse Kivy’s engagement with the page versus stage debate because he 
attempts to portray the reader as engaged in an act of performance (albeit without the affective 
capacities by which I determine performance). However, Kivy is not alone in discussing the role of 
‘voice’ in the receipt of a poem. See, for example: James Logenbach ‘The Spokenness of Poetry’, in 
The Resistance to Poetry (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 2004) pp.61-71. 
Logenbach argues that: ‘to one degree or another, no poem extends the illusion of an individual 
speaker without challenging that illusion; at the same time, no poem, no matter how strenuous its 
challenge, manages to avoid the illusion of being spoken’ (Logenbach, p.67). Of course this is a 
connected investigation, but the rhetoric it engages with, the impression of the receipt of a voice, 
locates the performance outside the reader thus highlighting Kivy’s value in this debate as a critic 
engaging with the processes enacted by the reader.  
348 Kivy is certainly not the only critic who proposes this. See also Peter Stockwell, Cognitive Poetics: 
An Introduction (London and New York: Routledge, 2002). Stockwell suggests that: ‘cognitive poetics 
sees reading as a process in which the reader performs the act of reading.’ (Stockwell, p.153). 
143 
 
his analysis reading is: ‘an event taking up a certain non-continuous period of time. 
It is the kind of event we would describe as an act or an activity: it is an action 
performed by a reader. And the most important aspect of this act is that it is, or 
results in, an experience’.349 This statement constitutes a neat linguistic gambit 
which does not satisfactorily address what is being contested between 
performance and reading. The judicious appropriation of ‘performed’ glosses 
problematic elements of the relationship between the two mediums, simplifying 
the context by which performance can be suitably applied. However, Kivy’s 
ontological approach offers an attempted justification for correcting the binary. 
Dichotomies between restraint and excess are formative to functionally negotiating 
how one’s understanding of art is shaped. This dialectic has many names – Kivy 
approaches the relationship through the lens of Nelson Goodman’s distinction 
between autographic and allographic arts.350 Autographic art (Apollonian restraint) 
is exemplified by painting or sculpture; that which is located in both spatial and 
temporal dimensions, whereas allographic art (Bacchic excess) governs music, 
drama, and performance – the live arts. Kivy’s ontology pivots on a Platonic 
understanding of type and token in the context of both autographic and allographic 
and his understanding of a performance piece denotes that: 
drama is among the allographic arts, and that its analysis, along Platonic 
lines, closely parallels that of music. The written text of the play is the 
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350 See Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1976). 
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‘score’ of the work; a performance of the play is a ‘score compliant’ and 
token of the type.351 
To re-contextualize, the script or text of a performance poem would be identified as 
the type – its tokens each individual performance of the poem. This logic holds for 
the allographic arts, however Kivy’s contention is that the autographic arts- in the 
context of the binary I analyse, the book of poems (for Kivy – the novel) - also 
engage with the interrelationship between type and token: ‘It would appear that 
the novel is a type. But what are its tokens?'.352 Kivy’s argument evades the 
problem of establishing an artefact relationship with a text by positing that the 
tokens of a novel or a collection of poetry are, similar to a performance poem – its 
readings: 
What I am suggesting, then, to bring out the major thesis of this section, 
is that the ontology of reading literary works is the type/token ontology 
of musical and dramatic works. But whereas the tokens of music, 
drama, and the other performing arts are performances, the tokens of 
read literary works are readings.353 
The analogy between readings and performances Kivy presents anticipates the 
difficult territory of arguments historicizing the origins and traditions of the reading 
process as oral performance. Kivy correctly identifies the circumscriptions inherent 
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to drawing an analogy between reading and performance, an act he labels the 
‘genetic fallacy’, and subsequently motions against:  
I am well aware of the danger, in this regard, of committing the genetic 
fallacy of inferring that something must have certain properties or a 
certain character merely because its historical predecessors and sources 
had those properties or that character. I shall try very hard not to 
commit the genetic fallacy.354 
Despite his attempts to defend his analysis against logical fallacies inherent in 
the conflation of oral cultures with contemporary performance practice, much of 
Kivy’s approach to resituating an understanding of reading relies heavily on 
dispelling notions of the originary culture of read literature and replacing these 
notions with a problematic and not entirely satisfactory response. The niche Kivy 
identifies and responds to is stated in the following excerpt: 
The whole history of fictional literature, until relatively recently, has 
been one stream only: the performance stream. And at some point, not 
much earlier than the early modern period, the stream diverged into 
two branches: the performance branch, properly so-called, and the 
read-to-yourself branch, with the modern novel as its centrepiece. How 
should we view this bifurcation?355 
Kivy refers to the divergence between these two approaches as a drastic 
ontological break, a discontinuity between experiential modes of reception. Silent 
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reading and the notion of the modern novel renegotiated the reader’s relationship 
to literature by altering the ontology between text and performance, or rather 
creating a second ontology: ‘After the advent of the silently read poem, and the 
modern novel, there were two: the work / performance and the work - …? Aye: 
there’s the rub. How are we to understand the second ontology?’.356 Kivy’s 
proposed solution is to dispense with this bifurcation altogether by removing the 
latter, incomplete ontology. In order to achieve this, he resituates the ‘read-to-
yourself branch’, the act of reading a text silently, as a performance to oneself:  
all fictional literature, has been, for almost all of its history, a history of 
literature as performance, even when the literature has been ‘read’ in 
private by the solitary reader. For even then he was read to, or read 
aloud, performed aloud, to himself… Reading silently, viewed in this 
way, is not an ontological change from the work / performance 
ontology. It is just the next logical step, into a performance of a 
different kind, a silent performance but clearly recognizable as 
performance.357 
As an approach to the relationship between read text and performance the 
contention that all fictional literature has been a performance and that the receipt 
of such, even when silently read, can be identified as performance has a number of 
problematic consequences. Not least among these consequences is the 
misconception that Kivy attempted to inoculate himself against by disavowing his 
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reliance on the conflation of oral tradition with contemporary performance 
practice. Kivy writes extensively about the emergence of literacy and, more 
specifically, the hegemony of our private relationship with the text. In his 
monograph he claims that the first recorded mention of private reading, not 
reading script in general but private reading (crucially in silence) is in The 
Confessions Of Saint Augustine, written between 397-398 AD.358 The connection 
between private reading of literature and reading in silence is of course important 
with regards to a shift in how readers receive poetry.359 The argument that 
performance can be conflated with a notion of the individual performing through 
silent reading is hampered by contending a fixed point at which silent reading 
became the fashion. Fixing this point invites criticism of Kivy because it fails to 
defend itself against the implication it harbours – that the analysis of literary receipt 
should be a diachronic analysis of successive periods of dominance.  
As a touchstone360 for the analysis of a diachronic structure of development in 
the relationship between the oral and the literate I refer to the work of the Jesuit 
scholar and philosopher Walter Ong, particularly his 1982 text Orality and Literacy: 
The Technologizing of the Word. Ong’s position with regards to the relationship 
                                                          
358 This text has been translated and reprinted many times, though I refer to the 1988 translation by 
John K. Ryan: Augustine and John K Ryan, The Confessions Of Saint Augustine (New York: Image 
Books, 1988). 
359 For a more robust historical study of the relationship between oral and literary cultures see: Jack 
R. Goody, The Interface Between the Written and the Oral (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987). 
360 For example, see: Bruce E. Gronbeck, Thomas J. Farrell, and Paul A. Soukup (eds.), Media, 
Consciousness, and Culture: Explorations of Walter Ong’s Thought (London: Sage Publications, 1991); 
Clarence Walhout, ‘Christianity, History, and Literary Criticism: Walter Ong's Global Vision’, in 
Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 62. Issue No. 2 (1994), pp.435-459; Thomas J. 
Farrell, Walter J. Ong on How and Why Things Are the Way They Are (Brooklyn: Thought Catalog, 
2014); Brian Street, ‘A critical look at Walter Ong and the ‘Great Divide’’, in Social literacies: critical 
approaches to literacy in development, ethnography and education (London: Routledge, 1995), 
pp.53-63. 
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between orality – by which he means oral culture and oral tradition - and literacy – 
by which he means chirographic, written culture - takes into account a synchronic 
comparison. However, Ong emphasises that it is essential to approach the 
relationship diachronically, analysing successive historical periods: ‘It is useful to 
approach orality and literacy synchronically, by comparing oral cultures and 
chirographic (i.e., writing) cultures that coexist at a given period of time. But it is 
absolutely essential to approach them also diachronically or historically, by 
comparing successive periods with one another’.361 Ong’s argument delineates a 
structure of orality and literacy whereby the oral traditions of cultural 
communication represent a primary orality. This is an orality completely 
unmitigated by the subsequent dominance of writing and the written word in 
cultural communication. Literacy, or the advent of a literate cultural society, arrives 
relatively late in human history; homo sapiens has been in existence for around 
30,000 to 50,000 years – our most accurate estimate of the earliest existence of 
script dates from only 6,000 years ago. Corresponding with Ong’s argument 
regarding primary orality, Kivy argues that the notion of reading in silence to 
oneself earlier than late in the 4th century was simply unknown. In the diachronic 
structure Ong describes the dominance of primary orality shifted to a focus on 
literacy and on writing, the reason for this being intimately tied with the power of 
symbols and of grapholects and how this relates to space. To quote from Ong’s 
Orality and Literacy:  
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Writing, commitment of the word to space, enlarges the potentiality of 
language almost beyond measure, restructures thought, and in the 
process converts a certain few dialects into ‘grapholects’. A grapholect 
is a transdialectal language formed by deep commitment to writing. 
Writing gives a grapholect a power far exceeding that of any purely oral 
dialect. The grapholect know as standard English has accessible for use 
at least a million and a half words, of which not only the present 
meanings but also hundreds of thousands of past meanings are known. 
A simply oral dialect will commonly have resources of only a few 
thousand words, and its users will have virtually no knowledge of the 
real semantic history of any of these words. But, in all the wonderful 
words that writing opens, the spoken word still resides and lives.362 
The spatial materiality of written language, what might be called the space on the 
page, offers a level of potential for homogeneity and for posterity.  The caveat Ong 
offers; that the spoken word resides and lives in all writing, indicates a 
denouncement of the strict dominance of literacy over the structures of orality 
which govern societal and cultural communication. This dominance bears out in the 
critical presence (or absence) of spoken word demonstrated by my analysis of the 
role performance practice has played in determining the value of performance 
poetics within the academy. Ong refers to this division in the conventional analysis 
of literature, positing:   
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Yet, despite the oral roots of all verbalization, the scientific and literary 
study of language has for centuries until quite recent years, shied away 
from orality. Texts have clamoured for attention so peremptorily that 
oral creations have tended to be regarded generally as variants of 
written productions of, if not this, as beneath serious scholarly 
attention. Only recently have we become impatient with our 
obtuseness here.363 
Of course, it must be recognized that Orality and Literary was written three 
decades ago and it would not thus be unfair to say that Ong’s observations, 
particularly regarding recent scientific and literary study, are dated.364 However in 
the diminution of oral creations as variants of the written, there is a marked 
correspondence with the relationship that performance poetry holds in the 
contemporary academy as explored in my previous chapter. Indeed, to build on this 
exploration, Ong’s mistrust of the hegemony of New Criticism in particular is 
delineated alongside ideas which challenge the consensus of New Critical thought 
and its placing of the text at the centre of critical study: 
The orality-to-literacy shift throws clear light on the meaning of the 
New Criticism as a prime example of text-bound thinking. The New 
Criticism insisted on the autonomy of the individual work of textual art… 
The New Critics have assimilated the verbal art work to the visual 
                                                          
363 Ong, p.8. 
364 For a more contemporary analysis of Ong’s work see the 2007 special issue of Communication 
Research Trends quarterly review entitled ‘Orality and Literacy 25 Years Later’: Paul A. Soukup, 
‘Orality and Literacy 25 Years Later’, in Communication Research Trends, Volume 26. Issue No. 4 
(2007), pp.1-44. 
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object-world of texts rather than to the oral-aural event-world. They 
have insisted that the poem or other literary work be regarded as an 
object, a ‘verbal icon’. It is hard to see how this visualist-tactile model of 
a poem or other verbal creation could apply effectively to an oral 
performance, which presumably could be a true poem.365  
The final remark in this excerpt demonstrates Ong’s position regarding the purity of 
primary orality and its productions; ‘true poems’. Ong’s theories situating primary 
orality as pure orality, pre-dating literate modes of representation and 
communication anticipate a necessary post-literate turn towards what Ong 
unsurprisingly refers to as secondary orality. Primary orality represents a cultural 
communication completely untouched by written grapholectics, with no knowledge 
of writing or print. Ong contends that in a post-literate world we simply cannot 
return to primary orality, which one could posit is thus now functionally extinct. 
Secondary orality, and the recent turn towards oral cultural communication which 
comprises and is made manifest by performance poetics, must take into account 
the contemporary world; a high-technology culture, with a new orality regulated by 
telephones, television, the radio, and other electronic devices which function orally 
but rely on an understanding of writing and print. What this means in the context of 
Kivy’s analysis is that the argument made for the idea of a post-literate, secondary 
oral culture’s performance in the silent reading of written text being alike to the 
mechanisms of a traditional oral culture’s performance is untenable. If, as Kivy 
contends: ‘all fictional literature, has been, for almost all of its history, a history of 
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literature as performance, even when the literature has been ‘read’ in private by 
the solitary reader’366 there is no accommodation made for the fact that oral 
culture prior to the introduction of the written word into the societal sphere does 
not and cannot resemble the secondary orality of a post-literate community. The 
very notion thus of a sublimation of the oral traditions of poetry into the 
conventions that govern receipt of written poetry is problematized by the 
diachronic intercession of a period where literacy dominated cultural 
communication. 
Whereas Kivy locates the relationship between voice and text in a fixed 
Platonic dialectic, Ong provides a more mutable interpretation of Plato. Ong 
suggests that despite the fact that Plato exhibits misgivings about literacy and the 
written word his objections are contained within written text, a technological 
transformation of the original spoken word: ‘Plato’s entire epistemology was 
unwittingly a programmed rejection of the old oral, mobile, warm, personally 
interactive lifeworld of oral culture (represented by the poets, whom he would not 
allow in his Republic)’.367 Akin to Ong’s description of the relationship between 
primary and secondary orality, this transformation represents a reflexive 
internalization of an external process where the technology of the written word 
becomes the means by which individuals internally process communication.  To 
take this argument further, Ong suggests that the entire notion of Platonic form 
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which Kivy ascribes as type; within the domain of the allographic ‘live’ art, is 
underwritten by a rejection of orality: 
Platonic form was form conceived of by analogy with visible form. The 
Platonic ideas are voiceless, immobile, devoid of all warmth, not 
interactive but isolated, not part of the human lifeworld at all but 
utterly above and beyond it. Plato of course was not at all fully aware of 
the unconscious forces at work in his psyche to produce this reaction, or 
overreaction, of the literate person to lingering, retardant orality.368 
In the context of a rejection of Kivy’s notion of silent performance of text through 
reading Ong highlights the detachment of written text from the ‘human lifeworld’. 
This critique of the relationship between orality and literacy when placed alongside 
Kivy’s theories seems to destabilize the argument Kivy makes for a text’s 
performative potential. This being said, Ong presents a compelling defence of this 
potential in the paradox of a dead text communicating living orality. By way of an 
elucidating analogy he compares the pressing of dead flowers between the pages of 
a book to the representation of life through fixed, dead text: ‘The dead flower, once 
alive, is the psychic equivalent of the verbal text’.369 Here Ong makes an apparent 
concession to the kind of thought which mobilizes in Kivy’s theoretical approach to 
text and performance. An oblique comparison can be drawn between Kivy’s notion 
of the silent reader’s constant performance to their self and Ong’s description of 
the performative potential engendered by the timeless fixity of the written word: 
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‘The paradox lies in the fact that the deadness of the text, its removal from the 
living human lifeworld, its rigid visual fixity, assures its endurance and its potential 
for being resurrected into limitless living contexts’.370 Ong relies heavily upon the 
term ‘human lifeworld’ to shore up his distinction between dead text and living 
orality. The concept of lifeworld here relates to a phenomenological understanding 
of lived experience first presented by Edmund Husserl in 1936 as a coherent 
universe of existing objects which form the basis of shared human existence.371 This 
shared horizon of experience is the background upon which all humans live. It is 
necessary at this juncture to foreground the potential relationship between an 
affective understanding and a phenomenological understanding of the performance 
poem as phenomenology forms an important methodological element of my later 
analysis of the experience of the spoken word event within a performance space. I 
contend that the phenomenological notion of a lifeworld that Ong impels his reader 
to consider is inseparable from the world of affective experience.372 Ong delivers a 
description of the lifeworld which grounds it in the negotiations between beings 
and bodies:  
In the absence of elaborate analytic categories that depend on writing 
to structure knowledge at a distance from lived experience, oral 
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371 See: Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp.108-109. 
372 This can be further supported by various alternatives to the Kivy model of reading as 
performance which foregrounds affect in the reading process. For example, in A.E. Housman’s 1933 
lecture ‘The name and nature of poetry’ Housman suggests that the feeling experienced by the poet 
is transfused into the poem and the reader then enacts a process of tracing the feeling back, sensing 
a ‘vibration corresponding to what was felt by the writer’ (Housman, p.12). This feels unsatisfactory 
as an explanation precisely because the affective experience (a bodily experience) cannot be easily 
accommodated within the ‘feeling’ which Housman gestures towards. This would require the 
interaction of performer and audience within a performance space. (A.E. Housman, The Name and 
Nature of Poetry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935)). 
155 
 
cultures must conceptualize and verbalize all their knowledge with 
more or less close reference to the human lifeworld, assimilating the 
alien, objective world to the more immediate, familiar interaction of 
human beings.373 
By dint of Ong’s reference to the absence of writing categories that structure 
knowledge one can infer quite clearly that in this context Ong is referring to a 
culture of primary orality. However, I propose that Ong’s argument, which 
separates the lifeworld from the technological world, interpolates a binary which 
can also be applied to a contemporary culture of secondary orality. Despite the 
necessary conflation of orality and literacy which hallmarks secondary orality, an 
argument for the disruptive potential of literate culture in the context of 
contemporary performance poetics is not diminished. Ong is not seeking to 
obfuscate any of the consequences of maintaining a binary between the lifeworld 
of the oral and the dead artificiality of the written text when he refers to this 
disruptive potential synchronically (timelessly) rather than as a fixed threat to 
primary orality: ‘A chirographic (writing) culture and even more a typographic 
(print) culture can distance and in a way denature even the human’.374 Critics of 
contemporary performance poetry must therefore not fail to address the issues 
Ong raises, or obviate their relevance simply on the grounds that Ong’s primary 
orality provides a perfect academic landscape; one which can be contested, but 
never actualized (because it is, as I contended, functionally extinct). The disruption 
of the literate exists as much in the context of contemporary secondary orality as it 
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did when it operated as the threat which extinguished primary orality: ‘Writing is an 
even more deeply interiorized technology than instrumental musical performance 
is. But to understand what it is, which means to understand it in relation to its past, 
to orality, the fact that it is a technology must be honestly faced’.375 This is the 
precise point where affect can be inferred in the debate surrounding the oral and 
the literate. Resonant with the notion of lifeworld Ong establishes, affect provides a 
platform to understand the distinction between the internalized and the 
externalized, or rather the natural and the technological: ‘There is no way to write 
‘naturally’’.376 To clarify, Ong finds a correlative naturalness in the oral which 
cannot be identified in the written:   
Oral speech is fully natural to human beings in the same sense that 
every human being in every culture who is not physiologically or 
psychologically impaired learns to talk… Writing or script differs as such 
from speech in that it does not inevitably well up out of the 
unconscious.377  
This unconscious, natural process is certainly related to affect in a way that the 
written is detached from. This is because the oral (as a communicative gesture) 
mandates the presence of more than one individual, which necessarily creates a 
field for affective negotiations, whereas written communication such as page 
poetry can communicate abstracted from the exchange of affect on the level of a 
technological intervention. Of course arguing for the separation of silent, solitary 
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reading from the exchanges of the liveworld of performance necessarily returns to 
Kivy, who destabilizes the ‘common sense’ approach of rendering performance and 
text distinct, replacing this understanding with what he proposes is a more nuanced 
depiction of the act of reading.378 However, Kivy’s rhetoric here can be challenged 
as a ‘category mistake’ a term first articulated by the philosopher Gilbert Ryle in his 
1949 text The Concept of Mind.379 Ryle furthered this analysis in a later text On 
Thinking (1979) expressing the idea that performing ‘to oneself’ is a category 
mistake: 
We look through his caravan window and see the circus clown or the 
conjuror going through his capers or his prestidigitations in solitude. I 
suppose we might, though I doubt if we really would say that he is 
clowning or conjuring to himself, but can he literally be amusing or 
mystifying himself…?380 
Ryle’s contention is accurate, and while Kivy attempts in the course of his 
monograph to propose that an individual can be their own audience, he predicates 
his rhetoric with the disclosure that: ‘Of course, in performing to yourself there are 
many things you can’t do, among them those things that you can’t do to or for 
yourself’.381 Attempts to renegotiate the dialectic between page and stage, 
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performance and reading, creating one single ontology - are frustrated by the fact 
that there can be no complete parity between the two. What sits between them 
and maintains the distance is the structural vitality of affect in performance. Kivy’s 
statement regarding the problem of containing the totality of the reading 
experience within his approach points directly towards affect, which as I argue in 
this chapter, is responsible for answering what can be done to and for the self and 
how it can be done. 
To return to the initial contention: the capacity to witness, to observe a 
performer drawing upon and engaging with affect allows an audience to recognize 
and to similarly encounter affect, it awakens: ‘a body’s capacity to affect and to be 
affected’.382 When one considers the relationship between performance and print 
poetry, and the identities of these elements within the wider body of poetics, it is 
apparent that a distinction can and should be made between the two. There is an 
experiential difference that must be explored in order to justify analysis of 
performance poetry as a distinct mode of poetry, and it is affect and the study of 
affects which provides a way to critically understand this difference.  
 
Performance as persuasion  
 
Affect studies however, with respect to alternative major critical camps which 
engage with the question of how to value the experience of literature, is recent, 
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nascent, and far from an authoritatively established model. There is a certain 
mistrust of affect as a critical mode: ‘first encounters with theories of affect might 
feel like a momentary (sometimes more permanent) methodological and 
conceptual free fall. Almost all the tried-and-true handholds and footholds for so 
much critical-cultural-philosophical inquiry… become decidedly less sure and more 
nonsequential’.383 Affect falls foul of the classic and inflexible pedantry of the critic 
who will not bend to allow any question left intentionally unanswered. There must 
be a distinct, observable, measurable, and demonstrably infallible response to the 
interrogation of each stage of the argument, or the theory collapses. The 
imprecision of affect- the lack of a neat and quantifiable taxonomy is impermissible: 
‘Because affect emerges out of muddy, unmediated relatedness and not in some 
dialectical reconciliation of cleanly oppositional elements or primary units, it makes 
easy compartmentalisms give way to thresholds and tensions, blends and blurs’.384 
In addition, when considering affect within the context of performance poetry 
mistrust is further compounded. Reiterating the argument that performance poetry 
is an act of persuasion, and that rhetoric is utilized by the performance poet to 
direct affect, brings spoken word perilously close to the insubstantial didacticism so 
often used as justification for attacks on the value of performance poetry as a 
genuine mode of receiving and understanding poetry.  
To accept this impression of performance poetry’s rudimentary and 
uncomfortable didacticism is to obviate interest in understanding the mechanism of 
affect in performance. In order to appreciate the role affect plays in shaping 
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performance poetry, it is vital to first understand the substance of performance 
poetry. As C. M. Bowra argues in his text Poetry and Politics: ‘The essence of this 
poetry is that it deals with events which concern a large number of people… It is 
thus the antithesis of all poetry which deals with the special, individual activity of 
the self’.385 Of course, the modern day performance poet will often rely heavily on 
their individual self during both the creative process and the presentation of the 
complete piece. The performance of poetry is the projection of an identity, and this 
identity underpins any rhetorical content within the poem.386 However, the potency 
of this identity is derived from the recipient’s capacity to empathize with the 
affective tenor of the experience therefore demonstrating their ultimately public 
nature. Bowra comments on the loss of the public voice, or rather, speaking to the 
public with the intention of coaxing affect into familiar shapes: ‘To younger poets 
mystical or metaphysical assumptions on any large scale are unwelcome because 
they claim too much and are incapable of verification. It is safer and often more 
honest to keep clear of them and to confine oneself to what is known’.387 Once 
again, suspicion and mistrust is mediated by an unwillingness to accept what is not 
quantifiable, that an unprovable feeling can be afforded a potency measured by our 
capacity to recognize and empathize with it regardless of its seemingly unique and 
individual source: ‘In [poetry] the transformation has been from a desire to be 
comfortably universal to a conviction that only through a very precise attention to 
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particulars can it be anything at all’.388 This comfortable universality is where the 
vitality of affect the performer engenders must engage the audience or fail to move 
them. In the vague generality of such relatively weak affective commitment the 
audience finds little purchase, and no way to vitalize the experience of the poem 
through affect or through empathetic resonance.389 The real potential of 
performance poetry lies in the experiences which catch the audience within a 
strong and shared affective field the audience can commit to. 
When this strong, shared affect is not established however, performance 
poetry as a mode or an art form intrinsically connected to public address diminishes 
itself upon an audience who cannot but be disenchanted by their underwhelming 
lack of participation in the process. This manifests in the tendency of critics to 
misconstrue performed public poetry as uninspired didacticism. For the modern 
poet who has moved against the uncomfortable rhetoric of public address, 
mistrusting any claims that can be made to universal affective experience, poetry 
must recede to that which is personal, and that which by virtue of its being the 
poet’s own sentiment cannot be expressed, and subsequently recognised as a 
universal truth: ‘Instead of moving outwards in pursuit of unfamiliar universes, 
[poetry] moves inward to unexamined recesses of the self. In the end it may find 
something universal, but this is not to be sought as such in the first instance’.390 
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To argue that all performance poetry is an act of persuasion appears to 
facilitate arguments for the trivial, uninspired didacticism inherent in less 
sympathetic views of performance poetry. The performance poet appears didactic 
in the sense that his or her motive is to provoke and persuade the audience to feel 
as the poet is feeling by a process of empathy, or to direct their audience to a 
certain feeling by utilizing their mastery of rhetorical structures and devices. 
However, this form of persuasion is not didactic as it relies on the participation of 
the audience in a co-transaction of affect. Didacticism, used in a pejorative sense, is 
vilified in the context of performance poetry because when adopted it overwhelms 
and governs the perspective of the audience. A common criticism of performance 
poetry is that it appears to fundamentally lack the challenge presented by page 
poetry, which in its profound state offers itself as a terser, more opaque, and more 
interesting experience. Critics of performance poetry, particularly those critics who 
identify with the new Modernist avant-garde poetry of the latter half of the 
twentieth century and beyond, reliably stick to condemnation of the transparency 
of the medium, one which does the work for the audience by telling them how to 
feel, by believing in the value of the public experience of the private as a vehicle for 
motivating affect. Such critics believe that by denying the audience the challenge 
and the puzzle of the poem, the performance poem is nothing more than an 
indulgence, one which cannot become anything with potential. Had the recipient, 
the reader of the poem participated in the process, unpicking the puzzle, joining the 
scatter of dots, undertaking and achieving the journey of approaching the poem’s 
intention, then perhaps, with a symbiotic gestation of achieved understanding 
rather than an objective answer, the potency of the poem might manifest. The 
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recipient of the performance poem however, can do nothing more than receive the 
didactic message of the poem, regardless of the calibre of the performance. In 
conceiving of the page and stage debate in this manner, the ideological argument 
dictating contemporary study and appreciation of performance poetry is unmasked, 
for though certain strands of New Poetry and contemporary studies of poetics may 
valorise subjective doubt, in contrast the performance poet may twist and turn, but 
the one thing the performance poet must not do is refuse the audience an answer. 
To do so is to fail to engage with a clear affective goal, and to replace public 
rhetoric and persuasion with a challenge, one which crucially takes time. Though 
this type of poem, one which its reader must take necessary time with, certainly 
has merit, when rendered as a performance due to the constraints of the medium it 
falls flat.391 Of course the space allowed for lengthier exegetical interpretation of a 
page poem does find comparison in the manner in which the performance poem 
persists in the memory of the audience and can be reflected upon after the fact. 
The argument I make here is that during the event of its reception a performance 
poem is offering an additional affective dimension. This does not mean that 
performance poetry is an inferior medium. The distinct flaw in such arguments 
regarding the nature of performance poetry is that participation within a poem 
should not be relegated simply to the solitary reader puzzling out the poet’s 
intentions. One must not assume that performance poetry as a medium denies its 
recipient the participation which underpins the puzzle solving element of 
arguments favouring printed poetry, because the burden of work which the 
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audience does undertake in the process of the performance poem is being done 
elsewhere, by affect.392 
Barthes, Latour, and affective neutrality 
 
The complexities of the web of affect indicated earlier in my analysis returns as the 
participatory element which negotiates the relationship between the audience and 
the performer. Crucial to this process is exposure both of the body, and to the body 
of the performer, and it is this aspect of the body (and the role it plays in the 
affective process) which requires further examination. Attempts to conceive of a 
priori postulations that situate affective transaction as a holistically beneficial 
process do not attend to the aforementioned complexities or to the fact that affect 
encompasses a varied and totalizing spectrum of engagements, which may or may 
not be positive: 
As much as we sometimes might want to believe that affect is highly 
invested in us and with somehow magically providing for a better 
tomorrow, as if affect were always already sutured into a progressive or 
liberatory politics or at least the marrow of our best angels, as if affect 
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were somehow producing always better states of being and belonging – 
affect instead bears an intense and thoroughly immanent neutrality.393 
It is important to acknowledge this, particularly in the context of performance 
poetry which is often couched as an emphatically positive experience for both 
audience and performer. In response to this issue I interviewed a contemporary 
spoken word poet; Azfa Awad Ali who has been involved with spoken word projects 
in the UK since 2013 when she auditioned for Apples and Snakes’ 2013 project ‘One 
Way Ticket’. Her latest project ‘Map of Me’ produced by Papertale Theatre in 
collaboration with Half Moon Theatre and Apples and Snakes South East394 
presented her own real-life experiences as an asylum seeker told through a series 
of spoken word performances. Ali discussed the structure of the show and its two-
year development, saying:  
The backbone of the 50-minute show is poetry, and it is raw, emotional, 
personal poetry mostly written by myself. The show taught me how to 
be an actress and a poet at the same time without it looking like 
melodrama. Allowing the poetry to breathe, that was always the 
thing.395 
When questioned about the content of the poetry Ali confirmed that the material 
was autobiographical, charting her own experiences seeking asylum in the UK: 
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We sold it as based on real life stories. We did do research and 
development workshops with young people who had refugee 
backgrounds. We didn’t end up using these experiences, but to save me 
from constant interrogation we did still market it as based on true life 
experiences from different refugees.396 
In the process of developing, rehearsing, and performing real life traumatic 
experiences I enquired about the emotional relationship Ali developed with the 
show. Her response elucidated the problems that can occur when encountering 
affect: 
It felt like a lot, like a two year process of doing the same show over and 
over again. After the first few performances I was done, but then there 
were more bookings and gigs, it got to the point where I completely 
resented it and I had to stop doing it. I resented the familiarity of it. I 
described it as peeling back a scab; annoying, painful, unnecessary. 
Other people haven’t been through the emotional labour of the poetry: 
five years of poetry I have written, taken from different experiences 
from my childhood. It’s like reliving a life for 50 minutes every show – 
it’s a nightmare! If you haven’t had the most amazing life, it’s not 
something you really want to be doing.397 
The experience Ali outlines is a manifestation of the transmission of affect between 
performer and audience; a mechanism which will be explored further in this 
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chapter. Discussing the physical reaction Ali had to performing the show, she 
indicated that the affect she experienced often expressed itself as a tension both on 
the stage and after the performance. When asked if that feeling was consistent she 
replied: 
Every time I did the show, and after each performance period. I didn’t 
understand what it was at the time and I think that made me angry, 
because I enjoyed doing the show, it’s great to share my experiences 
with people. I have that cathartic process of letting go, but then it hits 
me back in the face. I’ll feel something, this feeling in my throat. The 
next day it would be difficult for me to get up, sometimes I’d feel dizzy. I 
know what that feeling is now. Throughout the whole show I’m in 
character. But when I get home I’m Azfa again and all of those things 
which were art are now personal experiences that I need to absorb. 
Because I’m distancing myself while on stage it all comes flooding in as a 
rush. I’ve had to stop doing the show because I’m reliving trauma by 
doing it. It’s all of these childhood experiences and it’s heightened. 
You’re in that moment, in every single experience: the taste, the sound, 
everything – again and again and again for 50 minutes at a time. Even 
performing poems which are cathartic you’re reliving that trauma.398 
Our discussion of the length of ‘Map of Me’ (and the potential compounding of the 
affective experiences over a 50 minute show) exhibits notable differences to the 
conventional spoken word performance, which is rarely as protracted. However, Ali 
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herself drew comparisons to the experience of shorter performances from both the 
perspective of a performer and an audience member, noting: ‘One of the things you 
experience with a lot of spoken word poets is a constant tension, and when they’re 
finished it’s a huge slump and then you go away feeling overwhelmed, thinking 
about what they’ve said. It’s too much sometimes’.399 When I interrogated the 
potentially cathartic element of the experience which Ali had eluded to in our 
discussion she responded: ‘Sometimes when I write and I perform I go in with an 
optimistic perspective that if I share it with someone then I’m letting it go. But then 
it might come back to me in a different way that I don’t recognize’.400 The fact that 
Ali gestures towards a distortion of the returning transmission of affect further 
reinforces the complicated web of affect which can determine the experience of a 
performance. Even when couched as a cathartic or redemptive expiation of 
feelings, Ali often found that the performance manifested a different bodily 
experience for her. Pursuing this notion of anticipated catharsis Ali affirmed: 
Even when I was doing the show I knew why I was doing the show. I was 
so tired of holding onto my past, reliving it in my mind so I just wanted 
to write the story, perform it, let it go. I knew I was doing it for that 
purpose. I also need to keep myself safe in the process though. I did 
spend a majority of the time after the shows feeling sorry for myself and 
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eventually I had to sit it out – I can’t do the thing I love to do 
(performance poetry) the way that I love to do it.401 
The notion of safeguarding which is explicit in Ali’s experience of spoken word 
performance is vital evidence of the need to promote the pedagogical merit of 
performance poetry. Experiences of performance poetry educate both performer 
and audience, and increased attention to the experience of affect in performance 
under a pedagogical frame would be of great benefit to investigations into the 
potential wellbeing ramifications of affect.402 
These wellbeing ramifications are of course grounded in the ways in which 
the body processes and manifests affect and it is important to stress that the affect 
itself remains neutral. To return to Seigworth’s comments regarding the ‘intense 
and thoroughly immanent neutrality’403 of affect, an assessment of affect as a 
negotiating element which fails to take into account this neutrality would be 
arguing solely from the site of affect’s consequences, and by positing a logic 
independent from the process, misinterpreting the role of affect. One way of 
addressing this concept of neutrality is to draw on Roland Barthes’ series of lectures 
The Neutral, delivered between 1977 and 1978, and first published in 2002. In these 
lectures Barthes approaches distinctions of neutrality, especially with regards to 
affect and affect transaction. Barthes’ interest in poetry frames the value of his 
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theoretical approach to poetics. Of particular note is the relationship between 
‘readerly’ and ‘writerly’ habits, terms Barthes employs to distinguish the 
experiential consumption of text, and that position him integrally within a critical 
discourse addressing engagement with poetry on and off the page. In response to 
the idea of the neutral, Barthes proposed ‘a hyperconsciousness of the affective 
minimum, of the microscopic fragments of emotion… which implies an extreme 
changeability of affective moments, a rapid modification, into shimmer’.404 For 
Barthes, neutrality offered the presence of potential rather than the absence of 
designation. A neutrality implicating extant and established conditions, a fixed 
monochromatic greyscale, is distinguished from a neutrality constantly on the 
margin of determination, operating within a model of scaled and gradated intensity 
(as per the interrelationship between affective ‘patterns’). As Barthes articulates: ‘I 
define the Neutral as that which outplays (déjoue) the paradigm, or rather I call 
Neutral everything that baffles the paradigm’.405 Barthes offers a gambit which 
challenges the conventional paradigm of opposition between, or negation of, non-
neutral positions. The neutral, encompassing a potentiality engendered by its non 
or pre-designation, is active: ‘My definition of the Neutral remains structural. By 
which I mean that, for me, the Neutral doesn’t refer to ‘impressions’ of grayness, of 
‘neutrality’, of indifference. The Neutral – my Neutral – can refer to intense, strong, 
unprecedented states. “To outplay the paradigm” is an ardent, burning activity’.406 
Within a situational context, the Neutral is placed between: ‘only intervals, only the 
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relation between two moments, two spaces or objects’.407 These locations- the 
same interstitial spaces, are the territory of affect, of affect’s ‘inbetween-ness’. 
Reading affect’s neutrality within the context of Barthesian Neutrality, one 
may avoid simplifying affect by positing a new framework for affect analysis. Binary 
associations give way to a spectrum of potential states and progressive intensities. 
Out of Neutrality, and his study thereof, Barthes sought to postulate an ethical 
structure: ‘All that: dispassionate apparatus of intellectual nature: the argument of 
the course + principles of exposition. It remains to bring out the truth of the course: 
the desire that is its origin and that it stages. The course exists because there is a 
desire for Neutral: a pathos (a patho-logy?)’.408 Separating out the ethical 
investment particular to the project Barthes was engaged with he writes that: ‘I 
add: a reflection on the Neutral, for me: a manner – a free manner- to be looking 
for my own style of being present to the struggles of my time’.409 What remains is a 
‘Patho-logy’ which can be superimposed upon the affective drive, and the 
relationship between affect and the body. The neutral state of affect resonates with 
and against the experience of the body, as determined by what can be felt, what 
can be identified as issuing recognition from the body. Though in a state of 
neutrality, affect’s intense and mutable potential anticipates the body in an: 
‘inventory of shimmers, of nuances, of states, of changes (pathè)’.410 For Seigworth, 
Barthes’ Neutrality presents an apt state of latency, and crucially, one which is 
dominated by a potential which employs creative faculties: 
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Here affect theory is, at one level, an ‘inventory of shimmers’ while, 
upon another register, it is a matter of affectual composition (in a 
couple of senses of the word ‘composition’ – as an ontology always 
coming to formation but also, more prosaically, as creative / writerly 
task). This is a passion for differences as continuous, shimmering 
gradations of intensities. Making an inventory (of singularities). And in 
the interval, is the stretching: unfolding a patho-logy.411 
The dictum of Barthesian Neutrality suggests that the body, attuned to the 
developments and fluctuations arising out of affect has the potential to 
administrate the ‘inventory of shimmers’, to process via pathological response. 
Intensity or grades of potential within affect can be determined by the body. 
Reordering questions of neutrality and the undetermined nature of the complex 
array of affect, the body becomes a tool to anticipate and manage affect as one 
encounters it. 
Affect studies reinforce the inter-relationship between mind and body, the 
necessity of the body in the process of engaging with emotions. Exploring the 
phenomenological construction of the physical self in his critical study How to Talk 
about the Body? The Normative Dimension of Science Studies, Bruno Latour states 
that: ‘to have a body is to learn to be affected… put into motion by other 
entities’.412 The prominence of performance poetry as a means to re-construct our 
understanding of poetry and our relationship as recipients is configured by the 
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importance of the body as a tool to be used to access and process affect. By such an 
opening of the body individuals can educate themselves, accepting affect as a 
conditioning force not simply for an emotional education, but to condition their 
experiences as social and cultural beings. When the body is attuned to affect, the 
notion of bodily capacity as a contained, physical structure loosens in favour of the 
body as: ‘an interface that becomes more and more describable when it learns to 
be affected by many more elements’.413 Indeed Seigworth and Gregg’s 
aforementioned essay ‘An Inventory of Shimmers’ serves as an introduction to a 
collection of critical essays which attempt to corral the fluid fragments of affect into 
a concerted study. Appropriating Barthes’ ethical approach as a constructive design, 
the closest the critics come to a statement of intent serves as a reminder of the 
importance of utilizing the body not just in our critical faculties, but in our day to 
day life:  
We would maintain that affect theories, whatever their multiple 
trajectories, must persistently work to invent or invite such a ‘patho-
logy’ into their own singular instantiations- not only as inventory 
(though, heaven knows, sometimes that can be work enough) but also 
as a generative, pedagogic nudge aimed toward a body’s becoming an 
ever more worldly sensitive interface, toward a style of being present to 
the struggles of our time.414 
                                                          
413 Latour, How to Talk about the Body?, p.205. 
414 Seigworth, p.12. 
174 
 
It is this belonging to the reality of life which shields performance poetry from the 
mode of criticism which questions its capacity to provoke challenging and valuable 
conceptual processes. The reward of solving the puzzle may be a powerful aspect of 
poetry, but within performance poetry where the tangible and the transparent is 
shifted into focus in favour of allowing the audience to firmly grasp intention before 
it slips away, space is created to allow the audience to engage more sharply with 
their identity as affective beings. Affect may be generated in all engagements of the 
human psyche, in every in-between of our existence as social and cultural beings; 
however, the potential of performance poetry is the power it affords to 
concentrate our affect, to drive forward our feelings unfettered by mystery and 
dissimulation. Though the hard won poem (the puzzle solved) may offer a richer, 
subtler, more complicated pattern of affect, the process required to reach the 
solution threatens the recipient’s ability to feel the reality of the affect and its 
poignancy as a real experience.  
 
The Spinozist imperative 
 
The value of performance poetry, and the justification for its study lies in its 
capacity to offer an experience of the material exchange of affect – to witness 
affect shifting between performer and audience, to grasp the rhythms and flows of 
affect within a performance space. With clarity we experience the body as an active 
part of the affective process and gather together our own mental and physical 
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reactions as bodies participating within, and engaging with a shared affective field. 
This, not only as a poetic endeavour but a human practice, is a vital act. Foremost, 
affect must be connected to the real world, to feelings being bodily felt:  
affect’s impinging / extruded belonging to worlds, bodies, and their in-
betweens – affect in its immanence – signals the very promise of affect 
theory too: casting illumination upon the ‘not yet’ of a body’s doing, 
casting a line along the hopeful (though also fearful) cusp of an 
emergent futurity, casting its lot with the infinitely connectable, 
impersonal, and contagious belongings to this world.415 
Theorists working within the tradition of affect studies as a critical field operate 
from a site which grounds affect in the real world, alive to changes between bodies, 
the practical application of felt affect. Critics engaging with affect studies as a 
critical mass, albeit a relatively nebulous mass, commonly cite Baruch Spinoza as a 
forefather of sorts for the responsibility of developing affect studies. In the Ethics, 
Spinoza maintains that: ‘nobody as yet has determined the limits of the body's 
capabilities: that is, nobody as yet has learned from experience what the body can 
and cannot do’.416 The inconclusive, not-yetness which characterizes our knowledge 
of the body sets us the task of engaging with ourselves as bodies, as sites of affect 
negotiation, and exploring our capacity to radically impose ourselves upon our 
surroundings. This can be contrasted to the closed challenge of the denser page 
poem, the puzzle to be solved. Of course the puzzle common to the page poem 
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offers a similar never-ness, there isn’t a neat author’s solution printed upside down 
on the back page of the collection, the challenge is rather for the reader to unpick 
the stitches and perhaps perceive through the pattern a potential possible which 
satisfies them. However, the dogged solipsism at the heart of this process hampers 
the live, animated, bodily dynamism of engaging with affect in reality, a sense of 
vibrancy which may justifiably stake its lot in performance poetry. The directive 
which lies at the heart of Spinoza’s statement is made manifest: ‘the unceasing 
challenge presented by Spinoza’s ‘not-yet,’ conveying a sense of urgency that 
transforms the matter and matterings of affect into an ethical, aesthetic, and 
political task all at once’.417 Performance poetry undertakes this urgency by 
facilitating bodily engagement with affect, by literally providing a stage for affect to 
be experienced. Without doubt the frame of this undertaking, as Seigworth and 
Gregg accurately observe, does not anticipate a firm conclusion: ‘But then, of 
course, Spinoza must have also understood that affect’s ‘not yet’ was never really 
supposed to find any ultimate resolution… It is this Spinozist imperative, ever 
renewed by the ‘not yet’ knowing of affective doing that drives affect’.418  It would 
be crude and not a little naive to posit performance poetry as a totalizing response 
to the challenge of realizing affect in poetry and poetics, however it may be the 
case that performance poetry, with its associated engagement with the physicality 
of the body and bodily processes makes an important contribution to addressing 
our understanding of affect, and how we can become more and better attuned to 
affect in our lives. Gathering together a gradated milieu of affects, the ‘inventory of 
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shimmers’, a rationalizing pattern begins to appear.  With the emergence of such a 
pattern it is possible to gesture towards the limitless extent of our capacities as 
affective beings as a result of (and simultaneously beyond) the felt force of the 
strong emotional drives which are offered through performance poetry: 
In the accumulation of gradient tweakings, one finds the simultaneous 
delivery of a bodily capacity and a world of sometimes near-
infinitesimal difference: nurturing differences through affective relay 
into perpetually finer-grained (and concurrently enlarged) postures or 
comportments until there are only articulations of a world in its 
expressiveness: expressions that are only ever the interval between 
sensings or the stretching of this sensuous interval that comes to 
progressively produce (when successful) a passion for difference, where 
the pathology of a body meets the pedagogy of an affective world.419 
Of course, statements of an affective pedagogy in correspondence with the 
already established omnipresence of affect within collective life anticipate certain 
complications. Pushing against the role of performance poetry as a pedagogic 
mechanism is an already oversaturated field of everyday affective impulses vying to 
direct our senses. In the conclusion to his essay on the aesthetics of affect ‘Bitter 
after Taste’, Ben Highmore argues: ‘It seems clear though that if our ‘affect 
horizons’ are the result of deep pedagogy, then an affective politics that wanted to 
expand the aesthetic realms of communities would need to champion an affective 
                                                          
419 Seigworth, p.12. 
178 
 
counter-pedagogy ‘.420 If performance poetry can be a tool to effect changes in the 
affective awareness of an individual, a community, it must be distinguished from 
the ever present field of affect through which we engage with other bodies, and the 
suggestion of an ‘affect horizon’ or ‘realm’ governing the limits (sub-conscious, self-
imposed) of our affective lives. This mass of affect, a contesting barrage of affective 
drives articulated by Lauren Berlant in her essay ‘Cruel Optimism’ as ‘the impasse of 
living in the overwhelmingly present moment’421 presents a barrier to progressive 
development or refining of affect. Highmore’s solution is ‘the transformation of 
ethos through experiments in living… a form of experiential pedagogy, of constantly 
submitting your sensorium to new sensual worlds that sit uncomfortably within 
your ethos’.422 
The subsequent difficulty encountered with this experiment in living is that it 
can be daunting to derive the value of sensory experientialism prior to experience 
itself, and therefore the individual or the collective body find themselves at a loss 
regarding how best to approach the responsibility of submission to new sensory 
encounters. I would contend that this is once again where performance poetry 
shows its strength as an affective medium. As a public art, an art engaged in the 
business of promoting new experience (the performer conducts a sensory 
experience within their own body and the body of their audience, one which is 
intended to surprise, to engage, to captivate) performance poetry can, in the 
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creative act, access and direct new experiences. Writing on shame as an emotional 
state manipulating affect within the body, Elspeth Probyn contends:  
Writing is a corporeal activity. We work ideas through our bodies; we 
write through our bodies, hoping to get into the bodies of our readers. 
We study and write about society not as an abstraction but as 
composed of actual bodies in proximity to other bodies.423  
What Probyn articulates is the distinction between the affective construction of our 
everyday and the heightening of affect when purposed by certain activities: 
‘Thinking, writing, and reading are integral to our capacities to affect and to be 
affected’.424 The desirability of performance poetry in aiding the expansion of our 
affective horizons may thus be found in its mutability. The difficulty of categorizing 
the live aspect of the performance, the capacity of the performer to shift between 
affective states and to manipulate affect within their audience contributes to its 
potential as a pedagogic tool. At the heart of this engagement is the body: ‘Simply 
put, writing affects bodies. Writing takes its toll on the body that writes and the 
bodies that read or listen’.425 
Despite the confidence with which affect studies commends the body as an 
active part of the affective process, undetermined use of terms such as ‘body’ and 
‘mind’ can ultimately prove problematic: ‘The challenge of the perspective of the 
affects resides primarily in the synthesis it requires. This is, in the first place, 
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because affects refer equally to the body and the mind’.426 Affect, as referenced 
earlier in my analysis, concerns ‘the capacities to act and be acted upon’.427 Not 
only is bodily action generated by affect, but affect anticipates our actions, as 
Michael Hardt proposes in his foreword, ‘What are affects good for’ in The Affective 
Turn – Theorizing the Social that ‘[Affects] illuminate… both our power to affect the 
world around us and our power to be affected by it, along with the relationship 
between these two powers’.428 To return to Spinoza429, Hardt suggests that 
Spinoza’s theories should not be approached simply in terms of a bodily enquiry but 
an application of the mind:  
[Spinoza] grasps the powers of the affects in terms of two set parallel 
developments or correspondences… the mind’s power to think and its 
developments are, he proposes, parallel to the body’s power to act. This 
does not mean that the mind can determine the body to act, or that the 
body can determine the mind to think. On the contrary, Spinoza 
maintains that mind and body are autonomous but that they 
nonetheless proceed or develop in parallel.430 
The correspondences of these aspects of affective potential are vital to the drive 
which supplies performance poetry with its value. As well as a relationship between 
the body’s power to act and the mind’s power to think, a relationship which 
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deconstructs the mechanism of action, the body is placed in a similar relationship 
with affect. This is a relationship which draws upon the mind’s potential to receive 
affect and to translate it into a form which can be reciprocated by the body. Thus, 
the body’s power to act also corresponds with the power to be affected. Antonio 
Damasio articulates the interrelationship between body and mind as fulcra in a 
single organism in his study of Spinoza’s theories; Looking For Spinoza: 
 
Emotion and related reactions are aligned with the body, feelings with 
the mind. The investigation of how thoughts trigger emotions and of 
how bodily emotions become the kind of thoughts we call feelings 
provides a privileged view into mind and body, the overtly disparate 
manifestations of a single and seamlessly interwoven human 
organism.431  
 
Having established a relationship of correspondence, it can thus be 
predicated that through the accretion of one’s capacity to be affected – through 
exposure to performance poetry as a method of conditioning experiences of affect, 
the greater one’s capacity to act becomes: ‘the mind’s power to think corresponds 
to its receptivity to external ideas; and the body’s power to act corresponds to its 
sensitivity to other bodies. The greater our power to be affected… the greater our 
power to act’.432 The importance of this practice, and thus the importance of 
performance poetry as a procedure which enables and facilitates experiences of 
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affect in a diverse and heightened manner, corresponds to Spinoza’s dictum ‘not 
yet’. Though we can never reach a totality of understanding regarding the limits of 
the body’s relationship with affect (the offered answer is never a complete answer) 
we must continue to grasp it. To reiterate, if it is within our capacity to do so, we 
must continually explore the unfathomable limits of our body, our mind, and the 
interrelationship therein: ‘We do not know in advance what a body can do, what a 
mind can think – what affects they are capable of. The perspective of the affects 
requires an exploration of these as yet unknown powers. Spinoza thus gives us a 
new ontology of the human or, rather, an ontology of the human that is constantly 
open and renewed’.433 From the perspective of performance poetry the absence of 
a puzzle, the illusion of an easy answer - one freely offered by the performer - is 
precisely what illuminates the manifest contribution of the spoken word 
performance to a developing and shifting contemporary poetics. Performance 
poetry offers new experiences of affect, it asks its audience to yield to an 
introspection that is not born out of closed and solitary rumination but instead is 
founded in the public and in the social, in the body’s capacity to experience other 
bodies, to participate within the experience, and to live the affect.  
 
This living of affect, or rather the experience of affect as a vital element of 
lived experience, is crucial to the imperative Spinoza articulated. At the core of 
Spinoza’s ontology of the human and his theoretical position towards affect one 
can find a particular attention to the relationship between affects and the human 
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condition: ‘Spinoza saw drives, motivations, emotions, and feelings – an ensemble 
Spinoza called affects – as a central aspect of humanity. Joy and sorrow were two 
prominent concepts in his attempt to comprehend human beings and suggest ways 
in which their lives could be lived better’.434 In a spoken word performance the 
performer and the audience engage within a mutual relationship delineated by 
affect, both contributing to the participation of affect within the space. I posit that 
this dialogue between the body of the performer and the body of the recipient, or 
recipients, facilitates an understanding of lived experience and that the 
performance space may thus be understood as an exemplary site of affect 
negotiation.  
 
Spinozist imperatives to live better impel a legacy of thought which could 
problematize the ordering of exemplary sites of affect and affect transaction in as 
much as Spinoza’s decidedly human incitements towards a better life sit 
uncomfortably with the deconstruction of affect at a mechanical level. However, as 
Damasio’s search suggests, attempts to categorise Spinoza meet with difficulty: 
‘The difficulty begins with the problem that there are several Spinozas with which 
to reckon, at least four by my count’.435 Damasio contends three dominant 
Spinozas; the radical religious scholar who ‘proposes a new road to human 
salvation’; the political architect, ‘the thinker who describes the traits of an ideal 
democratic state populated by responsible, happy citizens’; and the philosopher 
qua scientist who works through fact to establish ‘a method of geometric 
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demonstration and intuition to formulate a conception of the universe and the 
human beings in it’.436 The fourth figure, who most keenly elucidates Spinoza’s 
relationship with the mechanism, or materiality of affect transmission is: ‘Spinoza: 
the protobiologist. This is the biological thinker concealed behind countless 
propositions, axioms, proofs, lemmas, and scholia’.437 It is this Spinoza who had 
most impact on the development of affect studies geared towards a deconstruction 
of the relationship between the mind and the body. In part two of Spinoza’s Ethics 
the protobiologist Spinoza (the Spinoza engaged with an exploration of the ways in 
which affect negotiates mind and body) outlined his conception of the body 
through the following six postulates: 
 
1. The human body is composed of very many individual parts of different 
natures, each of which is extremely complex. 
2. Of the individual components of the human body, some are liquid, some 
are soft, and some are hard. 
3. The individual components of the human body, and consequently the 
human body itself, are affected by external bodies in a great many ways. 
4. The human body needs for its preservation a great many other bodies, by 
which, as it were [quasi], it is continually regenerated. 
5. When a liquid part of the human body is determined by an external body 
to impinge frequently on another part which is soft, it changes the surface 
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of that part and impresses on it certain traces of the external body acting 
upon it. 
6. The human body can move external bodies and dispose them in a great 
many ways.438 
 
Parsing through these postulates to the core of the relationship between body and 
affect, it is clear that Spinoza favours an investigation of what is compounded in the 
idea of the body. As the first postulate suggests, the body is composed of multiple 
complicated elements, and as the third postulate suggests these individual 
elements, or components, are all affected externally by other bodies. This rationale 
has already located Spinozist thought around a locus of composition, where each 
component can be analysed for potential affective changes. When examined in 
these terms it becomes simpler to conceive of the idea that the Spinozist body is a 
mechanism of corresponding components which intersects with other bodies.439 I 
now retrieve the potential complication of Spinoza’s vision of the ensemble of 
affects and their relative roles in shaping exemplary modes of living when offered 
against a non-qualitative notion of the body as a mechanism. Against this, I posit 
Spinoza’s fourth postulate: ‘4. The human body needs for its preservation a great 
many other bodies, by which, as it were [quasi], it is continually regenerated’.440 
Through this postulate one can reconcile the notion of the mechanism central to 
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Spinoza’s larger conception of the body with the enriching potential of the 
engagement between external bodies. Not only does Spinoza invoke the idea of 
preservation, but also regeneration. This language is critical to understanding how 
the body as mechanism can be translated by the human mind to fashion a 
comfortable co-existence with the imperative to live lives better. Spinoza contends 
that:  
 
The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body (Pr.1 
3, II), and this idea is in God (Pr. 9, II) insofar as he is considered as 
affected by another idea of a particular thing; or, since (Post. 4) the 
human body needs very many other bodies by which it is continually 
regenerated, and the order and connection of ideas is the same (Pr. 7, 
1)441 
 
Through the affective engagement of ‘very many other bodies’ in the performance 
poetry space the mind reorients understanding of the bodily mechanism as an 
enrichment. As Spinoza suggests, ‘The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of 
the human body’.442 Though the body may participate in a mechanical process of 
affect transmission and reception, for Spinoza the mind engages in a proprioceptive 
comprehension of these processes, the result being a means for the mind to 
translate affective transmissions as enrichment: ‘The human body (Posts. 3 and 6) is 
affected by external bodies in a great many ways and is so structured that it can 
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affect external bodies in a great many ways. But the human mind must perceive all 
that happens in the human body (Pr.12, II)’.443 As will be further supported in my 
phenomenological analysis of the performance poetry experience later in my 
investigation, the relationship between body and mind and the ways in which affect 
actually affects the individual are not as simple as a binary between the two. 
However, this interpretation of Spinoza’s thought allows one to come to terms with 
the problem of locating a mechanical conception of the material body alongside the 
dictum to live lives better in Spinoza’s work.  
 
Through my reading of Spinoza, reconsideration of the performance poet’s 
body as an instructive element of the affective process expands to allow a 
conception of the process as a mechanism as well as reinforcing the qualities of 
performance poetry as a conditioner of affect. The implications of this are that a 
deeper analysis of how the body functions as a mechanism for affective 
engagement would be the next logical step. In her article, ‘Political Economy, 
Biomedia, and Bodies’, Patricia T. Clough foregrounds her understanding of the 
affective body to critics who were themselves ‘indebted to Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari, Baruch Spinoza and Henri Bergson’.444 Alongside Spinoza, who has already 
proven vital to my analysis, Deleuze and Guattari present the body as a particular 
site of functions and pressures which, once dismantled, can be analysed in terms of 
its affective potential. Working within the context of affect through the tradition 
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outlined by Spinoza’s corresponding parallelism of the body and the mind, Deleuze 
and Guattari reify the body’s place in the affective transaction. Discussing the body 
in A Thousand Plateaus, the second part of their landmark critical and philosophical 
project Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that:  
 
A body is not defined by the form that determines it nor as a 
determinate substance or subject nor by the organs it possesses or the 
functions it fulfils. On the plane of consistency, a body is defined only by 
a longitude and latitude: in other words the sum total of the material 
elements belonging to it under given relations of movement and rest, 
speed and slowness (longitude); the sum total of the intensive affects it 
is capable of at a given power or degree of potential (latitude). Nothing 
but affects and local movements, differential speeds.445  
 
The bodily organism functions as a machine within this analysis, though crucially it 
is configured as a developing, physical process as Karen Wendy Gilbert argues, ‘for 
Deleuze and Guattari a machine is not a mechanical device but an ontic category in 
which heterogeneous linkages take place across phyletic times and zones’.446 
Radicalizing the concept of the body to this transactional structure does not reduce 
it to a function-fulfiller, it simply renegotiates the language of the bodily process: 
‘The simplest daily activities – smelling, walking, playing a piano – require a 
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coordination of elements taken for granted. Deleuze and Guattari instead would 
speak of smelling as a ‘smelling-machine’ consisting of a nose-breath-flower-
olfactory bulb assemblage’.447 Considering ways of orienting the body in 
relationship to how it negotiates its role within everyday functional transactions 
necessitates a re-examination of Latour’s description of the body as an interface 
conditioned towards an ever increasing process of effectuated development. To 
learn to be affected is the role of the body:  ‘The body is thus not a provisional 
residence of something superior – an immortal soul, the universal or thought – but 
what leaves a dynamic trajectory by which we learn to register and become 
sensitive to what the world is made of’.448 The pertinence of this approach to a 
mode of study investigating one’s capacity to direct the body towards affect is that 
it anticipates the space necessary to actively reconstitute the figure of the body 
around affect, to oil the machine towards a certain purpose.449 
 
The determination of longitude and latitude explicated in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s analysis seems to promote an unmalleable body subject to the whim of 
‘affects and local movements’.450 However, Deleuze is explicit in his text Spinoza: 
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Practical Philosophy that the movement and development of the body is defined 
through interaction with other bodies: ‘a body affects other bodies, or is affected 
by other bodies; it is this capacity for affecting and being affected that also defines 
a body in its individuality’.451 For critics such as Patricia Clough, Deleuzian analysis 
represented a new horizon: ‘The turn to affect points[...] to a dynamism immanent 
to bodily matter and matter generally – matter’s capacity for self-organization in 
being informational- which, I want to argue, may be the most provocative and 
enduring contribution of the affective turn.’452 For Clough, the key to critical 
understanding of the body was to ‘conceptualize affect as pre-individual bodily 
forces augmenting or diminishing a body’s capacity to act’.453 However, leaning 
heavily upon the centralizing rationalization of the organism indebted to Deleuze 
and Guattari’s work in the field, Clough’s focus in particular falls to an analysis of 
how we might permit our bodies to be changed and developed with, alongside, or 
rather in the wake of, greater critical attention to affect and affect studies: ‘I want 
to argue that focussing on affect – without following the circuit from affect to 
subjectively felt emotional states – makes clear how the turn to affect is a harbinger 
of and a discursive accompaniment to the forging of a new body’.454 Clough’s 
analysis sets upon the distinction between the body as organism, and her own 
original classification: ‘the biomediated body’.455 While the intercession of new 
medias and biomedias in the analysis of the body strays away from the approach I 
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wish to take towards reconfiguring understanding of the body, Clough’s association 
with affect as a protagonist in the reconfiguration of the body provides a strong 
platform for my analysis of the figure and body of the performance poet: 
‘Therefore, while I am drawing on critical discourses on new media and biomedia 
that define these media as technically expanding what the biological body can do 
while, however, remaining biological, I also am pointing to the postbiological 
threshold as the limit point of these discourses’.456 Through Clough’s understanding 
of the body as a Deleuzian machine which is also subject to change and 
development, an approach towards positing the performance poet as a figure of 
affective pedagogy can be established, as can a practical approach to the 
mechanism of affective transmission.  
 
 
Brennan and the mechanisms of affect transmission 
 
 
Bound as affect is to the importance of the body (and by extension bodily 
mechanism and function) arguments presenting the pedagogical value of the 
performance poet in actively instructing or improving our bodily capacity to register 
and process affect engage predominantly with the actual process of affect 
transaction: 
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in theory, the ‘what’ of affect often gives way to matters of ‘how’ in the 
rhythm or angle of approach: thus, why a great many theories of affect 
do not sweat the construction of any elaborate step-by-step 
methodology much at all, but rather come to fret the presentation or 
the style of presentation, the style of being present, more than anything 
else.457 
 
Feminist and post-colonial critic Sara Ahmed approaches the mechanism of affect 
transmission in her article ‘Happy Objects’. Looking specifically at happiness as 
affect, Ahmed poses the question of how we arrive at affective transactions within 
the context of objects.458 Positing the potential to invest affect in objects opens the 
critical field to analysis of how totems of affect are produced. It also enables an 
expansion of arguments concerning the validity of the totemizing elements of the 
spoken word poet, and of the shared performance poetry space. This in turn 
requires a dissection of the culture of a spoken word audience – the qualities which 
delineate the collective, and which can cause a radical shift in the affective senses 
of a collected group in response to performance. As Ahmed contends: ‘Groups 
cohere around a shared orientation toward some things as being good, treating 
some things and not others as the cause of delight’459; collectives, communities, 
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and groups become sites for the development and transmission of concentrated 
affect. Affect critic Anna Gibbs compares the process of affect transmission from 
body to body within a group to a contagious outbreak: 
 
Bodies can catch feelings as easily as catch fire: affect leaps from one 
body to another, evoking tenderness, inciting shame, igniting rage, 
exciting fear – in short, communicable affect can inflame nerves and 
muscles in a conflagration of every conceivable kind of passion.460 
 
Though predicated by Gibbs as a simple biological process, the mechanism by which 
affect transmits through and shifts between bodies requires further examination. If 
‘communicable affect’ can be patterned or analysed the results may demonstrate 
the capacity through which performance poetry achieves its affective results. To 
this end, within the field of affect transmission perhaps the most seminal research 
that has been conducted has been Teresa Brennan’s critical study, The Transmission 
of Affect, published in 2004. 
 
Brennan’s research on affect and affect transmission explores a wide range of 
disciplines. In her introduction to The Transmission of Affect Brennan explains that 
she has sought to establish ‘the case for transmission by diverse means: deductive 
argument from clinical findings and biological facts, some history (theology and 
philosophy) of the affects, and a little modern neuroscience’.461 Brennan’s intention 
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regarding the direction of the project as a whole is clearly elucidated in her opening 
statement: 
 
Is there anyone who has not, at least once, walked into a room and ‘felt 
the atmosphere’? But if many have paused to wonder how they 
received this impression, and why it seemed both objective and certain, 
there is no record of their curiosity in the copious literature on group 
and crowd psychology, or in the psychological and psychoanalytic 
writing that claims that one person can feel another’s feelings… This is 
not especially surprising, as any inquiry into how one feels the others’ 
affects, or the ‘atmosphere’, has to take account of physiology as well 
as the social, psychological factors that generated the atmosphere in 
the first place.462 
 
The reason for Brennan’s diverse range of critical approaches rests on the premise 
that the transmission of affect is a bodily process and well as a mental or 
psychological process:  
 
The transmission of affect, whether it is grief, anxiety, or anger, is social 
or psychological in origin. But the transmission is also responsible for 
bodily changes; some are brief changes, as in the whiff of the room’s 
atmosphere, some longer lasting. In other words, the transmission of 
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affect, if only for an instant, alters the biochemistry and neurology of 
the subject. The ‘atmosphere’ of the environment literally gets into the 
individual.463 
 
Once again, the predominance of the body in affect negotiation and transmission 
finds suitable purchase within the context of performance poetry. Reviews and 
testimonials from audience members who attend performance poetry events 
frequently cite the charged atmosphere and the feeling of excitement – hereto 
understood as the passage of affect to and from bodies. Indeed, the importance of 
such charged atmospheres cannot be overlooked as it often manifests as a 
fundamental influence upon the audience’s response to a performance poetry 
event. Additionally, this passage of affect between audience and performer can be 
recognized in the ways that performers discuss their own performances. Ollie 
Higgins, a London based performance poet who was longlisted for the 2016 Out-
Spoken poetry prize, notes of one of his performances: 
 
I ended up making an animation to accompany my poem 'fuck you 
Theresa May'464 which was seen by some of the NUS student delegates 
who represented international students. They liked it so much they 
invited me to perform at a concert, which was absolutely mental. It was 
alive, because everyone there was totally in agreement with the 
message, so the whole room was basically jumping with energy, which 
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allowed me to feed off what they were feeling and heighten my 
performance. I think that was one of the best performances of my life. I 
felt like fuck all anxiety or worries about it, I was just going for it.465 
 
Much like the experiences described by Azfa Awad Ali earlier in my thesis, Higgins 
also notes that the atmosphere of the performance space (the affects transmitted 
within it) can have an adverse impact on the performer and the performance: 
 
Performance poetry is an interesting beast because I've found there's 
always a sort of curve to the night. At the beginning people tend to be a 
little less receptive, because the audiences come in cold, and need to 
warm up before being able to process listening to one speaker for 3 or 4 
minutes at a time. Good comperes can usually alleviate this a bit but I've 
performed at a few nights with totally cold audiences which is always a 
struggle because they're much less receptive to emotion. You ask quite 
a lot of your audience as a poet; you are asking them to meet you, listen 
to you, and completely empathise with your point of view, all in a space 
of three minutes - it's hard for people to do that if they've just clocked 
off from a nine-hour shift from work. Once they get a few drinks in 
though, they tend to soften up and be very receptive.466 
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Higgins’ frequent use of terminology which engages with bodily feeling or bodily 
action (‘alive’ or ‘jumping’ in the case of effective performances, and ‘cold 
audiences’ for less effective performances) reinforces the prominence of the body 
in the transmission of affect articulated by Brennan. Intent as Brennan was to 
respond to the question of affect from multiple platforms and disciplines, her 
analysis also deals with the problematizing issues surrounding such transmission. I 
submit that resistance towards the transmission of affect is delineated in Brennan’s 
critical analysis in three forms: vagueness regarding the structure and definition of 
the ‘crowd’; boundaries presented by sight-oriented conditions of objectivity; and 
fears of self-containment and threats to the subjective self.  
 
Approaching the question of defining the group, criticism has traditionally 
been levied regarding the hard logic of a scientific approach to feelings of group 
identity: ‘The idea that emotional connections between beings have an energetic 
force of their own, by dint of magnetism and romantic association, became less 
scientifically respectable’.467 In particular, study of transmission within crowds has 
been criticised for failing to establish or respond suitably to the issue of interaction 
between bodies: 
 
In contemporary discussions of the group mind, now called the ‘crowd’ 
or ‘gathering’, transmission is discounted at the outset. By definition, it 
seems that the stress on the cognitive is a turn away from affect, and 
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so, necessarily, away from questions of affect’s transmission. So 
invisible became the idea of transmission that it had to be rediscovered 
in the psychoanalytic clinic, dredged up from the unconscious.468 
 
The question posed indicates the problematic status of the ‘group mind’, which 
Brennan clarifies in detail in her text. She begins with the simple premise that 
contentions regarding the ‘group mind’ are vulnerable to dissection on the basis of 
an unsubstantial and ungrounded assumption of reality: ‘The group mind is 
invoked, much as pantheism might be invoked, with no argument but powerful 
‘intuitive’ appeal’.469 The comparison to pantheism is an adept one, as it inculcates 
the question of engaging in a grouped identity; being, becoming, or feeling as one 
with an ‘other’. However, Brennan’s understanding of the question of ‘group 
identity’ is grounded on a logical approach to the definition: ‘A group, in sociology 
and social psychology, is two or more people. The theory of the transmission of 
affect is always and already, given this definition, a theory of the group’.470 In 
Brennan’s critique, mechanisms for transmission subsequently engage with the 
process of establishing the parameters and material of this relationship.471 
Brennan’s description of the group rests on a review of the literature documenting 
crowd theory and her approach sublimates late nineteenth and twentieth-century 
                                                          
468 Brennan, p.18. 
469 Brennan, p.17. 
470 Brennan, p.51. 
471 Brennan states: ‘If I emit one emotion and you emit another, we may both of us take on board 
the effects of this new composite. This should yield the basis for a contribution to group psychology, 
because we are beginning with an idea of how a gathering is constituted, in part, through the 
transmission of energetic affects (which may add up to something more than the individual affects 
of the group’s members)’ (Brennan, p.51). 
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influences on Freud’s theories of feeling and affect in transmission472; particularly 
the work of Gustave Le Bon and William McDougall. The French theorist Gustave Le 
Bon first argued for a criticism distinguishing the individual as a generative site of 
affect rather than the crowd as a single body.473 However, though Le Bon’s interest 
in the individual represents a shifted paradigm in affect studies his analysis failed to 
represent a scientific approach to the question of how crowd behaviour was 
influenced. Le Bon fell back on vogue theories of hypnosis as a justification for 
affective transmission, which among other specious conditions, failed to 
satisfactorily identify the hypnotist within the transaction. However, while raising 
problems, Le Bon’s approach does implicate an intersection of performance poetry 
and affect transmission when one interrogates the notion of a source of affective 
contagion: ‘The power of words is bound up with the images they evoke’.474 
Brennan’s analysis simply substitutes the notion of the hypnotist with the 
appellation of ‘image’ in Le Bon’s argument: ‘Le Bon does accord great power to the 
image as an organizer of crowd responses; and I suggest that the ‘image’, as Le Bon 
understood it, stands in often for the ‘leader’’.475 I would extend this analysis 
further, underlining the distinction Le Bon makes regarding the word. There is a 
direct correlation drawn between affective influence and words, which: ‘synthesize 
                                                          
472 See: Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology And The Analysis Of The Ego (New York: Norton, 1975). 
473 As Le Bon argues in his 1952 text The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind: ‘The most striking 
peculiarity presented by a psychological crowd is the following: Whoever be the individuals that 
compose it, however like or unlike be their mode of life, their occupations, their character, or their 
intelligence, the fact that they have been transformed into a crowd puts them in possession of a sort 
of collective mind [âme collective] which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite different 
from that in which each individual of them would feel, think, and act were he in a state of isolation. 
There are certain ideas and feelings which do not come into being, or do not transform themselves 
into acts except in the case of individuals forming a crowd’. Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd: A Study of 
the Popular Mind (London: Ernest Benn, 1952), p.27. 
474 Le Bon, p.102. 
475 Brennan, p.54. 
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the most diverse and unconscious aspirations and the hope of their realization’.476 
The site of resistance to affect transmission delineated as critical doubt regarding a 
cohesive definition of crowd and group identity becomes a question of unpacking 
the correct empirical approach to how this identity is produced and nurtured. 
Alongside the context of spoken word as a powerful generative force for collective 
experience I contend that Le Bon’s study, though flawed, presents a platform for 
reinterpreting the nature of collective identity as a product of experiences with 
words and imagery; powerful forces endemic to our nature as collaborative and 
communicative beings. 
 
The second site of resistance I identify in Brennan’s study of critical 
approaches to affect and affect transmission is the notion of the empirical 
boundary as a condition of objective modes of study and understanding. Interest in 
affect transmission faces threats from shifts in the cultural conditions of 
representative empirical powers and faculties: ‘Sight… is the sense that renders us 
discrete, while transmission breaches individual boundaries. The eighteenth 
century was so preoccupied with vision that it was known as the siècle des 
lumières’.477 The immunity of sight from the potential manipulations of affect 
transmission and the correlative difficulty of accepting affect’s place as an 
explicator of social discourse is not clearly and categorically defined, however in 
practical terms Brennan argues that: ‘by the nineteenth century sight was the first 
of the senses, and to this day the only sense, to attain objective status’.478  
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Sensory objectivity as a motif presents a problem for affect theorists, who 
must contend with the body as the battleground for their theoretical negotiations 
of affect and feeling. In this regard they risk engagement with a particularly 
intransigent binary between objectivity and subjectivity.479 Affect cannot establish 
firm ground in the face of expectations delineated by and for objective analysis 
because affect identifies within a realm of subjective feeling.480 For Brennan, this 
distinction crucially revolves around the non-engagement of sight as a measure of 
affect transmission:  
 
Just as unconscious bodily processes are not meant to be intelligent or 
intentional processes, so are feeling and sensing ruled out as 
methodological tools for studying the object, because they cannot be 
seen, of course, and because they constitute a connection with the 
object.481 
 
                                                          
479 Articulating this binary, Brennan suggests that: ‘whether one insists on the subjective or the 
objective, whether one believes that the object can be known in itself or for itself, one tacitly 
assumes the foundational associations between mind, form, activity, will, and the subject, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, body, matter, passivity, lack of agency, and the object. When affects 
and feelings force themselves into consideration, they will be allocated a status that either makes 
them subjective or makes them part of the object, as in the physiology of the affects when bodily 
changes are measured – something to be studied, but not by means of feeling and sensing’ 
(Brennan, p.19). 
480 Elucidating this subjectivity, Brennan notes: ‘The name or the concept of the transmission of 
affect does not sit well with an emphasis on individualism, on sight, and cognition. These things are 
all associated with the subject / object distinction, with thinking in terms of subject and object. This 
thinking, while it long precedes mechanism, gives rise to a particular understanding of objectivity 
that is coincident with it, based on the notion that the objective is in some way free of affect. Once 
this notion is accepted, then affect, as a vehicle connecting individuals to one another and the 
environment, and for that matter connecting the mind or cognition to bodily processes, ceases to be 
a proper object of study’ (Brennan, pp.18-19). 
481 Brennan, p.19. 
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The dictum of the visual as the predominant and objective sensory mode presents a 
particular exegetical problem for the study of affect transmission in performance 
poetry. Although performance poetry relies upon sight as an important function in 
the process of transmitting affect; the performer’s body as a site of affect 
production is a visual guide as much as an oral, aural or olfactory (hormonal) guide, 
however the correlative of accepting the vitality of sight is a diminishment of affect 
transmission as a complicated and multi-faceted process. The risk of this 
simplification is the exclusion of certain powerful modes of affect transmission as 
unsubstantiated.  
 
Brennan’s sites of resistance conflate in this respect. In part a critical response 
to the problems of Le Bon’s late nineteenth century theories regarding the 
relationship between crowd and individual; William McDougall presented a case for 
what he termed the ‘primitive sympathetic response’ in The Group Mind (1920): 
 
It is well recognized that almost any emotional excitement increases the 
suggestibility of the individual, though the explanation of the fact 
remains obscure. I have suggested that the explanation is to be found in 
the principle of the vicarious usage of nervous energy, the principle that 
nervous energy, liberated in any one part of the nervous system, may 
overflow the channels of the system in which it is liberated and 
reinforce processes initiated in other systems.482  
                                                          
482 William McDougall, The Group Mind: A Sketch of the Principles of Collective Psychology with Some 
Attempt to Apply Them to the Interpretation of National Life and Character (New York: G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1920), pp.59-60. 
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McDougall’s contention that transmission was an energetic bodily process began 
the movement towards contemporary theories regarding the mechanism of affect 
transmission, however, as with Le Bon, McDougall was restricted by the trends and 
fashions of his time (explicitly the emphasis on the eye as the optimal tool for 
establishing and parsing empirical data). Criticism of McDougall was subsequently 
demarcated by the problematic value placed on the objectivity of sight.483 As a 
natural response to this site of resistance to affect, criticism of sight objectivity 
engages with the task of redressing the value placed on sight in relation to affect 
transmission. The actual concrete mechanism of affect transmission is designated 
by Brennan as ‘entrainment’; a complicated bodily process engaging with multiple 
capacities by which the body receives affects: ‘If contagion exists (and the study of 
crowds says it does) how is it effected? Images and mimesis explain some of it… but 
olfactory and auditory entrainment offer more comprehensive explanations’.484 
One of Brennan’s more colourful critical approaches is her insistence on the 
individual’s capacity to ‘smell’ the atmosphere of a room: 
 
If I walk back into the atmospheric room… and it is rank with the smell 
of anxiety, I breathe this in. Something is taken in that was not present, 
at the very least not consciously present, before. But no matter how 
thoroughly my system responds to the presence of this new affect, it is 
                                                          
483 Brennan discusses McDougall’s limitations as such: ‘McDougall is one who sees the ‘primitive 
sympathetic response’ in visual terms. The mechanism, in other words, is one of mimesis. Thus, the 
potential for an understanding of the direct transmission of affect is undercut by a stress on the 
sense of sight as the principle sense involved’ (Brennan, p.56). 
484 Brennan, p.68. 
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the case that something is added. Whether this in itself makes me 
afraid, or whether I respond to fear by producing it within myself after I 
have smelt it around me (and probably both things occur) the 
phenomenon cannot be explained by the simple postulate that I am 
acting out something I already felt or was driven toward feeling by my 
individual drives.485 
 
Adopting a physiological approach to olfaction as a mechanism of 
entrainment, Brennan elicits evidence suggested by research into the relationship 
between pheromones and the transmission of affect from body to body. In 
response to the question of how affect can be transmitted within a space – the 
physiological response postulates that they are constantly present within our social 
environments: 
 
One detects pheromones by touch or smell, but smell is more common. 
To smell pheromones is also in a sense to consume them. But the point 
here is that no direct physical contact is necessary for a transmission to 
take place. Pheromones are literally in the air.486 
 
Although pheromones have stronger conventional associations with sexuality and 
reproduction (owing in large part to their popularity as a medium for understanding 
and clarifying relationships between animals) the role of pheromones in 
                                                          
485 Brennan, p.68. 
486 Brennan, p.69. 
205 
 
understanding wider social relationships between humans can be expanded to 
include the transmission of affect. Dutch psychologist Piet Vroon proposes a 
context whereby this expansion may be structuralized. In his research Vroon argues 
that pheromones: 
 
also have a communicative function… a distinction is made between 
pheromones that affect the endocrine system (which produces sex 
hormones), pheromones that facilitate physiological changes of various 
kinds (primer pheromones) and pheromones that directly provoke a 
certain behaviour in the observer (releaser pheromones).487 
 
Of relevance to the transmission of affect and its application in the context of 
performance poetry is the notion that pheromones may both provoke and facilitate 
emotional or behavioural changes. This requires intervention within the body of the 
individual receiving the pheromones. The relationship between incoming 
pheromones and actualized physical changes to the body is dictated by the 
interplay between pheromones (external) and hormones (internal). Hormonal 
manipulation as a result of the intercession of an external pheromone can radically 
change, challenge, or disrupt emotions. However, such a conclusion does not 
indicate the need to radically resituate olfaction within the context of entrainment 
and affect transition. In Brennan’s critique she is careful to ensure that this does 
not simply imply a new hegemony (smell for sight): ‘hormones are not only 
                                                          
487 Piet Vroon, Smell, The Secret Seducer (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1997), p.126. 
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produced by smell, nor is olfaction the only means for the transmission of affect’.488 
With regards to the importance of olfaction within a general structure of affect 
transmission and entrainment one can begin to see the waning of the eye and of 
sight, Brennan is instead positing a wider model of understanding for affect 
entrainment. Elevation of the nose as a totem for fostering strong affective 
relationships with the world is misconceived. In the context of Brennan I recall the 
renegotiation of the body proposed by Deleuze and Guattari. This poses the nose as 
a smelling machine which contributes to a depiction of the body at large as a 
mechanism, the engagement of multiple parts.489 Within this model the presence of 
a dominant mechanism for receiving affect is disturbed in favour of a model 
acknowledging the relativity of multiple mechanisms working in relationship with 
one another to provide a more sophisticated platform for affect transmission and 
receipt; the body as a whole.  
 
Conceiving the limitations of establishing a singular mode of objective 
transmission enables an analysis of Brennan’s third site of resistance; self-
                                                          
488 Brennan, p.69. 
489 Of great interest, though too extensive for the purposes of this thesis, is the work of Rowan 
Boyson. Her focus on the senses, particularly smell, and particularly Romantic and Victorian poetics 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, elucidates a clear argument for a defence of 
sensory pleasure as an indicator of an Enlightenment aesthetic. Although I establish a mechanism of 
affect transmission which incorporates the whole body it is noteworthy that research seeking to re-
examine the translation of sensory receipt into poetics is being undertaken. See particularly: Rowan 
Boyson, Wordsworth and the Enlightenment Idea of Pleasure (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012); Rowan Boyson, ‘The Senses in Eighteenth-Century Literature’, in A Cultural History of 
the Senses in the Age of Enlightenment, ed. by Anne C. Villa (New York and London: Bloomsbury, 
2014), pp.155-179, and her lecture ‘The olfactory imagination: smell, materialism and metaphor in 
the eighteenth century’ delivered at the Queen Mary Centre for Eighteenth Century Studies on the 
11th of November 2015. 
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containment and threat to the subjective self. Proceeding from McDougall’s early 
twentieth century critical material, Brennan poses the following: 
 
The emphasis on sight as the principal mechanism in the 
communication of affect goes unchallenged in the literature on groups 
thereafter. There is also a stress on hearing, but, as with the emphasis 
on sight, the idea is that the communication of affect takes place 
between individuals whose affects are self-contained: one individual has 
the affect, other individuals see it, or sometimes hear it, they then drum 
it up within themselves, and so the affect, apparently, spreads. The 
emphasis on sight as the preeminent sense rendering individuals 
discreet to one another has been extensively criticised in writings on 
modernity. But the emphasis is not really challenged, or not consistently 
challenged, unless one takes account of the role of the less valorised 
senses.490 
 
Fixation on sight as our predominant sense does not simply extend to its 
objective status as a useful tool to provide empirical validation of shared 
experience, sight is a formative aspect of our concept of the body as self-
contained.491 This issue of self-containment and subjectivity is vital to the 
                                                          
490 Brennan, pp.56-57. 
491 Brennan discusses the link between sight and self-containment in great detail as it is key to her 
understanding of how beings form an understanding of their own individuality: ‘If we inquire into 
how the idea that we are self-contained came about, then ontologically as well as phylogenetically, 
we find that vision is critical. At the individual level, it is the priority given to hallucination in the 
formation of the individual that is significant. In infancy, hallucination and fantasy are key tools for 
inventing a world that is other than the dependent world of reality. In adult life, such fantasies are 
aided by visual media’ (Brennan, p.171). 
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administration of affect in studies of performance poetry, as it is a medium which 
relies on the full extent of affective drives and influences to facilitate a radical 
change in the emotions of its audience. Without the capacity to yield this change, a 
capacity engendered by the unique circumstances of performance poetry as a 
public mode engaged with a spectrum of bodily functions, performance poetry 
might be rendered indistinct from page poetry with regards to its affective 
potential. To elaborate; the more linear horizons of the text (the lesser affective 
interaction) would cease to hold relevance in the face of affective self-containment 
or the non-negotiation of affect entering and affecting the body, a notion which is 
not without purchase in contemporary society: 
 
As the notion of the individual gained in strength, it was assumed more 
and more that emotions and energies are naturally contained, going no 
farther than the skin. But while it is recognized freely that individualism 
is a historical and cultural product, the idea that affective self-
containment is also a production is resisted… if we accept with 
comparatively ready acquiescence that our thoughts are not entirely 
independent, we are, nonetheless, peculiarly resistant to the idea that 
our emotions are not altogether our own.492 
 
For Brennan arguments regarding societal resistance to affective governance of 
emotions are located by an acknowledgment of dominant Neo-Darwinian discourse 
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in contemporary society: ‘My affect, if it comes across you, alters your anatomical 
makeup for good or ill. This idea, perhaps more than any other, stands Neo-
Darwinism on its head. It is directly at odds with the premise on which Neo-
Darwinian biology is based’.493 This is a hegemony which Brennan suggests must be 
destabilized before an acceptance of affect transmission gains traction within 
contemporary critical analysis of emotion: 
 
Rather than the generational line of inheritance (the vertical line of 
history), the transmission of affect, conceptually, presupposes a 
horizontal line of transmission: the line of the heart. The affects are not 
inherited, or not only inherited. They also flow from this one to that 
one, here and now, via olfaction and the circulation of the blood. The 
relatively new discipline of psychoneuroendocrinology shows us this 
much… recent research in this field has demonstrated an immediate 
effect of airborne chemicals on human mood, although its significance 
goes unsung and attempts at disproving it (if any) remain unpublished. 
These facts may be neglected for a time as they signal the end of the 
hegemony of Neo-Darwinism, which is anchored in assumptions of self-
containment.494 
 
Inculcated within a discussion of affect transmission and a re-negotiation of the 
self-contained individual in a post-Darwinian context is the notion that the 
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relationship between the horizontal and vertical must be explored. There may be 
credence in discussing, with an eye to yielding an interplay between our affect 
driven behaviour and our capacity as individuals to retain control of our affective 
drives by virtue of the line of history, our predisposition to behave in certain 
manners. This may be a disposition fashioned by lineage in a Neo-Darwinian sense, 
or else educated by conscious reflection on behaviour. This, however, is an analysis 
which extends beyond the necessary elaboration of Brennan’s three sites of 
resistance. 
 
The threat to individual subjectivity posed by a depiction of affect as not only 
an intrusive force, but an intrusive force which retains a capacity to govern our 
emotional states can easily be overindulged by detractors of the affective model. 
Out of this perspective there is a clear correlation between a fear of affect’s 
potentially subversive capabilities and a mistrust and scepticism of the latent 
didacticism inherent in certain critical readings of performance poetry. As I have 
argued, this particular criticism of the persuasiveness of spoken word is engendered 
by a resistance to being emotionally manipulated; being told what to feel defeats 
the purpose of the poem. The intrigue at the centre of the page poem is a slow 
elaboration of potential feeling rather than a swift, explicit, and declarative 
indication of the poem’s required response. The tacit implication of a loss of agency 
over one’s emotions bound within the premise of affect studies plays into the 
hands of critics who target the didacticism of spoken word. However, these two 
aspects of the mechanism of performance poetry can be read differently if one 
accepts that affect transmission is an inherently and inalienably social process: 
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I am using the term ‘transmission of affect’ to capture a process that is 
social in origin but biological and physical in effect. The origin of 
transmitted affects is social in that these affects do not only arise within 
a particular person but also come from without. They come via an 
interaction with other people and an environment.495 
 
As tempting as it may be to engage in the business of measuring out the vertiginous 
heights of their ivory towers, such sceptics of performance poetry can be forgiven 
for their reluctance to accede to, or participate in the social model. Embracing our 
reality as social beings would be a fine and fearless display of unlicensed trust when 
one considers that for the better part of our time as humans cohabiting within a 
social structure we have engaged almost exclusively in an environment geared 
towards concretizing subjective control over our own emotions. Indeed, the 
subjective still has a place within the equation despite motions towards its 
displacement: 
 
All this means, indeed the transmission of affect means, that we are not 
self-contained in terms of our energies. There is no secure distinction 
between the ‘individual’ and the ‘environment’. But transmission does 
not mean that a person’s particular emotional experience is irrelevant. 
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We may influence the registration of the transmitted affect in a variety 
of ways; affects are not received or registered in a vacuum.496 
 
Affect transmission provokes a discussion of the permeability of boundaries and the 
extent to which we have control over affects that impact upon our emotional 
dispositions. However, the corresponding relevance of this affect is still, of course, 
unique to the individual: 
 
even if I am picking up on your affect, the linguistic and visual content, 
meaning the thoughts I attach to that affect, remain my own: they 
remain the product of the particular historical conjunction of words and 
experiences I represent. The thoughts are not necessarily tied to the 
affects they appear to evoke. One may as well say that the affects evoke 
the thoughts.497 
 
Despite the contention that hormonal influence upon human agency radically: 
‘challenges the Neo-Darwinian paradigm’498 and the associated levelling agenda of 
correlative arguments repositioning the objectivity of the self, one must still 
acknowledge that individuation necessarily precedes discussion and analysis of 
affect transmission by virtue of the localization of the individual as the site of 
analysis. Presenting affect transmission as a mechanism relies on the notion of 
placing the individual at the centre of discussion and thus the individual is 
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empowered. At some point in a discussion of affect, one must pay attention to the 
individual, to their body – even if it is to subsequently deny the non-permeability of 
the self. With comparative reference to Richard Dawkins’ analysis in The Selfish 
Gene499 Brennan argues that the structure of thinking about identity and self-
containment which we rely upon conditions our understanding of how affect 
transmits between individuals: 
 
Richard Dawkins, for instance, insists that we are lived by forces beyond 
our conscious control. But at least they are our unconscious forces, 
perceived as such because perception has also been structured in such a 
way as to mean we do not see or conceive of an alternative way of 
understanding, let alone one that means we are not (necessarily) 
masters of the house.500 
 
What this means for a discussion of affect and affect transmission is that 
boundaries between the self and the other, the relationship between intersecting 
bodies (through pheromone-hormone entrainment) will always be delineated by 
the self regardless of whether the biological implications of such radicalisation of 
the individual are rendered questionable. Brennan’s response to this re-situation is 
framed in her understanding of the individual’s capacity to resist affective 
entrainment: ‘visiting intentions are eluded by memory, ethics, and honesty’.501 
Such a particularly poetic triptych of better angels presented by Brennan receives 
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501 Brennan, p.76. 
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further elaboration in her response to the question of self-containment. Brennan 
discusses ideas not of an individual selfhood with a hard-coded imperviousness to 
affect but a self-containment negotiated by one’s ability to relegate affects which 
disrupt senses of self-containment: 
 
The self-contained subject maintains itself by projecting out the affects 
that otherwise interfere with its agency (anxiety and any sense of 
inferiority) in a series of affective judgements that are then carried by 
the other. As these affective judgements are tied to the very 
structuration of the ego via its relation with the other, they are likely to 
reinforce themselves in the process of creating passification.502  
 
Affective entrainment, through olfaction or otherwise, can be prevented from 
disrupting the body by the rigour of the ego. Brennan’s contention that affective 
negativity is ascribed explicitly to the other is a clear indicator of the ego’s 
prevalence in her model of affect transmission, and directs her reader towards the 
value of the body; the individual that is open to affect: 
 
The act of directing negative affects to the other severs my kin tie with 
her by objectifying her. I make her into an object by directing these 
affects towards her, because that act marks her with affects that I reject 
in myself… By encouraging attitudes of suspicion, by (worse) 
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encouraging the idea that a privileged class, sex, race, or caste is free of 
dissembling, emotionality, or stupidity, one comes to overvalue one’s 
own capacities.503 
 
In this respect, as argued in Seigworth and Gregg’s ‘An Inventory of Shimmers’ – the 
education of the senses through affective experience is crucial to understanding the 
critical and social contexts of the individual. Moreover, the capacity affect has to 
challenge the self-contained ego is determined by its pervasion: ‘all the miniscule or 
molecular events of the unnoticed’.504 Against the weight of information affect 
provides the body, the ego must constantly struggle to retain self-containment: 
 
The conscious ego forecloses knowledge and assumptions that 
challenge its sense of intellectual superiority in its body; the 
unconscious ego censors similar knowledge by repressing it and keeping 
it unconscious. By this censorship and this foreclosure, the ego creates 
gaps in conscious understanding. These gaps mean that ego-
consciousness knows less than the senses whose multiple 
communications battle with the ego’s censorship and denial.505 
 
Against the pervasion of affect transmission and entrainment, the individual is 
forced to accede to the fact that their own body is not a contained article, but a 
structure constantly present to and within a social world: 
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Affects (via hormones and other means of projection and reception) are 
carried in the blood, and with them is carried the presence of the other 
and the social in the system. (To find an utterly pure soul within, 
something untouched by human error, one would have to sustain living 
attention through a process of complete exsanguination.)506 
 
Tracing the pedagogic capacities of affect through Brennan’s discussion of 
mechanisms of transmission allows one to arrive at the conclusion which I gesture 
towards earlier in this chapter. The three sites of resistance posited by Brennan; 
vagueness regarding the structure and definition of the ‘crowd’, boundaries 
presented by sight-oriented conditions of objectivity, and fears of self-containment 
and threats to the subjective self- are all elements of the same locating structure 
behind criticism of affect’s capacity to genuinely alter the body of the recipient. In 
the case of performance poetry (when compared to page poetry) the potential of 
the medium is relegated or diminished by the suspicion of the performer’s capacity 
to evoke genuine feeling, compounded by a sense that the feeling in question is not 
sufficiently or appropriately profound, judicious, and honest. Such doubts deny the 
potential of affect transmission to engage with the ego on both a conscious and a 
subconscious level – to educate the senses. A subtext repositioning the critical 
fascination of Le Bon and McDougall may be the fact that crowd mentality 
contemporarily occupies the position of a watchword for political and social 
                                                          
506 Brennan, p.139. 
217 
 
cynicism. Such an impression destabilizes the potency of affect transmission by 
locating sites of overt, palpable (smell-able) transmission and rendering them at 
best disingenuous, and certainly not without an agenda. In addition, the dictum of 
‘seeing is believing’ inculcated in the hegemony of sight directing our empirical 
relationship with the world, diminishes the perceptual potency of our relationships 
within a social space. Brennan’s concentration on olfaction and the importance of 
pheromones and hormones within the dynamic of affect transmission replaces the 
contained location of sight-based relationships with world stimuli as the prominent 
critical element of the affective process, reorienting the dynamic of individual 
engagement towards a structure of social engagement. As discussed, there is a 
distinct correlation between the renegotiation of sight and the disruption of ideas 
of self-containment. Sight is an empirical faculty which reinforces ideas of self-
containment by refusing to provide a space for actual physiological or bodily 
engagement between individuals.507 However this particular idea of self-
containment is frustrated by studies of hormonal responses in the context of 
certain affective environments. The stage (a site of performance poetry) articulates 
a space where affect transmission can be engaged with on a conscious level, where 
one can feel tangible affective transmission.  
 
                                                          
507 It should be noted that arguments which submit to a diachronic visual/oral binary can be 
questioned. As the critic Jonathan Miller notes in his study of the work of Mashall McLuhan: ‘if, as 
McLuhan suggests, the visual sense was subordinate to the acoustic one before the invention of 
typography, the eloquent orator Cicero would surely have been the last person to sponsor the use of 
strong visual images as an aide memoire. And yet, in spite of the fact that Cicero lived long before 
the invention of type, he took extraordinary pains to acknowledge the primacy of sight among all 
other senses’ (p.54, Miller). While important to note, I suspect that this rhetoric is clouded 
somewhat by a particular and problematic aspect of McLuhan’s negotiation with media which 
abnegates materiality. Jonathan Miller, McLuhan (London: Fontana/Collins, 1971). 
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For the pedagogical, educational value of affect transmission it is important 
that Brennan’s contention regarding the individual’s capacity to cultivate their own 
sense of self-containment is recognized as an important element. To reiterate, this 
self-containment does not extend to a hardening of the skin or a thickening of the 
blood – an ability to manifestly refuse the physical stimulus of certain affects – but 
to reject the implications of the physiological changes provoked by affective 
transmissions. Much as attention must be paid to the individual, the body placed at 
the centre of affect driven analysis, the role of the ego and the self must be 
acknowledged and accommodated in order to derive the value of the potential 
education available through the recognition of our affective capacities: 
 
From the burden of individual self-absorption comes the interest in 
directing attention around and through the very structures that produce 
that self-absorption in the first place, releasing affects via the conscious 
exploration of their sedimentation. Extending attention into the flesh is 
simultaneously an exploration of the affects that have captured both 
individual souls as well as crowds of souls, and in this exploration there 
is an acknowledgment and a coming to terms with what the ages of 
reason and individualism have excluded from consciousness. This is the 
connection, affectively and energetically, to other living and dead 
things, the connection to the living logos and to the thing that 
misdirects affects and energies toward destruction.508  
                                                          
508 Brennan, pp.160-161. 
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Sites of resistance to Brennan’s notion of affect transmission are thus important 
arbitrating elements in the education of our affective drives. Engaging with the 
patho-logy of affect, conceptualizing the body as a space to interpret affective 
neutrality and generate intensities of feeling requires not only a receptive mind but 
an inquisitive mind, contesting the tenability of a self that accepts without scruple 
all affect driven towards the heart. Once again, the didacticism of the performance 
poet may be evoked as a criticism, however as Brennan elucidates, the mechanism 
of affect transmission and reception is more complicated than this model would 
indicate. Self-absorption rendered both consciously and unconsciously by the ego 
requires the audience member to question the visitation of affect enacted upon the 
body. Criticism of performance poetry as emotionally unsophisticated does not 
engage with the issues of affect that manifest beneath the surface of the skin and 
within the body. Affective, experiential education is facilitated by poetry 
performances, which offer a distillation of wide degrees of affect- allowing the body 
to interact with various drives. To return to ‘An Inventory of Shimmers’, 
performance poetry enables a space where: ‘the pathology of a body meets the 
pedagogy of an affective world’.509  
 
 
Phenomenological enquiries 
 
                                                          
509 Seigworth, p.12. 
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The progress of such education, and the difficulties associated with perceiving the 
potential of affect can be distinguished both in the academic aggression articulated 
in my first chapter and in the sophisticated position that affect occupies as 
articulated in my second chapter. With the introduction of the potential for a 
pedagogy of affect the enmeshed interrelations of affect and the complications that 
occur when one attempts to track it510 could present a dividing non-linearity 
without suitable conditions through which analysis may be focused. I contend in my 
next chapter that these conditions are grounded by performance poetry’s 
engagement with space. However, in order to robustly connect the affective turn 
with the spatial turn it is necessary to first arbitrate an investigation of their 
respective experiential capacities through an initial phenomenological enquiry.511 
Phenomenology underpins much of the thinking outlined by many of the scholars I 
have already discussed and will go on to discuss. I consider it necessary to 
accompany my analysis of the essential structures of affect transmission with a 
phenomenological reification of affects. I also consider it necessary to foreground a 
discussion of the occupation of space through performance with a 
phenomenological analysis of judgements of space.  
 
                                                          
510 Andrew Sturdy, ‘‘Knowing the Unknowable? A Discussion of Methodological and Theoretical 
Issues in Emotion Research and Organizational Studies’, in Organization, Volume 10. Issue 1 (2003), 
pp.81–105. 
511 The relationships between space, phenomenology, and poetics has been explored in a number of 
critical frameworks, notably Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969) 
originally published in French in 1958. Bachelard primarily focuses on the poetic-aesthetic 
experience of dwelling in space, inviting a discussion of architectures which foreground these 
phenomenological experiences and in this respect enables a connection between experience and 
encounter with space, a consideration I articulate in the course of my analysis of performance 
spaces. 
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Critical appraisal of the negotiation between affect and phenomenology 
begins with the same logic that defines the value of reading affect through 
performance poetry: that beneath the surface of receipt the spectator is involved in 
a highly complicated process of affective comprehension. As Paul Libbey Russell 
argues in his article ‘The Phenomenology of Affect’: 
 
Any feeling, no matter how basic, is already a highly complicated event 
and its own piece of competence, including within it elements of 
intentionality, of memory, of cognition, of communication, of 
attachment, and a thrust towards development, towards competence, 
towards a coherent sense of reality. We can say, then, that our feelings 
colour the world and confer reality. That is, we discover reality in our 
feelings, far more than we do from the traditional sense data.512 
 
Russell’s arguments are coordinated by what he contends are the functions of 
affects. Affects act as signals to ourselves and (through the mechanisms of 
transmission I have already investigated) signals to others: ‘all affects serve as 
signals, as indicators of reality. Affects also serve a communicative function. They 
serve as signals not only to us, but also from us to other people’.513 These functions 
of communication and transmission are, as Brennan contended, governed by the 
body. However, though I have offered the body as an apposite tool to process 
Barthes’ Neutrality or Seigworth’s ‘inventory of shimmers’, this does not defuse the 
                                                          
512 Paul Libbey Russell. ‘The Phenomenology of Affect’, in Smith College Studies in Social Work, Vol. 
76. Issue 1-2 (2006), pp.67-70 (p.68). 
513 Russell, ‘The Phenomenology of Affect’, p.70. 
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problematic issue of attempting (predicating a pedagogical utility) to present an 
objective or essential structure of the experience of the performance poem. In his 
essay ‘Embodied Inter-Affection in and beyond Organizational Life-Worlds’ 
Professor of Leadership and Organization studies514 Wendelin Küpers argues that: 
 
affective experiences are never related to finished closed ‘‘objects’’, but 
always in poly-sensual, inter-relational and continuous processes. As 
dynamic phenomena, they are unforeseeable in their self-disclosing and 
‘‘othering’’ expressions throughout their ongoing unfolding.515 
 
The implication of this perspective situates transient affect in a difficult relationship 
with conceptual definition, empirical investigation, and the comprehension of a 
logocentric model by which one might close-off the interstitial, dynamic elements 
of affect for any meaningful pedagogical analysis. However, Küpers presents 
phenomenology as a potential solution: ‘a phenomenological approach contributes 
to exploring the interwoven nexus of affection in a more inclusive way, while 
keeping the heterogeneity and multi-foldedness of its phenomenality alive’.516 
Küpers appeals to the notion of affective encounter as a process by which the 
individual makes phenomenological sense of an experience through a process of 
feeling in relation to the self and to others. By doing so he presents a strategy 
                                                          
514 Much of Küpers’ work, particularly his cross-disciplinary phenomenological criticism, centres on 
an investigation into the impact of economization of affect and emotion in economic and 
organizational life-worlds. Although this focus separates him from the specific experience of a 
performance poem his work provides an interesting context for framing the relationship between 
the affective body and the phenomenological experience.  
515 Wendelin Küpers, ‘Embodied Inter-Affection in and beyond Organizational Life-Worlds’, in Critical 
Horizons, Vol. 15. Issue 2 (2014), pp.150-178 (p.154). 
516 Küpers, p.151. 
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whereby one might avoid reducing the variability of affect to a quantified array of 
embodied experience, thus re-evaluating the problematic idea of affect pedagogy 
as an attempt to objectively schematize or pronounce upon lived experience. The 
value phenomenological enquiry places upon the person through lived experience 
and upon rigorous yet unconstricting discovery-oriented study of practices517 offers 
a way for pedagogies of affect to avoid the complications of pedagogical framing.  
 
My analysis of a phenomenological interpretation of performance poetry is 
developed from the theories of the French scholar and phenomenologist Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty. A more comprehensive analysis of the Merleau-Pontian framework 
of body and perception would anticipate a deeper study of the French 
phenomenological tradition post-Husserl.518 However I have elected to limit my 
focus to Merleau-Ponty because of the fertile and motivating relationship between 
Merleau-Pontian concepts of the body and of the body in space. My 
acknowledgment of the utility of Merleau-Pontian phenomenology stems from 
three understandings. Firstly, Merleau-Ponty placed particular emphasis on the 
value of modern art and modern literature to effectively express the relationship 
between humanity and being which underpinned the logic of representation he 
examined. More so than philosophy, Merleau-Ponty believed that the current 
                                                          
517 As described in: Mark P. Orbe, ‘Phenomenology’, in Encyclopaedia of communication theory, ed. 
by Stephen W. Littlejohn and Karen A. Foss (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2009), pp. 
750-752. 
518 Husserl’s influence on Merleau-Ponty is discussed in Dermot Moran’s essay ‘Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty on Embodied Experience’ where Moran refers to Merleau-Ponty as ‘a supremely 
subtle and perceptive reader of Husserl… quick to grasp the fuller implications of Husserl's works, 
which we, thanks to the Husserliana publications, can now appreciate in more detail.’ (p.176, 
Moran) Moran, Dermot, ‘Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on Embodied Experience’, in Advancing 
Phenomenology: Essays in Honor of Lester Embree, ed. by Thomas Nenon and Philip Blosser 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), pp.175-197. 
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epoch relied upon art to prevent superimpositions upon the subject, and to allow 
phenomenology to comply with sensible, lived experience.519 Secondly, in relation 
to an affective understanding of performance poetry Merleau-Ponty is particularly 
well placed to extend my argument into a phenomenological reading. As David 
Morris notes in his chapter in Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts (2008) exploring 
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the body:  
 
The body is at the heart of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy… There is no 
ontological separation between the experiencing ‘I’ and the body as one 
lives it. Indeed, the lived body is one’s intentional opening to the world, 
through which alone one experiences meaningful things in the first 
place. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of the body is therefore no mere 
study of a neutral object, but an investigation of one’s existence as a 
philosopher.520 
 
Foregrounding the fundamentality of the body in the phenomenological experience 
supports my investigation into the role of the body in the exchange of affect 
through performance. Thirdly, deeply ingrained in Merleau-Pontian concepts of the 
body is an understanding that experience is constructed by a complicit dynamic of 
body and of space: ‘being is synonymous with being situated’.521 This has vital 
                                                          
519 For further analysis, see: Mauro Carbone, ‘The truth of ideas and idea of philosophy in the later 
Merleau-Ponty’, in Merleau-Ponty and the Possibilities of Philosophy: Transforming the Tradition, ed. 
by Bernard Flynn, Wayne J. Froman, and Robert Vallier (New York: SUNY Press, 2009), pp.237-257. 
520 David Morris, ‘Inventions: Body’, Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts, ed. by Rosalyn Diprose and Jack 
Reynolds (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008), pp.111-121 (p.111). 
521 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. by Colin Smith (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1962), p.252. 
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implications for my third chapter which analyses the role space plays in the 
experience of performance poetry. This essential correlation of body and space, 
affirmed in Stephen Priest’s critique of Merleau-Ponty522 allows for a more elegant 
segue between these two compositional factors of a poem’s performance. 
 
The value of a phenomenological, Merleau-Pontian approach to 
understanding performance poetics lies in the character of Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought regarding the process of perception. He proposes that perception is not 
simply contingent upon the body, but is itself a bodily phenomenon. Discussing the 
spatiality of the body Merleau-Ponty conveys the notion of extending our bodies as 
experiential sites by comparison to a white stick: ‘The blind man’s stick has ceased 
to be an object for him, and is no longer perceived for itself; its point has become 
an area of sensitivity, extending the scope and active radius of touch, and providing 
a parallel to sight’.523 The argument offered is that the habitualization of objects 
‘incorporates them into the bulk of our own body’.524 The importance of this to an 
analysis of the process of perception is that it opens up the potential for an concept 
of the body as a malleable site of experience: ‘the normal subject has his body not 
only as system of present positions, but besides, and thereby, as an open system of 
an infinite number of equivalent positions directed to other ends’.525 With this 
more flexible model526 in hand one could reposition the very idea of perception, like 
                                                          
522 Stephen Priest, Merleau-Ponty: The Arguments of the Philosophers, ed. by Ted Honderich (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1998), p.113-114. 
523 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.143. 
524 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.143. 
525 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.141. 
526 This is a flexibility predicated by the sense that the world, and our experiences of it, have infinite 
capacity. This is further analysed in the introduction to Performance and Phenomenology Traditions 
and Transformations, where the Merleau-Pontian approach specifically: ‘embraces the possibility 
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affective reception, to be a shifting, mutable process. However, unlike affect which, 
as I have argued, can be demonstrably understood as a feeling in relation and in 
response to other bodies, Merleau-Ponty’s description of the act of perception 
does not fully endorse notions of the self’s perception as being an ultimately 
unanchored, bodily experience. Alongside the body’s perception, one also 
encounters the deliberateness of the conscious self. This interrogation of the 
discreetness of perception is expressed in Taylor Carman’s analysis of Merleau-
Ponty: 
 
Perception is not a private mental event, nor is the body just one more 
material object set alongside others. We lose sight of perception itself 
when we place it on either side of a sharp distinction between inner 
subjective experiences and external objective facts. In its most concrete 
form, perception manifests itself instead as an aspect of our bodily 
being in the world.527 
 
Carman’s description of Merleau-Pontian perception allows for the intentional: 
‘Perception… is the ground of both the subjectivity and the objectivity of 
experience, of its inner feel and its intentional grip on the world’528 and in doing so 
it also allows for the engineering of conditions which situate perception as both a 
                                                          
that experience cannot be solved—it is inexhaustible, incomplete, and mysterious. And yet we can 
still encounter it—cannot help but be involved with it—and find meaning in it.’ Maaike Bleeker, Jon 
Foley Sherman, and Eirini Nedelkopoulou, ‘Introduction’, in Performance and Phenomenology 
Traditions and Transformations (New York: Routledge, 2015), pp.1-20 (p.3). 
527 Taylor Carman, Merleau-Ponty: Routledge Philosophers (London: Routledge, 2008), p.78. 
528 Carman, p.80. 
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bodily experience, and an abstractly generated process.529 Carman presents the 
idea that subjective sensation - a comparison or a questioning of the quality of 
sensory experience is an aspect of perception which, separate from the bodily 
experience, allows the subject’s interrogation to inform their perception. The 
complexity of this argument in the context of its application to performance poetics 
seems to question the strong affective potential of the experience of the 
performance poem. However, Carman reads Merleau-Pontian perception as a 
balance between the bodily and the intentional where the mechanism is firmly 
located within the body (and therefore the site of affect generation): ‘perception is 
not a mental phenomenon, if by ‘mental’ we mean something in contrast to 
material or physical. Rather, perception is a bodily phenomenon, which is to say 
that we experience our own sensory states not as mere states of mind, but as 
states of our bodies’.530 Additionally, although Merleau-Ponty used Phenomenology 
of Perception to question the relationship between perception and affective 
reception, interrogating the nature of the body as an affective object: ‘It was 
therefore recognized that my body does not present itself as the objects of external 
impressions do’. 531 In his later developments he was explicit in expressing that the 
                                                          
529 As Carman argues: ‘Interior and exterior, mental and physical, subjective and objective—such 
notions are simply too crude and misleading to capture it. For perception is both intentional and 
bodily, both sensory and motor, and so neither merely subjective nor objective, inner nor outer, 
spiritual nor mechanical. Moreover, the middle ground between such traditional categories is not 
just their middle but indeed their ground, for it is what they depend on and presuppose. There are 
such things as subjective sensations and sensory qualities, of course, but only because we can 
sometimes generate them by abstracting away from our original openness onto the world and 
zeroing in on isolated features of things, and on bits of experience, which we suppose (rightly or 
wrongly) must correspond to those features, just as we can abstract in the other direction away 
from ourselves toward a world independent of perspective on it’ (Carman, p.78). 
530 Carman, p.80. 
531 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.93. 
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ontological relationship between the individual (body) and the world was one of 
intimate shared bodily experience.532 
 
Understanding the centrality of the body in the phenomenological 
experience, I now turn to the implications this portends for the situation of the 
body in space. As I will argue, alongside the negotiation of affect, performance 
additionally requires an underlying recognition of space. This is present at the 
initiation of any performance, where the performer clears (mentally and frequently 
physically) a space in which to enact the performance. In spoken word the poet will 
establish themselves as the focal point within a room, thus securing the space for 
performance. My contention is that this element of performance provides a crucial 
social function by utilizing the performance space to interrogate the space of the 
everyday. This not only correlates with, but facilitates the role I have outlined for 
performance poetry as a pedagogical examination of our affective capacities. 
Additionally, this process has a firm basis in our phenomenological perception of 
the body in space. As Merleau-Ponty outlines in Phenomenology of Perception: ‘my 
whole body for me is not an assemblage of organs juxtaposed in space. I am in 
undivided possession of it and I know where each of my limbs is through a bodily 
                                                          
532 As Carman asserts: ‘by the late 1950s [Merleau-Ponty] was apparently dissatisfied with what he 
had come to regard as the still too dualistic framework of Phenomenology of Perception. In its place 
he now insisted more emphatically that body and world must be seen as overlapping sinews in a 
common ‘flesh’ (chair), related not as situation and reaction (let alone stimulus and response), but 
as a kind of ‘chiasm,’ an ‘interweaving’ or ‘interlacing’ (entrelacs) of threads in a single fabric. 
Merleau-Ponty scholars often write as if these new metaphors amount to a radical break with his 
earlier work, but I think this is only half right. For although Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh does 
mark an abandonment of the primacy of consciousness in his account of being in the world, the 
images of chiasm and interlacing are elaborations on an idea he had already been expounding in his 
early work, decades before’ (Carman, pp.79-80). 
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image in which all are included’.533 The relevance of this outline of the body is that 
it offers up the possibility to understand the body in relation to the space it 
occupies. Although the body is discreet: ‘The outline of my body is a frontier which 
ordinary spatial relations do not cross’534, it is also explicitly and intimately shaped 
and manifested by the spatial life-world: ‘We are therefore feeling our way towards 
a second definition of the body image: it is no longer seen as the straightforward 
result of associations established during experience, but a total awareness of my 
posture in the intersensory world’.535 From a phenomenological perspective spatial 
occupation, for example the spatial positioning of a performer at a poetry 
performance, is not crudely restricted to the literal notion of a stage, but can be 
understood as a situational space generated by the role the performer plays within 
the shared experience of the event.536  
 
The implications of this phenomenological and experiential perspective of 
space allows for my subsequent analysis of space in performance to be shaped by 
the understanding that, as Merleau-Ponty pontificates in his 1948 text The World of 
Perception; the individual cannot be rendered separate from the space he or she 
occupies.537 Recalling Merleau-Pontian concepts of the body, space presents an 
                                                          
533 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.98. 
534 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.98. 
535 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, pp.99-100. 
536 As Merleau-Ponty further explicates: ‘Psychologists often say that the body is dynamic. Brought 
down to a precise sense, this term means that my body appears to me as an attitude directed 
towards a certain existing or possible task. And indeed its spatiality is not, like that of external 
objects or like that of ‘spatial sensations’ a spatiality of position, but a spatiality of situation’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.100). 
537 ‘We can no longer draw an absolute distinction between space and the things which occupy it, 
nor indeed between the pure idea of space and the concrete spectacle it presents to our senses’. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The World of Perception, trans. by Oliver Davis (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2004), p.51. 
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experience in which the body is fundamentally embedded, and any movement 
within the space effects changes within the body. The character of a performance 
poetry space thus co-operates with the affective negotiations manifested through 
spoken word performance. Discussing the dynamism of the body in motion538 I 
argue Merleau-Ponty clearly articulates the importance of a medium such as 
performance poetry for exemplifying a deeper, pedagogical understanding of our 
experience of space. Operatively, Merleau-Ponty posits the value of denuding ‘the 
commonplaceness of established situations’:  
 
it is clearly in action that the spatiality of our body is brought into being, 
and an analysis of one’s own movement should enable us to arrive at a 
better understanding of it. By considering the body in movement, we 
can see better how it inhabits space (and, moreover, time) because 
movement is not limited to submitting passively to space and time, it 
actively assumes them, it takes them up in their basic significance which 
is obscured in the commonplaceness of established situations.539 
 
In the course of my proceeding analysis I take up the significance of this 
notion through an investigation of the role performance poetry plays in re-
examining the everyday space through engaging the body within a space of 
performance. To return to Wendelin Küpers’ analysis of the interrelation between 
Merleau-Pontian phenomenology and affective potential Küpers presents the 
                                                          
538 As I have argued in this chapter, I take motion to absolutely incorporate both performer and 
spectator of a performance poem as affectively active participants within a performance event. 
539 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.102. 
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revitalization of the everyday as a necessarily social reality: ‘Affects and inter-
affections are depleting or enhancing transitions of intensities through the 
influences of embodied realities that are always already cultural and social’.540 He 
evokes Teresa Brennan in his discussion of the social mechanism of affect 
transmission whereby one educates the senses by, among other things, overcoming 
the illusion of self-containment.541 From a phenomenological perspective the 
dictum Küpers presents: ‘to experience an affective happening is to process, realize 
or to enact a moving relation to the phenomenal world’542 suggests that the 
experience of an ‘affective happening’ must necessarily be located in a shared 
(social) space: ‘Occurring in encounters, affects are thus part of the relationships 
between manifold beings. The outcome of each of these encounters depends upon 
what form of composition these beings are able to enter into’.543 By re-examining 
the spatial element of the experience of performance poetry through a 
phenomenological lens it is possible to establish a firmer outline of the pedagogical 
potential latent in performance poetry544, or as Küpers articulates, a potential for 
‘radical transformational shifting’:  
                                                          
540 Küpers, p.159. 
541 In the footnotes to his text Küpers elaborates on the debt owed to Brennan’s research in the 
transmission of affect: ‘For Brennan the transmission of affect is social in origin, and works via 
bodies as media (and hormonal exchange), which create affective resonances independent of 
content or meaning, causing bio-physical effects and physiological shifts… Basically all forms of 
communication, whether facial expressions, respiration, tone of voice, sounds or postures are 
perceptible, and can transmit affect’ (p.159, Küpers). 
542 Küpers, p.159. 
543 Küpers, p.154. 
544 Küpers clearly foregrounds his intention to establish the potential of affective experience as an 
educative process earlier in his analysis: ‘Effectively, the pathetically tuned senses and body 
perceives the world in an affective modality of being, that makes living more intensive. With 
intensified affect then comes a stronger sense of embeddedness and heightened sense of inter-
connection to ‘‘Others’’ or ‘‘othering’’ phenomena, including for example places, atmospheres, 
technologies, people, and so on in the larger field of life’ (Küpers, p.156). Thus the ‘radical 
transformational shifting’ as Küpers indicates here is intimately linked to the kind of pedagogical 
application demonstrated by other critics evaluated in the course of my analysis.   
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Furthermore, that affects and emotion emerge as potential movement 
implies not only a particular bodily and relational orientation to the 
world and to others, but also that they carry a potential for radical 
transformational shifting… We not only feel moved by something, but 
also are moved to do something, to take an action and move others.545 
 
Utilizing a phenomenological basis for my enquiry into the potential of performance 
poetry thus forms a bridge between my analysis of the role of affect in performance 
and my subsequent examination of shared performance spaces.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
545 Küpers, p.160. 
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Chapter three 
Space and Performance Poetry 
 
The framework of phenomenological enquiry I have established in my preceding 
chapter necessitates an investigation into the spaces in which the affective 
transmissions of performance poetry occur. It is my contention that through an 
analysis of the relationship between space and performance in the context of a 
number of key phenomenological scholars, a robust defence for the value of spoken 
word in contemporary society may be posited. This defence will take the form of a 
re-negotiation of the role performance poetry takes in the production of social 
spaces and the dis-alienation of everyday life through the occupation of 
performance spaces. Building upon relationships established in my previous chapter 
between phenomenological experience and spatial occupation (and the 
implications this shared, social element holds for an effective affect-driven 
education of the senses) this chapter further reinforces my argument regarding the 
pedagogical value of performance poetry. In this chapter I explore the 
contemporary spaces occupied by performance poetry events with reference to 
first hand experiences from performance poets and spoken word organizers. In 
shaping a referential frame for my contention that spoken word performances can 
occupy a variety of spaces I present a discussion regarding the ways in which 
spaces, in the context of performance, are constituted or enabled. This opens my 
argument to an examination of the roles of both performer and audience within the 
space created. As I have argued previously, performers and audience all contribute 
234 
 
to the affective potential of the spoken word experience. Discussing how this 
collaboration is enacted within a shared space I reference the work of French 
philosopher Jacques Rancière, specifically his text The Emancipated Spectator (first 
published in English in 2009).546 The notion of the audience as a collection of 
passive spectators is frustrated by the affective co-relationships formed through 
performance which I have previously established. An analysis of Rancière, who 
focused specifically on the relationships between performer and audience within 
the performance space, and subsequently of the work of the theatre critic Gay 
McAuley permits a shift in my argument from an interrogation of the affective turn 
to an interrogation of the spatial turn in the late twentieth-century. 
In her text Space in performance: making meaning in the theatre (1999) 
McAuley continues the arguments established by Rancière, positing a spatiality of 
the theatre which is fundamentally inscribed by the relationships between 
performers and audience.547 She recalls in all but name the importance of affect in 
this spatial production: ‘the space in relation to oneself… the ‘feeling’ (whatever 
that is) of being in a theatre’.548 This can be analysed in the context of Bob 
Holman’s Slam Disclaimer.549 As a popular poem performed at the introduction to 
many Slams this serves as a tacit reinforcement of the shared importance of bodily 
presence to both an affective and a live spatial field of analysis: 
                                                          
546 Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator (London: Verso, 2011). 
547 Gay McAuley, Space in performance: making meaning in the theatre (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1999). 
548 McAuley, p.256. 
549 It is difficult to find an exact date for the composition of this poem, however it has been cited in a 
number of texts including: Marc Kelly Smith and Joe Kraynak, Stage a Poetry Slam: Creating 
Performance Poetry Events-Insider Tips, Backstage Advice, and Lots of Examples (Naperville: 
Sourcebooks Inc., 2009). 
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Yes, we must destroy 
ourselves in the constant 
reformation that is this very moment 
and propel you to write the poems 
as poets read them550 
 Armed with a justification for approaching the question of space and spatial 
production as being intimately connected to feeling and to bodily negotiations, I 
turn to the critical frontier of spatiality and the ways in which studies of space have 
shaped the development of theories of interactions within social spaces. This 
encounter with the spatial turn anticipates an engagement with the value of 
experiences in the phenomenological mode I have established, examining the 
pedagogical function of shared space through performance.  
Through a negotiation of Modernism and the problems of the Modernist 
obsession with time and temporality, the French critic and philosopher Michel 
Foucault presents the ‘epoch of space’, first articulated in his 1984 article ‘Of Other 
Spaces’, an epoch which anticipated and sustained the spatial turn in the twentieth-
century.551 This turn fixed space as a dominant site of enquiry, privileging spatial 
concerns, and foregrounding a deeper understanding of the way in which 
                                                          
550 Cristin O’Keefe Aptowicz, Words In Your Face: A guided tour through twenty years of the New 
York City Poetry Slam (New York: Soft Skull Press, 2008), pp.30-31. 
551 Michel Foucault, ‘Of Other Spaces’ trans. by Jay Miskowiec, in Diacritics, Vol. 16. No. 1 (1986), 
pp.22-27. For further critique and analysis of the spatial turn, see: Barney Werf and Santa Arias, The 
Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary perspectives (London: Routledge, 2009); Phil Hubbard, et al (eds)., Key 
Thinkers on Space and Place (London: Sage, 2004); Michael J. Dear and Steven Flusty, The Spaces of 
Postmodernity: Readings in Human Geography (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002). 
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communities created and maintained social spaces. Foucault’s presentation of 
heterotopias in this article is crucial to understanding how performance poetry can 
enable an active renegotiation of spaces and foster and promote the creation of 
social spaces. Through a successive analysis of Foucault’s six principles of 
heterotopology in the context of the performance poetry space I posit the implicit 
correlation between the spoken word stage and the heterotopic space.  
  To clarify the problems that emerge when one takes this argumentation and 
applies it to the theatre space or the space of the traditional poetry reading I refer 
to the work of the theatre critic Patrick Primavesi.552 Primavesi’s study of 
heterotopias in the dominant theatre of the nineteenth century is critical to my 
investigation, however it must first be read in the context of an analysis of 
developments in spatial occupation in theatre of the period.553 The widening of 
legitimized performance spaces effected by the mid-1800s Theatre Acts frames the 
context of Primavesi’s arguments regarding the ways in which public and social 
spaces operated as performance spaces. However, as can be evidenced in the 
relative paucity of academic study of nineteenth century theatre (a paucity which is 
analogous to the volume of critical engagement with contemporary performance 
poetry) the opening up of social spaces for performance did not constitute a 
successful re-evaluation of the pedagogical value of this relocation of potential 
spaces. Through Primavesi’s analysis I initiate a discussion of sites of performance: 
                                                          
552 Patrick Primavesi, ‘Heterotopias of the Public Sphere: Theatre and Festival around 1800’, in 
Performance and the Politics of Space: Theatre and Topology, ed. by Erika Fischer-Lichte, Benjamin 
Wihstutz (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp.166-182. 
553 For further background analysis of the implications of theatre of this period see: Marvin Carlson, 
Performance: A Critical Introduction: 2nd edition, (London and New York: Routledge, 2003). 
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the theatre or the space of the poetry reading, which may in fact circumscribe the 
production of social spaces through the subsequent establishment of (in 
Primavesi’s terms) a bourgeois ideology of performance spaces: ‘Theatre fervour 
and “theatromania” were deemed harmful excesses of affect and fantasy, an 
escape from reality and a sign of moral decay. The fundamental ambivalence of the 
bourgeoisie’s attitude toward the theatre was finally expressed in the attempt to 
discipline the behaviour of performers and spectators, and to channel the desire to 
transgress everyday conventions’.554 Significantly, Primavesi establishes a contrast 
between the conditioned theatrical space and the festival space as a site of excess. 
The festival is crucial to the final element of my analysis of the spaces occupied by 
spoken word. To prepare for this analysis I have included an interview I conducted 
with a performance poet who has also worked extensively in traditional theatre. 
The interview includes a discussion of the ways in which relationships to space and 
the occupation of space differ in different modes of performance and posits 
potential explanations and responses to the current paucity of spoken word in the 
UK compared to its presence in the US.  
The final element of my analysis concerns the festival in relation to the work 
of Henri Lefebvre and Martin Heidegger. I argue that that the relationship between 
performance poetry and representations of social spaces as heterotopias of the 
festive can be further reinforced by Lefebvre’s insistence on the materiality of 
spatial negotiations, and the uniqueness by which spoken word relates to 
Heidegger’s concept of art and the capacity of the festive space to relegate the 
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‘enframing’ potential of the everyday.555 A Lefebvrian approach to representations 
of space draws together elements of my enquiry into the relationship between 
affect and space through phenomenological approaches underpinned by Lefebvre’s 
insistence on the importance of the body. The conclusions that can be reached 
from Lefebvre’s assertions regarding the fundamentality of the material body 
reinforce the connection between spatial production and the affective processes 
enacted by performance poetry in the performance space. From a Heideggerian 
perspective, ‘the opening up of a world’ is achieved through poetics, and through 
representation within a space which enables rather than forecloses such 
opening.556 In both approaches (underpinned by a discussion of heterotopias and 
the festive space) performance poetry can be interpreted as exemplary for the 
production and maintenance of social spaces. This production is, in essence, 
pedagogical as it educates and protects against the very real threat of alienation 
posed by the everyday space which circumscribes rather than facilitates social 
interaction. In this respect, a spatial analysis of performance poetry offers a strong 
defence for its inclusion within the social and cultural landscape of twenty-first 
century poetics. 
 
 
                                                          
555 The concept of ‘enframing’, or ‘Gestell’ was introduced by Heidegger in a 1949 lecture ‘The 
Framework’ (Das Gestell), and consolidated in his 1954 text The Question Concerning Technology: 
Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. by William Lovitt 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1977). 
556 Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), p.44. 
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Contemporary spaces for spoken word 
 
One may argue that there exists an established tradition of locating a poetry 
reading in a space which engenders connotations with literature and with literary 
study, for example the library, or, to reinforce the tacit relationship between 
poetics and the academy, the university space. Contrary to this, there has been an 
increasing trend over the last few years which dictates a movement of the 
performance of poetry into spaces which serve the function of recreational, social 
spaces. Increasingly, at a community level, spoken word performances and events 
can be found in pubs, cafes, and on variety club stages. Testaments to this are the 
experiences of London based performance poet Laurie Bolger who has supported 
my exploration into contemporary UK performance poetry with a wealth of first-
hand information regarding the current spoken word scene in the UK. Currently 
Bolger hosts one of London's leading performance poetry night BANG Said the Gun 
and also organizes a range of poetry events at Camden Roundhouse - one of the 
most prominent and iconic venues for spoken word in the UK.557 Alongside this she 
was recently appointed London’s lead facilitator for BBC 1Xtra’s Words First as well 
as being one of London's young poet Laureates. This role requires her to host and 
perform at a variety of events including The Mayor’s Dinner, and the opening of the 
Olympic Swimming Pool. Bolger notes that the kinds of spaces she performs in also 
extend to streets, factories, and pop up performances in garden sheds. When 
                                                          
557 Laura Thornley, ‘Somewhere you should go… Poetry Slam at The Roundhouse’, The Cultural 
Exposé, 9/8/12 < http://www.theculturalexpose.co.uk/what-to-do-in-london/somewhere-you-
should-go-poetry-slam-at-the-roundhouse/> [accessed 28 June 2016]. 
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questioned whether, based on the variety of spaces Bolger has utilized for 
performance events, there were any spaces that did not work for spoken word she 
responded: ‘Not really. I think you can take it anywhere to be honest. I think the 
space is definitely changed by performance and that's what makes it so fun isn't it? 
Poetry can go anywhere’.558 In 2015 Bolger hosted the poetry stage at LOVEBOX 
festival and Shambala festival to audiences of well over a thousand. She also 
performed at Camp Bestival, a role which also required her to present spoken word 
workshops for groups of teenagers, a pedagogical element of her practice which is 
supported by her work with primary schools at Story festivals in various locations 
across the UK.   
Bolger’s prominence and wide experience on the performance poetry scene 
makes her an able candidate to speak about the kind of spaces utilizes by 
contemporary spoken word in the UK. When asked whether the spoken word scene 
had changed much over the last few years, both in terms of number and variety of 
events available she suggested that: 
I think there’s a lot more variety now and the scene is opening up to 
people who are not necessarily into poetry. You've got nights like BANG 
Said the Gun and Tongue Fu that reach bigger venues such as 
Udderbelly559 and Roundhouse and the punters might have never heard 
                                                          
558 Laurie Bolger, interviewed by Jack McGowan, 17 September 2015. 
559 A custom performance space which comprises a large tent in the shape of an inflatable purple 
cow which can be transported to different festivals around the country. 
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poetry before but because it is fun and most importantly accessible the 
word gets out and people love it!560 
Pursuing the distinction between event and expectation invites the question of how 
different spaces encode different expectations. As Bolger hints in her commentary 
on the different spaces opening for spoken word around the UK, the audiences that 
attend these varied events have preconceived notions shaped in large part by the 
kind of spaces inhabited. Addressing the question of to what extent the utilization 
of traditionally social spaces has developed through spoken word events and 
performances Bolger states that: ‘I think it takes it back to the bardic tradition of 
getting up on a bar stall and reading your poems and hoping that someone gives 
you a glass of gin or a bed in return. The first time I ever performed poetry was at 
Poems in Pubs, the UK's first poetry pub crawl’.561 This kind of engagement with 
social spaces underlies the potential manifested by performance poetry’s shift 
towards incorporating affect and the body into the poetic process. Not only does 
spoken word inculcate the physical body within the poetics it also addresses the 
need to reconcile the production and receipt of poetry with the public, social body. 
This notion of audience expectation and receipt bears out in Bolger’s own 
experiences:  
I think the stereotype of poetry for a lot of people is of a lectern and 
quill, and a polite audience adjusting their monocles and clapping 
politely like they are watching cricket. But poetry can be sweaty and 
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loud too and the more risks I take to bring it to audiences outside of 
ticketed literary events the more exciting it becomes. I also think with 
BANG that we create a poetry party from the minute people walk in the 
door. People start reading that the room has such high energy but is 
also so engaged with what the performer is saying and are with them all 
the way.562 
The profusion of high energy in the performance space is certainly in keeping with 
descriptions of the affective qualities of spoken word performances. The fact that 
this affect is brought within the social space creates a different dimension for both 
audience and performer. The meeting of poetry within a social space facilitates an 
experience which, certainly for Bolger, is preferable to the conventional spatial 
landscape for the reception of poetry: ‘I love reading at prestigious literary venues 
of course I do! I'm a writer! But sometimes it’s nice to take risks and battle a bit to 
make people listen, and then find that they genuinely feel it. I love venues like 
Southbank and Keats Houses with all my poetic guts but to be honest my favourite 
gig will always be a grubby local pub with punters and poets alike’.563 Discussion of 
the appropriation of social spaces as performance venues naturally invites an 
exploration of the strong connections between community and the development of 
contemporary spoken word. For Bolger, the apex of community engagement with 
spoken word finds purchase by bringing performance poetry to social spaces and 
thus by bringing poetry to audiences that would not otherwise conventionally 
engage with it: ‘As much as I respect the lectern and the fifteen pound a ticket vibe 
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563 Bolger, interviewed by Jack McGowan. 
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and the audience being genuine poetry lovers, I feel like sometimes poetry is a bit 
cut off to people outside the scene and that’s why the public engagement stuff is so 
rewarding and important’.564 This of course invites an antecedent argument 
regarding the manifestation of value both in the social space and the academic 
space, and the subsequent derivation of high and low cultures. Concluding our 
interview, I invited Bolger to discuss how both spoken word audiences and spaces 
have changed during her time engaging with the performance poetry scene in the 
UK. Her response indicated the necessity of spoken word as a tool to reconsider the 
binaries of value inherent to the separation of page and stage: ‘I think we bring in a 
fairly varied crowd these days. Spoken Word is becoming much more mainstream 
so you have the academic page poetry lot and then the hipster crowd but this can 
only be a good thing when they meet together to celebrate great writing full of 
genuine personality and that's what BANG Said the Gun does for me’.565 Bolger’s 
impression of the contemporary spoken word scene in the UK is illuminating when 
one considers the variety of individuals and audiences engaging with performance 
poetry. Ultimately, her perspective on the role performance poetry plays in shaping 
public impressions of poetry and its cultural identity centralizes feeling and 
affective engagement: 
I think you do have to cater for your audience and gauge what they'd 
like to hear but at the same time I have learnt recently that just because 
you're in front of a thousand business people or academics doesn't 
mean you have to read tame or clever stuff. They want poetry to move 
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them and the same as performing at Keats House or in a carpark in 
Stoke, people will always take something from what you read and to be 
honest I think if you can do that, and take some risks but keep you voice 
consistent and not try to tick boxes the whole time then you're bloody 
sorted!566 
This appropriation of social space is of great importance when one considers the 
function of the performance poem or the performance poetry event within a 
society; however, my critical analysis of performance spaces goes beyond types of 
locations commonly associated with performance poetry events. As Bolger asserts 
in her final comment, affect transmission is of primary importance over the 
specificities of space, reminding us that: ‘Poetry can go anywhere’.567 Indeed, in her 
chapter ‘Policies of Spatial Appropriation’ in the edited collection Performance and 
the Politics of Space (2013) the theatre and performance critic Erika Fischer-Lichte 
suggests that in contemporary performance practice: ‘It has become almost 
impossible to find a space that has not, at one time or another, been considered 
suitable for performances’.568 The relationship between audience and performer is 
critical to understanding how this movement out of the traditional structure of 
fixed location in the theatre may have occurred. Attending to a phenomenological 
interpretation of performance this is certainly true. From a phenomenological 
perspective performance (though crucially located in a performance space) does 
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567 Bolger, interviewed by Jack McGowan. 
568 Erika Fischer-Lichte, ‘Policies of Spatial Appropriation’, in Performance and the Politics of Space: 
Theatre and Topology, ed. by Erika Fischer-Lichte, Benjamin Wihstutz (New York: Routledge, 2013), 
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not require specific encoded spaces to persist, only an affective engagement 
between bodies within that space.569  For Fischer-Lichte, the transition from 
traditional theatre spaces stems from a generalized dissatisfaction with the 
impositions established by the detachment of the theatre as a cultural institution 
from the everyday life of its patrons: 
This development was rooted, among other things, in a general critique 
of theatre as a bourgeois institution. It was a reaction to the insularity 
of the theatre, and to the perceived distance between it and the daily 
life and work routines of the majority of the population, and against the 
impenetrable borders laid down by the strict division of the theatrical 
space into one area for actors and another for spectators. Therefore, 
the policies that underpinned theatre’s appropriation of new spaces 
attempted to shift the threshold between the theatre and other 
domains of everyday life, create shared communities between actors 
and spectators, and institute a participatory form of democratic 
activity.570 
 
 
                                                          
569 This phenomenological link is demonstrated further in Performance and Phenomenology 
Traditions and Transformations: ‘Performance, regardless of how broadly or narrowly we 
understand it, only takes place through the attendance of others; it can only begin to exist through 
the involvement of others to whom it can respond. There are many means by which performance 
persists, but as a phenomenon it arises utterly embedded in a perceptual world dependent on 
others’ (Bleeker, p.8). 
570 Fischer-Lichte, p.219. 
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Space and Spectatorship 
 
Fischer-Lichte’s analysis presupposes a prior consensus over the notion and identity 
of the spectator in her comparison with the relationship between audience 
(spectator) and performer. This relationship, which forms the site of affect 
transmission in performance poetry requires further examination before any 
theories concerning their shared occupation of space can be advanced. In order to 
construct the notion of the audience as a collective body of spectators by which I 
then address the relationship between of audience, performer, and space I refer to 
Jacques Rancière’s The Emancipated Spectator (2009). Rancière establishes what he 
delineates the ‘Paradox of the Spectator’: there can be no theatre, no performance, 
without a spectator however the condition of spectatorship is antithetical to what 
Rancière determines the priority of performance to be, which is an activating 
process. Spectatorship is a necessary element of performance, however, as 
Rancière outlines: ‘To be a spectator is to be separated from both the capacity to 
know and the power to act’.571 For Rancière the traditional theatre as a site of 
performance or spectacle establishes and reiterates a distance between performer 
and audience: ‘There is the distance between the artist and spectator, but there is 
also the distance inherent in the performance itself, in so far as it subsists, as a 
spectacle, an autonomous thing, between the idea of the artist and the sensation or 
comprehension of the spectator’.572 Not only is bodily participation circumscribed 
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by the structure of the performance, but there is also an intractability of shared 
affective participation in the spectacle. In other words, the audience can’t reach the 
apogee of emotional content because they are prevented from sharing a 
comprehension of the process by their own passive role within it. For Rancière, this 
passivity is the problematic element couched within any interaction between 
performer and audience: ‘What human beings contemplate in the spectacle is the 
activity they have been robbed of, it is their own essence become alien, turned 
against them, organizing a collective world whose reality is that dispossession’.573 
Rancière’s arguments are formulated with regards to traditional theatre.574 
However, the implications for spectatorship within theatrical or performance 
spaces can be extended to the performance of poetry. Within his critical analysis he 
distinguishes the bad practice in passive spectatorship from the potential theatre 
has, being one of the only places where the audience can ‘confront[s] itself as a 
collective’.575 Indeed, he argues:  
The separation of stage and auditorium is to be transcended. The 
precise aim of the performance is to abolish this exteriority in various 
ways: by placing the spectators on the stage and the performers in the 
auditorium; by abolishing the difference between the two; by 
transferring the performance to other sites; by identifying it with taking 
possession of the street, the town, or life.576 
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The spectators who have relinquished their power and consigned themselves to a 
role of passivity thus lack the power to grasp the plurality of the performance, 
which is accomplished by participation within the collective body of the audience. 
Rancière’s emancipation is: ‘the blurring of the boundary between those who act 
and those who look; between individuals and members of a collective body’.577 This 
notion of collective body which is at the forefront of Rancière’s argument is worth 
defining as it veers perilously close to an equally circumscriptive, passive 
misunderstanding of the constitution and participation of the audience. As Rancière 
argues:  
The collective power shared by spectators does not stem from the fact 
that they are members of a collective body or from some specific form 
of interactivity. It is the power each of them has to translate what she 
perceives in her own way, to link it to the unique intellectual adventure 
that makes her similar to all the rest in as much as this adventure is not 
like any other.578 
Participation within the body of the audience does not contest a plurality of 
responses; rather it establishes the cohabitation of responses as a necessary 
realization if the audience is to escape the passivity of spectatorship. Rather than 
the perception of the collective body as a closed totality, it is vital they be perceived 
as an open totality of which each member is an active and constitutive participant. 
This is of course central to understanding performance through a 
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phenomenological lens. As the editors argue in their introduction to Performance 
and Phenomenology Traditions and Transformations (2015):  
Embodied refection of the kind proposed by performance involves 
accepting that there is no perceiving the world without altering it and 
being altered by it. Performance stages this reflective emphasis because 
of its inherent contingency, its manner of appearing dependent on the 
shifting and malleable experiences of both performers and audience 
members.579 
The affective composition of a performance poem, altered by both the performer 
and the audience members, creates a specific phenomenological experience of the 
performance which facilitates an exploration of one’s role within the experience. 
Such exploration is intimately linked to the pedagogical value of performance 
poetry I outline. To expand upon this argument, the following quote from McAuley 
discusses the role of the spectator within the creative process:  
If the performance event can be defined as what takes place between 
performers and spectators in a given space and time, then the spectator 
has to be seen as a crucial and active agent in the creative process. The 
spectators are physically present in the theatre space just as the 
performers are.580 
Application of these theories to performance poetry reveals the alignment of 
new approaches to spectatorship with the development of spoken word as a 
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prominent feature of the contemporary poetic landscape. Allied to a necessary 
reconstruction of spectatorship, performance poetry (particularly Slam Poetry) re-
posits a phenomenological understanding of audience experience through a 
reaction against established connotations of audience in the traditional poetry 
reading.581 It may be worth addressing a potential counterpoint to this thesis; for a 
general audience spoken word performance poetry enjoys a different set of 
connotations to page-based poetry and to the conventional ‘poetry reading’ which 
is firmly aligned and invested in the institution of the publishing industry. The 
poetry reading has been seen as a necessary element of marketing a new, printed 
collection of poems, the audience receipt (beyond the potential sales provoked by 
their enjoyment of the poetry) is thus not an end in and of itself. Further to this, 
one may argue therefore that the spoken word event anticipates of its audience 
something quite different from the audience of a poetry reading. The inquiry into 
the difference between ‘page’ and ‘stage’ poetry becomes one, almost, of 
demographics; how a spoken word audience (stage) is going to differ from the 
audience of a more conventional poetry reading (page), an audience who are in 
attendance for entirely different purposes. Following the logic of this argument 
presents a difficulty for the expression of a new vitality in performance poetry as it 
simply re-subscribes to the same exegetical position: performance poetry is new 
and vital not because of a quality it inherently possesses but because of the more 
                                                          
581 Not only this, the role of the performer may also be reconsidered through a phenomenological 
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reserved, less affective connotations that underline its antithesis in this 
comparison: the poetry reading. I argue this is a simplification. As McAuley avers of 
‘mainstream theatre’ which I take as analogous to my opposition between spoken 
word and the poetry reading: 
Acknowledging that the audiences for mainstream theatre nowadays 
generally behave in a restrained manner, one may nevertheless 
question whether this necessarily denotes passivity: does being quiet 
equate with passivity? Is activity to be judged solely in terms of bodily 
mobility?582 
McAuley’s argument foregrounds the shared elements of the relationship between 
performer and spectator: ‘In the exchange of energy that occurs in a good live 
performance, the audience gives as much to the actors as they give back’.583 She is 
keen to note that a new kind of spectatorship exists, one which has a productive 
role in the active experience of the spectacle: 
The primary fact of theatre is, however, the live presence of both 
performers and spectators, and from this flow two major consequences 
for the spectator: first, theatre involves an energy exchange among and 
between spectators and performers, and, second, the performance is 
necessarily embedded in a social event.584 
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Girded with the establishment of an emancipated, active audience and their 
performance of responses to the spectacle, shared occupation within a 
performance space can be critically assessed. Active (bodily) spectatorship 
demonstrates an awareness of and engagement with the affective construction of a 
performance. Performances which attempt to develop circumscriptive modes of 
audience receipt offer only fixed spatial relationships. Alternatively, performances 
which engage the audience as affective co-participants offer an opportunity to 
facilitate an education of the ways in which we affectively process bodily 
experience as meaning: ‘Phenomenology provided an alternative and a 
complement to (structuralist) semiotic approaches while shifting from a generalized 
affirmation of ‘the body’s’ experiences during performance towards thinking about 
bodies’ construction of being and meaning’.585 What must thus be explored is the 
capacity for spoken word to redefine and renegotiate how space uses and is used 
through performance. What is encoded in the act of theatregoing for McAuley is a 
recognition of the space of the theatre as a constituent part of the feeling of 
spectatorship: 
Experience of theatregoing teaches us to look at the stage, but the 
spectator in the theatre is always involved first and foremost in the 
phenomenological experience of being there, of the space in relation to 
oneself, of one’s self in the place, of the ‘height in the air’, of the 
‘feeling’ (whatever that is) of being in a theatre.586 
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The unfocused designations McAuley offers in her analysis are clearly descriptions 
of affect. The whatever of ‘feeling’ and of ‘height in the air’ comprise the 
transmission of affect between theatregoers geared towards a shared experience of 
spectatorship. McAuley refuses in her argumentation to name this as such, even 
though the comparison is clear. When McAuley offers that: ‘theatre makes 
demands on its audiences in intangible ways to contribute to the energy 
exchange’587, the transaction is affective – intangible yet insistent, the space 
creating a physiological demand on the bodies of the audience members to 
contribute to the shared affective experience. Presence is once again represented 
in the concluding statements of McAuley’s text:  
the spatial reality is paramount, for it is only because the spectators are 
really present in the auditorium that they can enjoy the shifts and turns 
in their consciousness of themselves, other spectators, the actors, and 
the dramatic fiction. It is evident, then, that space is at work in every 
aspect of the spectator’s experience of the theatre event.588 
An implicit connection is drawn between performance, affect, and space. The 
context of presence offers an interesting reinterpretation of the first few lines of 
Slam Poetry guru Bob Holman’s famous Slam Disclaimer. Holman, one of the most 
seminal influences on the New York and US Slam poetry scene589, performs his Slam 
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Disclaimer at the beginning of any Slam he hosts or competes in. The first few lines 
read as follows: 
As Dr. Willie used to say, 
We are gathered here today 
Because we are not gathered 
Somewhere else today590 
 
Though on cursory inspection it appears to be a simple quip, I posit that Holman is 
effectively invoking not only presence but presence as part of a communal 
gathering, gearing the audience to engage in the transmission of affect. Despite the 
connections between bodily engagement (affect) and space, McAuley suggests that 
this element of interaction has been misrepresented in a critical, academic analysis 
of performance: ‘Scholarly emphasis on play, production, and performance has 
tended to downplay the importance of the social experience occurring in the 
audience space’.591 I contend that this may be a more complicated negotiation, and 
that the function of the social in performance theory does share some commonality 
with a major shift in criticism in the late twentieth century; a shift which has been 
labelled the spatial turn.  
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Space: a critical frontier 
 
In the late twentieth century, the landscape of literary criticism shifted. 
Alongside the affective turn, as analysed in my previous chapter, certain critics and 
theorists undertook a renegotiation of concepts of space and spatiality. The spatial 
turn encompassed a period of increased inter-disciplinary study, combining 
scholarship in the humanities and social sciences with the neogeographies of place, 
border, and community identity. Questions of capital power and production, which 
had stamped themselves upon literary criticism in the late 1960s and 1970s, found 
common ground with the socio-geographical examination of space and the use of 
space within a society. In his essay ‘Of Other Spaces’ Foucault observed: 
The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space. We are 
in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the 
epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed. We are 
at a moment, I believe, when our experience of the world is less that of 
a long life developing through time than that of a network that connects 
points and intersects with its own skein.592 
Foucault’s ‘epoch of space’ does not situate a distinct period whereby the spatial 
turn can be identified as having shifted critical understanding of the context of 
space and place, however it does encourage an analysis of dominant 
preoccupations in literary theory in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
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Foucault’s critical assessment of spatiality within society will be analysed in due 
course, but here I focus on his assertions regarding the nineteenth century 
obsession with time as fundamental to understanding the spatial turn in succeeding 
centuries. The French Revolution in 1789 cemented a fixation on a social narrative 
which was delineated by history.593 This centred around a then versus now 
ideology; systemic feudalism in the past and liberated identity in the present. The 
emergence of the historical novel at the beginning of the nineteenth century594, 
and the rise of professional analysis of historical developments of nations and 
societies, reinforced the authority of such a fixation. Temporality underpinned the 
manifestations of production in the literature of the period, as the spatial critic 
Robert T. Tally Jr suggests:  
Foucault’s sense that nineteenth-century philosophy had given pride of 
place to temporality and history is borne out in the vast literature of the 
era. For the most part, even with the developments in spatial 
knowledge, space was still viewed by philosophy as static, empty, and 
mere background to historical and temporal events. At the turn of the 
century, time trumped space as the main object of fascination for many 
writers and theorists.595 
Reasons for the diminishment of time and history as a critical obsession remain 
unfixed, however points of justification for this shift curiously delineate along lines 
                                                          
593 Dale K. Van Kley, The French Idea Of Freedom (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994). 
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of historical context.596 Further to this, the impact of societal fractures which forced 
critics to reassess notions of progressive community invigorated an analysis of 
diasporic identity and how that identity could be manifested in the art and 
literature of the dispossessed.597 
For Foucault, the shift towards space and the diminishment of time was 
almost total: ‘I believe that the anxiety of our era has to do fundamentally with 
space, no doubt a great deal more than with time. Time probably appears to us only 
as one of the various distributive operations that are possible for the elements that 
are spread out in space’.598 Such a fundamental redefinition of spatial fixity in 
response to the accompanying changes in post-war society and the blurring of 
boundaries between individual and space had great impact on all elements of 
society.599 Space, and the spatial turn as established under this critical lens must be 
interpreted as a vital element in the development and practice of performance 
                                                          
596 The literary critic Betrand Westphal posits that the restructuring of society after the Second 
World War radically influenced the development of a framework supporting investment in space as 
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fractures of global conflict. The result, for Westphal, indicated the necessity of a reorientation of 
values which underpinned our understanding of society and social structure: ‘nature abhors a 
vacuum, and the weakening of traditional historicity, alongside the decoupling of time and progress, 
has made possible the valorizing rereading of space’. Betrand Westphal, Geocriticism: Real and 
Fictional Spaces (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p.25. 
597 As the critic George Steiner suggests: ‘it seems proper that those who create art in a civilization of 
quasi-barbarism which has made so many homeless, which has torn up tongues and peoples by the 
root, should themselves be poets unhoused and wanderers across language’. George Steiner, 
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‘the transformation of social space… affect the ways in which humans operate in space, ‘use’ space, 
and make sense of their various spatial and social relations. This changing role of spatiality in human 
history has real consequences for theory and practice. The spatial turn in modern and postmodern 
literary theory and criticism is an acknowledgment of the degree to which matters of space, place, 
and mapping had been under-represented in the critical literature of the past. The writers, critics 
and theorists whose work has directly or indirectly engaged with such matters in recent years 
attempt not only to remedy this former oversight, but to propose new ways of seeing a world in 
which many of the former certainties have become, at the very least, uncertain’ (Tally Jr., p.16). 
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poetry. Spoken word performances are situated implicitly in social spaces by virtue 
of the shared experience of the medium, a virtue which Gay McAuley supports in 
her critique: ‘The social experience enhances, even accentuates the individual’s 
response to the performance’.600 The material spatial identity of the page, and of 
poetry on the page, can be compared against the exterior social codification of 
performance spaces. To quote further from Tally Jr: ‘The spatial turn is thus a turn 
towards the world itself, towards an understanding of our lives as situated in a 
mobile array of social and spatial relations that, in one way or another, need to be 
mapped’.601 The spatial appropriation enacted by verbal art such as performance 
poetry practices a radically different engagement with shared, social, world spaces 
than the proliferation of poetry on the page. I argue that the rise in popularity of 
spoken word towards the end of the twentieth century has been propagated and 
reinforced by the shift towards spatiality and the spatial turn. 
Increased interest in performance poetry and the importance of space in 
literature is underscored by how literary criticism has reconditioned itself to the 
spatial turn. Placed in a historical chronology of movements in literary and 
philosophical discourse, post-war twentieth-century society was largely 
characterized by late-modern and post-modern thought. In his 1982 iconic study of 
Modernism; All that is solid Melts into Air, Marshall Berman states that a 
characteristic shared by modernists is that:  
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they are moved at once by a will to change – to transform both 
themselves and their world – and by a terror of disorientation and 
disintegration, of life falling apart. They all know the thrill and the dread 
of a world in which ‘all that is solid melts into air’.602 
The relationship between this assessment of modernity and re-conceptions of an 
understanding of space implicates the transformative potential of the period, both 
radical and momentous, where the powerful vicissitudes of modern life 
necessitated a conceptual shift regarding social relations. In the realm of the 
theatre, this manifested itself in the break between institutional spaces and the 
occupation of social spaces as discussed earlier: ‘the departure from established 
theatres and the appropriation of new spaces represented a reaction to crises 
generated by bursts of modernization in society’.603 That these crises specifically 
precipitate a transformation of spatial occupations is explicitly related to the 
presence of affectively felt communities, and the absence of such within traditional 
performance spaces. The ‘will to change’ Berman cites is an alteration of the 
individual’s relationship with the world around them, articulated by the social 
sphere.604 Furthermore, Berman specifically impels the individual directly towards 
social interaction: 
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most likely rational. We can touch. We can even allow ourselves to dream. There’s nothing, for 
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I believe that communication and dialogue have taken on a new specific 
weight and urgency in modern times, because subjectivity and 
inwardness have become at once richer and more intensely developed, 
and more lonely and entrapped, than they ever were before. In such a 
context, communication and dialogue become both a desperate need 
and a primary source of delight. In a world where meanings melt into 
air, these experiences are among the few solid sources of meaning we 
can count on. One of the things that can make modern life worth living 
is the enhanced opportunities it offers us--and sometimes even forces 
on us--to talk together, to reach and understand each other. We need 
to make the most of these possibilities; they should shape the way we 
organize our cities and our lives.605 
Berman’s analysis of the modern condition precipitates exactly the kind of 
transformative opportunities engendered by performance poetry. Inculcated within 
such opportunity, verbal art offers the audience a profound sense of engagement 
with the social and the communicative. Although the cultural significance of 
communication through the medium of text offers communicative potential, the 
spoken word does so without the divisive potential inherent to Berman’s conflation 
of subjectivity and inwardness with loneliness and entrapment.   
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True consensus within critical circles as to the boundaries of Modernism is 
notoriously absent606. An analysis of contemporary poetics, and the role of 
performance within such, cannot rest solely upon a theoretical position so 
circumscribed by the doubt and obfuscation common to Modernist thought.607 In 
drawing a tacit line between the development of contemporary performance 
poetry and the possibilities engendered by the development of the spatial turn it 
must be recognized that Modernism begat theoretical positions which jostle for 
position in the corpus of contemporary literary and philosophical thought. This said, 
the prominence of the spatial turn has not been diminished by the advent of 
postmodern critical theory. In his text Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism (1991) the Marxist theorist Frederic Jameson refers to ‘that new 
spatiality implicit in the postmodern’.608 Further reinforcing the spatial turn as a 
distinct shift away from the temporal, and perpetuating the social element so 
visible in performance poetry which Berman encourages, Jameson posits that: ‘our 
daily life, our psychic experiences, our cultural languages, are dominated by 
categories of space rather than by categories of time’.609 Within the framework of 
postmodern thought, spatiality still retains a direct relationship to the extent that 
Robert T. Tally Jr contends: ‘The recent spatial turn in literary and cultural studies 
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has, for the most part, been a product of, or response to, the postmodern 
condition’.610  
To suggest that the fact that spatial elements so dominantly exist in 
postmodern theory uniquely justifies the rise of performance poetry in 
contemporary poetics is certainly a complicated argument. Jameson stipulates the 
‘waning of affect’ in the postmodern character, drawing a correlation between 
affect and temporality: ‘The waning of affect, however, might also have been 
characterized, in the narrower context of literary criticism, as the waning of the 
great high modernist thematics of time and temporality’.611 This criticism explicitly 
stands against one of the critical faculties of the performance poem; the 
transmission of affect. However, the case made for performance poetry relies not 
on its position within a corpus of postmodern theory. The invocation of late 
modernism and postmodernism serves to establish and to justify both the 
significance and the perseverance of the spatial turn in literary and philosophical 
thinking throughout the last few decades. This in hand, the role space plays in the 
delineation of performance poetry requires further analysis. The art and literature 
that is created by a society is influenced by its interrelationship with space, as Tally 
Jr. argues:  
the material, historical bases underlying human social relations have 
also produced different spaces… these spaces have had to be addressed 
in novel ways. With respect to literary and cultural productions, these 
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spaces call for new cartographic approaches, new forms of 
representation, and new ways of imagining our place in the universe. 
Space, place, and mapping, then, are crucial to literary and cultural 
studies, just as these concepts and practices are required for living in an 
ever-changing social and geographical milieu.612 
It is through the importance that space holds in our social structures that I contend 
the respective importance of performance poetry as a medium which most radically 
interacts with these spaces. Through affective-phenomenological experience the 
performance of poetry changes the spaces we occupy. In order to ground this 
contention, I return to Michel Foucault’s discussion of space (particularly Foucault’s 
presentation of heterotopias) in response to the configuration of social 
performance spaces. It is important to note at this juncture that by extending my 
phenomenological methodology across an investigation of Foucault’s work I 
encounter clear problems in Foucault’s rejection of phenomenology.613 However, as 
Todd May proposes in his essay ‘Foucault’s Relation to Phenomenology’, Foucault’s 
rejection of phenomenology is a little more complicated: ‘although Foucault rejects 
phenomenology in both his method and his content, he retains what might be 
called the spirit or motivation behind the phenomenological project’.614 One may 
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be forgiven for thinking that this appears on the surface to be a rather tenuous 
defence but May proffers a robust analysis of the trajectory of Foucault’s thought 
from early essays explicitly in favour of phenomenology615, to his engagement with 
phenomenological psychology616, and most pertinently the elements of Foucault’s 
later thought which mirror his earlier phenomenological enquiries: 
The phenomenologically inspired Foucault sees the obstacle to asking 
the question of who we might be as a certain form of explanatory 
reductionism. Phenomenology resists the reduction of human 
experience to objective categories. It seeks to reanimate human 
experience, and thus places its focus on the living human subject. The 
later Foucault resists another kind of reductionism, one that might be 
called ‘categorical reductionism.’ It is the reduction of human 
experience to essential or ontological or natural categories. This 
reductionism, like the explanatory reductionism rejected by 
phenomenology, blunts our ability to ask the question of who we might 
be by severely circumscribing the answers available to us.617 
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The consequence of analysing Foucault’s engagement with both his earlier 
phenomenological methodology and his later, more archaeological-genealogical 
approach under a lens of reduction allows one to trace a sustained thematic:  
As Foucault’s thought matures, the character of what is ‘heavy and 
oppressive’ changes. But what is at issue – who we are, who we might 
be – remains the same. In the end, Foucault leaves phenomenology, but 
the spirit of phenomenology does not leave him.618  
It also enables an application of Foucault in the precise context of a 
phenomenological enquiry into space utilized through performance poetry. Across 
Foucauldian thought, as May argues, the challenge posed is to interrogate 
categories of existence which reduce lived experience to themselves. I contend that 
this interrogation finds apt purchase in an evaluation of how everyday space is 
utilized. Furthermore, I argue the relationship between Foucault’s critical 
understanding of heterotopias can be accurately mapped to phenomenological 
experiences of a performance space which, through performance enacted within 
the space, radically contests reduction. 
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Spoken word, theatre, and heterotopia 
 
Foucault’s development of heterotopias, articulated in his article ‘Of Other Spaces’ 
delineates a framework for separating non-hegemonic spaces of otherness from 
traditional ordered spaces; utopic spaces. His analysis is predicated by an 
understanding of oppositions that are inherent to everyday life, and suggests that 
these oppositions permeate the utilization of space to such an extent that they 
present what Foucault tentatively refers to as an inviolable organizing structure: 
perhaps our life is still governed by a certain number of oppositions that 
remain inviolable, that our institutions and practices have not yet dared 
to break down. These are oppositions that we regard as simple givens: 
for example between private space and public space, between family 
space and social space, between cultural space and useful space, 
between the space of leisure and that of work.619 
A position established upon the concept of opposition is important to an 
application of Foucault’s theories to the use of space in the context of performance 
poetry because of the radical mutability of the performance space. The capacity 
spoken word has to persistently alter a space through affect, and thus to resist the 
category reduction of an institutionally governed designation allows occupation of 
the space to escape the problems inherent to these oppositions by constantly 
inhabiting different spatial identities. Performance poetry operates through the 
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utility of a site which, underpinned by the fluctuation of such spatial oppositions, 
resists identification under a permanent structure or function.620 This resistance 
stems from the principle that spaces for performance poetry are formed 
elementarily by the performances themselves, and can be operatively changed or 
adapted through the performance and the subsequent transmission of affect within 
the space. Discussing frameworks of site and space mobilizes distinctions between 
function as intention and function as utility; the designation or identity of a space, 
and the actual living use of a space. Foucault offers a critique of the former by 
noting that our lived space is not stable and defined: 
The space in which we live, which draws us out of ourselves, in which 
the erosion of our lives, our time and our history occurs, the space that 
gnaws and claws at us, is also, in itself, a heterogeneous space. In other 
words, we do not live in a kind of void, inside of which we could place 
individuals and things. We do not live inside a void that could be 
coloured with diverse shades of light, we live inside a set of relations 
that delineates sites which are irreducible to one another and 
absolutely not superimposable on one another.621 
One could argue that the social spaces in which performance poetry is so often 
practiced - the pub, the café, the theatre - are all sites functioning for a particular 
practice or role. Foucault poses that sites can be codified under function if we 
accept a tacit identity composed from the sets of relations which contribute to the 
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uses of the site. Relating to the context of the social sites I raise as common 
examples of performance poetry venues, Foucault offers that: ‘One could describe, 
via the cluster of relations that allows them to be defined, the sites of temporary 
relaxation - cafes, cinemas, beaches’.622 However, Foucault contends that certain 
sites may have functional identities, but simultaneously challenge codification 
under set relations: 
But among all these sites, I am interested in certain ones that have the 
curious property of being in relation with all the other sites, but in such 
a way as to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they 
happen to designate, mirror, or reflect.623 
Through the transformative potential of affect within the space, spaces of 
performance poetry can be identified as examples of sites which effect the same 
mechanisms Foucault considers in his analysis. They are impermanent sites of social 
engagement which can adapt to function under a varied spectra of explorative 
social encounters delineated by the emotional contexts or the assumed affective 
purposes of the performances. Designations of set relations forming sites of 
relaxation; the structures which commonly host performance poetry, are 
manipulated through the active, energetic, and bodily transactions of the 
performance and the phenomenological experience of being in these spaces. I 
contend that this presents the performance poetry space as a heterotopic space 
following Foucault’s definition of heterotopias: 
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There are also, probably in every culture, in every civilization, real places 
– places that do exist and that are formed in the very founding of 
society – which are something like counter-sites, a kind of effectively 
enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be 
found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, 
and inverted… Because these places are absolutely different from all the 
sites that they reflect and speak about, I shall call them, by way of 
contrast to utopias, heterotopias.624 
The heterotopia is an othering of rationalized utopias, a space which functions as a 
non-hegemonic site for exploration and representation of fixed spaces. Some critics 
have identified within this framework of non-location a sense of detachment which 
cannot be reconciled with progressive social reengagement. The academic Walter 
Russell Mead suggests in his critique of Post-Modernism that ‘Utopia is a place 
where everything is good; dystopia is a place where everything is bad; heterotopia 
is where things are different – that is, a collection whose members have few or no 
intelligible connections with one another’.625 Mead argues that this fragmentation 
is a perception of a post-modern state which has lost a sense of the progressive. 
Rather than experiencing affect as possibility: ‘contradictions intensify but are not 
resolved’.626 Far from a dynamic potential space, much like the fixed utopias, 
‘Heterotopias are essentially static’.627 I contend that this interpretation runs the 
                                                          
624 Foucault, ‘Of Other Spaces’, p.24. 
625 Walter Russell Mead, ‘Trains, Planes, and Automobiles: The End of the Postmodern Moment’, in 
World Policy Journal, Vol. 12. Issue No. 4 (1995/1996), pp.13-31 (p.13). 
626 Mead, p.14. 
627 Mead, p.14. 
270 
 
gamut of misattributing non-designation as impotence by falling under the auspice 
of a necessarily grand, necessarily non-material ideology. This perspective fails to 
fully recognize the potential of affect transmission to give shape not only to 
heterotopic spaces, but to social engagement within these spaces. In evidence of 
this, performance spaces are an excellent example of the heterotopia as an active 
rather than a static space.  
In ‘Of Other Spaces’ Foucault establishes six principles of heterotopology, 
which is to say, a ‘simultaneously mythic and real contestation of the space in 
which we live’.628 Each of these six principles can be applied to performance poetry 
spaces in order to substantiate their identity as heterotopias. Foucault’s first 
principle applies to the totality of the heterotopia as a space within human society:  
Its first principle is that there is probably not a single culture in the 
world that fails to constitute heterotopias. That is a constant of every 
human group. But the heterotopias obviously take quite varied forms, 
and perhaps no one absolutely universal form of heterotopia would be 
found.629  
Foucault presents two main categories in which these forms can be identified; the 
heterotopia of crisis and the heterotopia of deviation. Crucially, these are 
diachronic categories; heterotopias of deviation having succeeded and largely 
replaced heterotopias of crisis, which Foucault relegates to more primitive social 
structures: ‘But these heterotopias of crisis are disappearing today and are being 
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replaced, I believe, by what we might call heterotopias of deviation: those in which 
individuals whose behaviour is deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are 
placed’.630 The exemplar Foucault uses is the prison, or the psychiatric hospital – 
which offer a realized space for the separation of deviant behaviour within a 
society. However, within the loose structure delineating such categories I contend 
that the site of performance poetry is an apt continuation of the notional 
distinction Foucault makes between deviance and norm, albeit a less extreme one. 
One of the defining elements which compounds the experience of the spoken word 
stage is the fact that it provides both space and opportunity to have a voice, and to 
be heard. The allure of this opportunity stems from the sensation of deviation 
which accompanies performance. Furthermore, in the context of the poem, spoken 
word provides an opportunity to deviate from conventional production and receipt 
of poetry on the page, and the attendant associations which circumscribe 
publishing as an industry which is controlled, regulated and which to the general 
populace carries an implication of profound exclusivity. In this respect, occupation 
of performance poetry spaces attends quite clearly to the vein of thought Todd May 
traces throughout Foucault’s work. Be it a reanimation of human experience 
through phenomenological enquiry or the kind of resistance to categorical 
reductionism typifying later Foucaldian thought, performance poetry fulfils the 
promise of a poetic mode which deviates, and which challenges formal or social 
category expectations. 
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The second principle Foucault identifies relates to the distinction between site 
and function previously established and interrogated:  
a society, as its history unfolds, can make an existing heterotopia 
function in a very different fashion; for each heterotopia has a precise 
and determined function within a society and the same heterotopia can, 
according to the synchrony of the culture in which it occurs, have one 
function or another.631 
Foucault's extended discussion of the cemetery is helpful to see the 
transformations of function, but to continue an analysis of the common sites of 
performance poetry; sites of relaxation determined by set relations, this principle 
can be applied to the spaces which performance poetry transforms. When the café 
or the pub becomes a site of performance the performance space exercises its 
capacity as a heterotopia. Through spoken word what exists as a gathering place 
circumscribed by socialization through shared utilization of space and, in most 
cases, product, accepts into its heart the spectacle of the performance. As this 
occurs an increasing recognition of shared affective experiences restructures the 
space as one fulfilling an entirely different function. Performance poetry formulates 
a new purpose for the space which is that of a site for shared spectatorship – the 
space for a show. As articulated in my previous analysis, the context and the 
affective tone of the performance itself can then continue a process of re-purposing 
the space, a liminal and transformative process which is not determined, and which 
creates further experiential potential. This kind of experiential potential (the 
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capacity for re-purposing a space) stimulates different phenomenological 
experiences and encounters, highlighting the pedagogical potential of the 
performance poetry space. Through performance poetry’s ability to generate 
alternative phenomenological experiences of a space, the occupants are able to 
grasp new potentials in the subsequent re-engagements of phenomenological 
experience.  
This phenomenological potential relates to Foucault’s third principle of 
heterotopias, which establishes that: ‘The heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a 
single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves 
incompatible’.632 In this respect, heterotopias can be explicitly applied to criticism 
of performances spaces. In theatre criticism the representative juxtaposition of 
several spaces, what Foucault refers to as the simultaneous representation, 
contestation, and inversion of real sites found within a culture is apparent in the 
manifest fluidity of the theatrical stage. This transformation of space gestures 
towards the mutable nature of the heterotopia; a reconciliation of irreconcilable 
spatial transgression. While this may be clearly evidenced in the imaginative 
transformations of the theatrical stage from one illusory vista to another through 
the unfolding of a shifting narrative, I contend that it is also evident in performance 
poetry spaces. Spoken word delineates a social transformation whereby the 
movement and transmission of affect transforms the physical and emotional tenor 
of a shared social space. What is established thus is the progressive manifestation 
of a unique space between the stage (performer) and the audience which may 
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undergo a number of incompatible spatial transformations through the same 
mechanism that the theatrical stage employs to encourage the imagination to 
invoke juxtaposing scenes.  
The fourth principle Foucault outlines relates to the bisection of space and 
time within the site of the heterotopia which contributes to the unique sense of the 
heterotopia as a space outside of the regulated structure of the utopia. It also 
serves to underpin the notion that despite Foucault’s designation of the ‘epoch of 
space’ in relation to a re-situation of critical attention to time, the passage of time is 
still of course fundamental to how one interprets the utilization of space: 
Heterotopias are most often linked to slices in time-which is to say that 
they open onto what might be termed, for the sake of symmetry, 
heterochronies. The heterotopia begins to function at full capacity 
when men arrive at a sort of absolute break with their traditional 
time.633 
This concept of heterochronies can be delineated along lines of the indefinite 
accumulation of time, which Foucault evidences in the heterotopia of the museum 
or the library. These heterotopias remain functional as fluid sites of representation, 
contestation, and inversion due to the constant accumulation of material. This 
distinction is, for Foucault, a particularity of the modern condition:  
the idea of accumulating everything, of establishing a sort of general 
archive, the will to enclose in one place all times, all epochs, all forms, 
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all tastes, the idea of constituting a place of all times that is itself 
outside of time and inaccessible to its ravages, the project of organizing 
in this way a sort of perpetual and indefinite accumulation of time in an 
immobile place, this whole idea belongs to our modernity. The museum 
and the library are heterotopias that are proper to western culture of 
the nineteenth century.634 
However, Foucault also gestures towards alternative heterochronies which are 
focused not towards infinite accumulation but to the constant passage of time:  
Opposite these heterotopias that are linked to the accumulation of 
time, there are those linked, on the contrary, to time in its most 
fleeting, transitory, precarious aspect, to time in the mode of the 
festival. These heterotopias are not oriented toward the eternal, they 
are rather absolutely temporal.635 
In the above quote Foucault refers explicitly to the notion of the festival, a concept 
which has profound implications for spatial criticism and the spatial turn. It is also 
profoundly important for the relationship between performance poetry and the 
phenomenological experience of the performance space. I contend that the 
heterochronies of the festival relate in particular to the heterotopia of the 
performance poetry space. This is due to the fundamentality of the passage of time 
to the processes which form the production and presentation of verbal art. Despite 
contestation that the poem may be a mark in time (relating to the processes by 
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which certain heterochronies enact the record of an accumulating infinity) the 
performance space relates more definitively to the notion of a fleeting moment of 
transition within a space. The content of the poem may never waiver but each 
performance will be unique, a result largely conditioned by the phenomenological 
experience of the space within which the poem is performed, and the affect 
generated within that space. The fluidity of this and the abjuration of a fixed form 
of the performance poem draws attention to the transience inherent to the spoken 
word event. This transience is reflected in the centrality of time as a guiding factor 
for utilizing the heterotopia, where performances are often delimited by 
constraints on time. Additionally, time is a distinct focus for many contemporary 
performance poets – whether it be a re-representation of past temporal periods or 
a contemplation of the poet’s identity in the present in relation to past and future 
iterations.636 Within the heterotopia of the performance space, time is established 
as an unequivocal factor in the mechanism of the event. It serves to condition an 
audience to reconceive their notions of their own traditional, everyday temporal 
experiencing by forcing upon them the complex dialogue between the distinct and 
concrete existence of the poem. It also invites consideration of the fluidity of the 
token of the particular performance they are receiving. This further reinforces the 
performance space as a heterotopia of contestation and juxtaposition, and in doing 
so, contributes to the pedagogical implication of the experience by facilitating a 
coming to terms with one’s own everyday temporality.  
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Foucault’s fifth principle explores the accessibility of the heterotopia as an 
element within a society conditioned by admission, rite, and public space, and the 
complications of potential exclusions to the heterotopic site:  
Heterotopias always presuppose a system of opening and closing that 
both isolates them and makes them penetrable. In general, the 
heterotopic site is not freely accessible like a public place. Either the 
entry is compulsory, as in the case of entering a barracks or a prison, or 
else the individual has to submit to rites and purifications. To get in one 
must have a certain permission and make certain gestures… There are 
others, on the contrary, that seem to be pure and simple openings, but 
that generally hide curious exclusions. Everyone can enter into these 
heterotopic sites, but in fact that is only an illusion: we think we enter 
where we are, by the very fact that we enter, excluded.637 
As a statement regarding the contemporary performance poetry scene this 
description seems to find comfortable purchase. Although institutions of 
performance poetry may present a democratic site of the body and the voice, the 
cultural connotations of the poetry reading, and the cultural capital of poetry 
remains both bound to and contained within it. Within the framework of an 
application of Foucault’s heterotopology to the performance space the simultaneity 
of both isolation and penetrability may thus be difficult to reconcile with an 
argument espousing performance poetry as a new, positive, accessible medium for 
receiving poetry. However, the performance stage is itself a space within the 
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heterotopia conditioned by the performance – and the interactions between these 
two spaces are I contend, more representative of the dialectic Foucault poses. 
Potential spectators may feel consternation at the exclusions presented by the idea 
of the spoken word event, but it is ultimately not the accessibility of the site which 
is problematized. The site, as explored in the analysis of Foucault’s second principle, 
commonly serves an alternative function – a space for relaxation or recreation. 
Access to this space is not contested until the interposition of the stage, which 
transforms the space into a site for spectatorship. It is not the idea of becoming a 
member of a collective body of spectators, but the notion of the performance 
poetry stage which creates a relationship of inclusion and exclusion by representing 
practice and ritual which may be unfamiliar. Though this recognizes the potential 
problems of performance poetry as a popular medium, it does not assert against 
the notion of the space as a heterotopia. On the contrary it accedes to implications 
of the importance of the performance poetry stage within a social structure – a 
space which, while circumscribed by potential rites and exclusions is vital to ensure 
that the hosting site is transformed from its normal function. When repurposed by 
performance the site becomes a space for significant and valuable discourse 
regarding the society it is placed within.  
The potential of this discourse in turn relates critically to Foucault’s last 
principle of heterotopology. Foucault’s sixth principle offers a representation of the 
function of the heterotopia itself: 
The last trait of heterotopias is that they have a function in relation to 
all the space that remains. This function unfolds between two extreme 
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poles. Either their role is to create a space of illusion that exposes every 
real space, all the sites inside of which human life is partitioned, as still 
more illusory… Or else, on the contrary, their role is to create a space 
that is other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well 
arranged as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled. This latter type 
would be the heterotopia, not of illusion, but of compensation.638 
One may argue that sites of performance poetry have potential to offer both. This 
of course depends on the focus point of the analysis. A heterotopic space of illusion 
might be established by the relationship between the audience and the performer. 
In this sense, the heterotopia focuses around the concept of the performance poet 
as a radicalized speaker, and the act of listening to the performance radicalizes 
itself against the everyday activities of the audience members. Here the 
performance poetry space becomes a site for contemplation and, ultimately, 
reconsideration of values that form out of engagement with utopic spaces which, as 
illusions, do not provoke or condition introspection. The function of this exposure 
reconditions the audience to re-evaluation, reflecting the process by which the 
heterotopia forms, becoming a site attenuated to deviance from the norm 
established in the everyday. The contrary position which Foucault articulates is a 
heterotopic space of compensation. This relies upon a focus point fixed between 
the spectators forming the audience. In this case the heterotopic space created is 
the space enacted by the spectators in response to the stage and to the performer. 
The affect which transforms this space is a unified affect established by an audience 
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of individuals responding as a shared body. The space that is created is real, albeit 
transient, and reflects an antithesis to the isolation impelled by utopic spaces, the 
very nature of which prevent the unification of shared affect via the regulative 
measures which fix relationships with and within these spaces. The oppositions 
which Foucault invokes in the introduction to his essay; oppositions: ‘that remain 
inviolable, that our institutions and practices have not yet dared to break down’639 
are, perhaps, the challenge against which such compensatory spaces are set. In this 
instance the heterotopia of the performance poetry space serves not as an invasive 
re-evaluator of social and societal norms, but an affirmation of the potential of 
shared affect within society. This poses the performance poetry space as an apt 
space for education through a pedagogy of diverse experiences rather than a 
dogmatic re-inscription of fixed social values.  
Regardless of the specification of function, within the context of performance 
spaces the elaboration of sites of performance as heterotopias is a useful 
designation of spaces which can be occupied and utilized to challenge conventional 
understanding of society and social space. This extends to both a study of the 
contemporary space, and the development of the social role of the theatre space 
throughout its history. Heterotopias are sites which enable potential change 
through the reconsideration of social structures facilitated by the use of spaces 
such as the performance poetry space, a site which encourages discourse and 
community. As the theatre critic Patrick Primavesi articulates in his article 
‘Heterotopias of the Public Sphere: Theatre and Festival around 1800’: 
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Unlike the utopias of an ideal and perfect world, which is delegated, one 
might say, to illusory spaces, heterotopias are real places that question 
the rules governing hierarchical emplacements. Whereas utopias have a 
stabilizing effect, heterotopias are always a potential disruption to 
symbolic order.640 
The transformations of space enacted by the shared relationship between 
audiences members and the relationship between audience and performer can be 
evidenced in the utilization and development of new spaces in traditional theatrical 
performances: ‘the creation of theatrical situations between performers and 
spectators is possible anywhere – recent work with forms of theatre that takes 
place outside of established theatre spaces has often confirmed this’.641 The 
heterotopia extends beyond Foucault’s initial proposition of counter-site, bisecting 
and reconstituting the realms of theatre and performance: 
The term ‘heterotopia’ can be further thought of in relation to the 
theatre, whose heterotopian effects are not limited to a represented 
juxtaposition of disparate spaces, but cover the entirety of its spatial 
layout – according to the changing relationship between stage and 
auditorium, which has become progressively more open.642 
Spatial occupation enacted by contemporary spoken word is not delimited by 
preconceived performance spaces; rather, as Laurie Bolger attests, the 
contemporary performance poetry scene in the UK in particular occupies and 
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utilizes spaces that are either otherwise designated or present as social spaces. In 
both cases application of a heterotopic analysis is appropriate. 
 
Nineteenth-century theatre spaces 
 
It is of course important to acknowledge that such capacity to utilize space in 
contemporary performance owes a great debt to the development of traditional 
theatre. Interrogating theatre in the early nineteenth century, Julie A. Carson, in her 
essay ‘Hazlitt and the sociability of theatre’ suggests that ‘By design theatre is a 
social space that assembles disparate people for entertainment and cultural 
enlightenment, achieving in the process some semblance of group coherence’.643 In 
the process of her analysis of William Hazlitt’s critique of the English theatre644, 
Carson articulates a relationship between the theatre and sociability in Romantic, 
post-Enlightenment England: 
What emerges for Hazlitt’s writings is the weight that arguments for the 
sociability of theatre assume in post-revolutionary England – how this 
weight shapes Romantic conceptions of theatrical representation and of 
theatre’s function in broadening social and political representation. 
                                                          
643 Julie A. Carson, ‘Hazlitt and the sociability of theatre’, in Romantic Sociability: Social Networks and 
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644 For more information, see: William Hazlitt, A View Of The English Stage (London: Robert Stodart, 
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can be found in: William Hazlitt, Lectures On English Poets & The Spirit Of The Age (London: J.M. 
Dent & Sons, 1910). 
283 
 
What also becomes clear is that theatre’s liminality is social, not simply 
aesthetic, that theatre is suspended between private and public 
dynamics of both cultural and individual identity. Coordinating these 
features accounts for many of the tensions evident in Romantic 
approaches to theatre. Perhaps more to the point, varying approaches 
to theatre reveal warring conceptions of human identity.645 
Carson’s argument suggests that problematic preference for theatre which worked 
‘to maintain the individuality and interiority of identity’646 resisted the demands of 
the theatre to facilitate social engagement: ‘More to the point, theatre strengthens 
by exercising memory more than do other aesthetic arenas and in doing so extends 
if not actual lifespans then certainly the depth and intensity of human life’.647 
The ‘depth and intensity of human life’ Carson remarks upon correlates with my 
argument regarding the pedagogical value of performance in relation to affect. 
Certainly Hazlitt himself believed strongly in such social value, as attested in his 
collected essays: ‘we feel a sort of theoretical as well as instinctive predilection for 
the faces of play-going people, as among the most sociable, gossiping, good-
natured, and humane members of society’.648 What is more, in the essay in 
question; ‘On play-going and on some of our old actors’ Hazlitt offers the notion 
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that: ‘the stage is a test and school of humanity’.649 The dual identity as test and 
school reaffirms the pedagogical value of performance, then as now. 
Further to this the phenomenology of the theatre, and of performance in 
general, acutely reinforces my larger argument: the pedagogical potential of 
performance poetry through a widening of experience within the performance 
space. In order to elucidate this connection, and to support my subsequent analysis 
of theatre as heterotopia I refer to Daniel Johnson’s essay ‘Phenomenology, Time 
and Performance’. The essay, delivered as a lecture at Monash University’s 2009 
time.transcendence.performance conference, argues that ‘theatre can be seen as a 
practical form of phenomenology—an investigation of Being.’650 As clarification, 
and also recognition that the argument may be extended across performance 
practice in general, Johnson states that: 
By referring to ‘theatre’ here, I mean the dynamic process of meaning-
making and ‘the whole performance process’ rather than simply the 
interpretation of a pre-given meaning in a dramatic text. Of course it 
should be noted that theatre-making is certainly a collaborative effort 
not in the least including the active interpretation and presence of the 
spectator too. My contention is that at least some theories of theatre 
have a deeply phenomenological concern by attending to ‘the manner 
in which things appear’ because they are based in and reflective upon 
concrete practices of lived experience. In other words, an emphasis on 
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practical experience and process in theatre guides both spectators and 
performers to an appreciation of the nature of Being.651 
Johnson evokes a similar argument to Rancière’s The Emancipated Spectator and by 
doing so opens the discourse for an affect-led exploration of our phenomenological 
experience of the theatre. Similar to Gay McAuley’s definition of the performance 
event652 Johnson situates the body at the centre of the experience: ‘Actors can 
express ideas in space in an embodied way, within a specific duration from a certain 
point in history. This may well be true of other art forms, of course, but in the case 
of acting, the actor’s own body is the material signifier itself’.653 Johnson’s 
arguments also establish a clear connection to the spatio-temporal engagements 
which are characterized by Foucault’s fourth principle of heterotopia. As Johnson 
states: ‘In the liminal or liminoid, ludic space and time, participants both lose 
themselves in ‘flow’ and have a stronger sense of self-awareness and temporality; 
they both lose sense of time and experience time—more than in everyday life’.654 In 
this last observation Johnson brings the experience of the everyday under 
examination, drawing together various different elements of the analysis of 
performance poetry under a phenomenological enquiry: ‘Because performance is a 
process rather than an object it highlights the importance of the situated-ness of 
the human subject in its engagement with its surroundings, or in phenomenological 
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terms, In-der-Welt-sein655 (Being-in-the-World)’.656 The investigation of 
performance through a phenomenological lens has pedagogical merit by virtue of 
its tacit reinforcement of practical applications:  
I suggest that we might not only investigate the question ‘what is 
Being?’ in abstract philosophical phenomenology, but also in a practical 
way through performance. In a way, such a view of theatre is less 
transcendental philosophy than it is drawing attention to aspects of 
Being through concrete practice.657 
This practical application is of course predicated upon an analysis of the socio-
spatial contexts which enable contemporary performance spaces (and their 
subsequent pedagogical implications). I contend that it is central to my argument 
that the space for contemporary spoken word be acknowledged alongside an 
understanding of the significance of developments in theatre during the nineteenth 
century. The opening of the theatrical space during the 1800s is critical to 
understanding the space (within a framework of contemporary poetics) which has 
opened to allow performance to re-emerge as a medium for receiving poetry. In her 
essay ‘Before the curtain’ from The Cambridge Companion to Victorian and 
Edwardian Theatre Nina Auerbach insist upon ‘‘the centrality of the theatre in 
nineteenth century culture; until the end of the century, its broad popularity gave 
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its conventions the aura of universality’.658 Concentrated academic study of theatre 
in the period developed slowly, in their introduction to Essays on Nineteenth 
Century British Theatre published in 1971 the editors Kenneth Richards and Peter 
Thompson noted that ‘It is still fairly respectable to know nothing about the 
nineteenth century theatre, but it seems unlikely that it will be so for long’.659 
Richards and Thompson present a common perception of the modest literary 
quality of the output during the period660, but further to their initial assessment 
they note that:  
as we become more aware of the need to see plays not only in their 
literary, but also in their social and theatrical contexts, and as we 
increasingly perceive that the roots of much modern drama are to be 
found in the experiments and extravagances of the nineteenth century 
stage, it is certain that the disparagement of the period cannot last.661 
It is for this reason that I contend the relevance of analysing the theatre of this 
period. The movement towards a consciousness of social (and spatial) contexts of 
performance precisely anticipates the emergence of a valuable medium in 
contemporary performance poetry. A connection also clearly emerges when 
considered alongside my earlier analysis of performance poetry’s value within the 
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academy. In the same period in which the critic Matthew Arnold was impelling a 
legacy of academic exclusivism in the apprehension of poetry as: ‘the best which 
has been thought and said in the world’662 the theatre of the time suffered a similar 
legacy of disparagement. The neglect of nineteenth century theatre studies is 
analogous to the absence of a contemporary academic focus on performance 
poetry. For Arnold, art existed as a kind of moral medicine663 situated in the context 
of his own anxiety over the pervasive threat that the sciences posed, as well as 
fears regarding the erosion of culture. Under a similar lens, academic disregard of 
nineteenth century theatre reflects hierarchies of value, erasing traditions of social, 
public performance. Contemporary assessment of the period suggests that it was in 
fact a time when theatre space was being opened up to public engagement in a way 
hitherto unknown or unacknowledged.664 The focal point of this engagement is 
encapsulated by the development of public spaces for performance, and is 
intimately connected to the Theatres Act in 1843 which gave powers to local 
authorities to license theatres, subsequently giving rise to the development of 
social spaces such as the public house and the music hall. Although subscribing to a 
slightly more complex impression of factors which precipitated the commencement 
of the Act the critic Clive Barker argues that its impact renegotiated the use of 
social spaces for public performance: 
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The public house being the centre for many of political and social life; it 
was often the cultural hub also. Many public houses had free and easy 
singing, and in some of these houses the processes that has called the 
Minor Theatres into being during the rise of middle-class consciousness 
gave rise to a demand for working-class theatre. It also gave rise to a 
further number of Minor Theatres in the fringe of the city which grew 
out of pleasure gardens.665 
In the course of his analysis Barker notes the limits of his inquiry: ‘I have not of 
course mentioned anything about the penny theatres and ‘dukeries’, which are one 
stratum of popular theatre below the saloons. This area can be neglected very little 
longer’.666 The limits are nonetheless suggestive of a direction of investigation; one 
which vectors towards an elucidation of the increasing role social spaces such as 
public houses played in hosting performance events. It is also important to note the 
role that Barker ascribes to Chartism in the reconstitution of performance spaces. 
Chartism; an early 1800s working-class movement seeking political reform667 took 
its name from the People's Charter of 1838. The movement was responsible for a 
number of petitions and protests aimed at redressing social, and class imbalance. It 
was also responsible for a significant cultural contribution considering it was 
relatively short lived (1838-1858).668 Indeed, as the critic Mike Sanders writes in The 
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Poetry of Chartism: Aesthetics, Politics, History (2009), ‘poetry played an active, 
primary role within the movement… the result of the realisation that for the 
Chartist movement, the political and the aesthetic are not just closely related 
concepts but are thoroughly imbricated practices’.669 A number of prominent 
critical studies of poetry of the nineteenth century have focused on the importance 
of the political and social aspects of lyric and verse, a particularly salient example 
being the critic Anne Janowitz. Janowitz’s 1998 text Lyric and Labour in the 
Romantic Tradition opens by interrogating the dichotomy of the British Romantic 
poet as an isolated body and a socially orientated poetic radical.670 I suggest that 
this dichotomy operates similarly in the context of the performance poet. Indeed, 
this description of Chartist negotiation of both the political and the aesthetic could 
easily be levied in support of spoken word671 and I contend further comparisons, 
particularly the notion that Chartism enabled a ‘poetry for the people’, accessible 
by the people rather than a minority of elected voices. To take this comparison 
even further, Sanders articulates a dislocation between traditional theatrical ‘logos’ 
(appeal to reason) and the more striking rhetoric of performative ‘pathos’ (appeal 
to feeling) which hallmarked the radical social performances of Chartist aesthetics: 
‘the radical playbill has a strong sense of the carnivalesque, of the radical 
debunking and overturning of the status quo through the use of satire, and hence 
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has a much heavier reliance on an affective and emotional response’.672 Particularly 
in light of my investigation of performance poetry’s affective potential I believe that 
this is consonant with descriptions of contemporary performance poetry I have 
articulated over the course of my analysis of spoken word and the academy.673 
Barker’s description of Chartist involvement in the negotiation of new spaces for 
theatre in the 1800s continues this description, suggesting that a lot of the material 
performed in these theatre spaces was politically charged: ‘several of the Chartist 
leaders were playwrights’.674 He also notes that several sites of Chartist activity 
such as Blackfriars Rotunda also functioned as theatre and performance spaces.675 
Whether or not one ascribes to the belief that the Chartist movement in 
particular incited shifts in the utilization of social spaces, the existence of these 
shifts is undoubtable. As Jacky Bratton discusses in her essay ‘The music hall’, the 
early 1800s was a time of enormous expansion for the performance spaces: ‘During 
this period huge success attended the transformation of a multitude of small-scale 
entertainments presided over by pub proprietors and semi-professional 
                                                          
672 Mike Sanders, ‘The platform and the stage: the primary aesthetics of Chartism’, in Politics, 
performance and popular culture: Theatre and society in nineteenth-century Britain, ed. by Peter 
Yeandle, Katherine Newey, Jeffrey Richards (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), pp.44-
59 (p.48). 
673 Furthermore, Sanders makes explicit the lack of critical attention paid to Chartist poets (both 
contemporary and of the period): ‘Most existing scholarship on Chartist poetry has tended to 
concentrate on the handful of ‘Labour Laureates’ (Cooper, Jones, Massey) and on poetry of an 
obvious and immediate political nature. In short, it has operated with what might be described as a 
‘self-evident’ definition of its object of study, constructing Chartist poetry as an ‘ideal type’ 
consisting of poems on a recognisably Chartist theme written by self-identified Chartist poets. 
However, this ignores the atypicality of the Labour Laureates. The overwhelming majority of Chartist 
poets did not achieve widespread recognition in their lifetimes, nor did they publish volumes of their 
work. Instead, the typical Chartist poet enjoyed a limited, local reputation and published their work 
in the periodical press’ (Sanders, The Poetry of Chartism, p.66). 
674 Barker, p.20. 
675 Barker, pp.20-24. 
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chairmen’.676 Bratton’s reading of the 1843 Theatres Act casts darker aspersions on 
its intended contribution to the cultural landscape of the 1800s. She suggests that 
rather than facilitating a wider platform for engagement with the arts 
(accommodating a host of smaller, and more diverse venues) the Act was intended 
to establish a value binary between high and low art: 
In an attempt to repel the encroachment of low entertainment… and so 
‘restore’ the privileged position of the written play over all other 
performance forms… The 1843 Act intended to abstract the serious play 
from its place within the matrix of entertainment, free it from pollution 
and defend it from competition, and render it answerable to a modern, 
respectable idea of Art. The rest was rejected, and left to be simply 
policed by the magistracy, through music and dancing licensing.677 
Sightings of institutionalized value-binaries between high and low art brings 
analysis of the period back in line with my interpretation of the absence of 
performance poetics in contemporary academic study. Although the 1800s may 
have established changes in the way that public space is utilized for performance it 
does not address the fact that performance poetry, despite the pedagogical 
potential I have outlined, did not manifest into an academic discipline or an 
accepted medium of transmission and reception. Bratton remarks in her longer 
investigation New Readings in Theatre History (2003), that ‘In this study I want to 
consider the discourse that crystallised the binary division between art and 
                                                          
676 Jacky Bratton, ‘The music hall’, in The Cambridge Companion to Victorian and Edwardian Theatre, 
ed. by Kerry Powell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp.164-183 (p.164). 
677 Bratton, ‘The music hall’, p.166. 
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entertainment, considering how the reforms of the 1830s used the notion of 
inferior, popular performance in their vision of the theatrical world’.678 Bratton 
concludes by highlighting the incongruity of establishing an opening for radicalized, 
socially engaged theatre in public spaces, only for it to be suppressed by fears of 
‘lower’ forms of popularized entertainment.679 Though she also cites investment 
and marketization of the lucrative small theatre scene in the later 1800s as factors 
contributing to their decline680 I believe a focus on the disparagement of the 
perceived value of the performances to be more appropriate to my investigation 
and to the context of contemporary performance poetry. In order to fully assess 
this disparagement, and to explicate how, in a spatial context, deleterious 
impressions of the cultural value of performance poetics relate to utilization of 
social spaces, I return to Patrick Primavesi’s discussion of Focauldian heterotopias in 
the 1800s.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
678 Bratton, New Readings, p.133. 
679 Bratton posits: ‘I suggest, at the end of this study, what is lost to theatre history and indeed to 
the development of English drama by the strict segregation between that vigorous theatrical 
lifespring and nineteenth-century Drama’ (Bratton, New Readings, p.133). 
680 This marketization is further discussed in Bratton’s essay ‘The music hall’: ‘Cultural change and 
aspiration, the broadening of the audience to include more segments of later-Victorian society, and 
concomitant moves to increase discipline and market control shifted power into the hands of 
business managers and investors… The transformation resulted not only in the shifting character of 
the large halls themselves, as they developed into ‘variety theatres’, but also the suppression of 
small independent halls; it eventually deracinated an institution which then failed to meet the 
challenge of further developments in the leisure industries’ (Bratton, ‘The music hall’, p.164). 
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Traditional theatre and contemporary performance spaces 
 
By addressing the role of heterotopias across critiques of nineteenth century 
theatre spaces, Primavesi’s study of Foucault in relation to the theatre raises 
certain important questions. Chief among these questions is the development of a 
contention between traditional representations of theatre and new engagements 
with the theatre as a site for radical social performance and development.681 
Alongside the widening of performance spaces articulated by critics such as Bratton 
and Barker, Primavesi situates the original pivot for re-engagement in the 
development of a new public sphere as a response to the Enlightenment:  
The critique and replacement of inherited forms of representation, 
promoted by the philosophical and aesthetic redefinition of community 
and the public sphere constituted a central element of the 
Enlightenment project. The theatre, in particular, was held up as a 
school of ethics and morality, something which, in practice, it was both 
unable and unwilling to be.682 
Of particular note, Primavesi invites interpretation of public theatre as ‘an 
autonomous festival of responsible citizens, set in opposition to courtly 
                                                          
681 For an enlightening analysis of these trends of social performance see: John Mee, Conversable 
Worlds: Literature, Contention, and Community 1762-1830 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
which presents the emerging importance of sociability in reading and writing practice during the 
period 1762-1830: ‘If definitions of the field of literary production in terms of visionary genius or 
professional specialism grew apace and gathered cultural authority, they did not simply erase the 
understanding or practices of reading and writing as taking place within and between variously 
situated conversable worlds’ (Mee, p.33). 
682 Primavesi, p.169. 
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representation… thereby conceiving theatre anew’.683 The festival, and the 
transgression of a hegemonic understanding of performance spaces, is key to 
understanding the contemporary status of performance poetry. The festival 
presents a site where autonomy (between performer and spectator) is recognized 
as mutually contributing to the performance; much like affect transmission 
presents a collaborative engagement. Not only does this critical analysis of space 
reconcile the adoption of public spaces in contemporary spoken word 
performances, but also the manner by which performers of spoken word enact 
representations of themselves. Primavesi argues that in the context of the festival 
enacted by the public theatre of nineteenth century heterotopic spaces such as the 
music hall or the pub, legitimated representation of the self were crucial to the 
maintenance of the public sphere: ‘representative self-portrayal is also a 
prerequisite to the idea of a democratically constituted public sphere’.684 In this 
delineation, traditional concepts of the performance stage were rendered 
inflexible, utopic, bound spaces, whereas the renegotiation of performance spaces 
(transgressive, representative, heterotopic spaces) were elevated to spaces of 
dynamic social engagement, where the self could be freely represented. This 
representation was enabled through the collective understanding that such self-
engagement was effected against a backdrop of performativity, and that the single 
voice was participating within rather than designating or delimiting the heterotopic 
festival space as one fulfilling a set function. 
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In reality however, as evidenced by critical detachment from theatre in the 
period, nineteenth century idealization of the public sphere and the transgression 
of theatrical stage to social space did not achieve a unified community. Theatre 
failed to deliver the democratic social space demanded by the representative public 
sphere. As Primavesi argues: 
At the same time, however, it prompted a resurgence of old anti-
theatrical prejudices contained in new moral concerns. Theatre fervour 
and ‘theatromania’ were deemed harmful excesses of affect and 
fantasy, an escape from reality and a sign of moral decay. The 
fundamental ambivalence of the bourgeoisie’s attitude toward the 
theatre was finally expressed in the attempt to discipline the behaviour 
of performers and spectators, and to channel the desire to transgress 
everyday conventions. The establishment of bourgeois theatre, 
determined by this program of discipline and self-control, already 
demonstrated the tension between utopia and heterotopia that has 
shaped theatre discourse ever since.685 
The development of bourgeois theatre (against the notions of a theatre serving a 
democratically constituted public sphere) was undermined by the problematizing 
elements represented in the threat of excess through theatrical performance; the 
‘lower’ forms of entertainment. Bourgeois theatre intended a critical public 
appraisal; a forum space for discourse. However, pressure evoked by a deep desire 
to react against theatrical traditions prompted an element of control over the 
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transgressions appropriated within the public space which only proved counter-
productive. Ironically this forum of spectatorship, fearing its own fragility, struggled 
to disassociate itself from the sort of rituality observed in theatre, or to provide 
adequate freedoms implicit within the ideals of festive transgression.  
However, for bourgeois theatre, thrown out with ‘theatromania’ the notion of 
affect as a principle of the social, and of transgression from routine, became 
synonymous not with liberation but with excess. Subsequently, the public space of 
the theatre came to be depicted as ‘an ambivalent object of fascination, to which 
the crises of bourgeois existence were linked as much as the expectation of a life 
fulfilled by the glamour of public recognition. Theatre events of this period 
exhibited the paradoxical features of a festival that reflects and questions itself’.686 
Focus on the failure of bourgeois theatre to radically employ the notion of 
heterotopias implicit within the festival has value to a study of contemporary 
performance poetry because it represented a direct challenge to the liberating 
function of the communal social space. This communality is the exact element of 
shared affect negotiation which contemporary performance poetry seeks to 
reengage with. Just as the bourgeois theatre began to circumscribe the festival, so 
does the relative abjuration of spaces which might have supported a true place for 
performance in the canon of poetics mimic this moment of renunciation critically. 
The festival, akin to the performance space, entitled community engagement at a 
transformative level: 
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Festivals are heterotopias, not only because they require ephemeral 
spaces, as described by Foucault, but, more generally, as events based 
in a collective staging. As such, festivals include a potential for 
communality and excess, precisely those elements that bourgeois 
theatre had sought to eliminate in order to establish a critical discourse 
opposed to courtly theatre culture. But a theatre that wished to 
renounce all moments of festivity was in danger of ossifying in its 
function.687 
The paradox which contained bourgeois theatre also prevented it from embracing 
the festival, establishing a boundary between theatre as a site of discourse and the 
excesses of the festival which, when logically pursued, becomes a familiar 
distinction between high and low art. As Primavesi writes: ‘literary theatre moved 
along the very border marked by the curtain- as a heterotopia oscillating between 
an exclusive claim to higher education and a culture of popular entertainment’.688 
Rather than embracing the pedagogical potential of a shared affective experience, 
bourgeois theatre distanced itself from overabundance.  
When one considers the festival as heterotopia evoking a rich tradition of 
communal reflection and evaluation of the everyday, the notion that it should have 
been decoupled from the late 1800s reassessment of ethics and morality in the 
public sphere seems untenable.689 No less incompatible may be the idea that in 
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689 Indeed, in their essay ‘Victorian and Edwardian audiences’ (Jim Davis and Victor Emeljanow, 
‘Victorian and Edwardian audiences’, in The Cambridge Companion to Victorian and Edwardian 
Theatre. ed. Kerry Powell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) pp. 93-109) the authors 
offer the following: ‘The orthodox history of English theatre audiences from 1843 to 1910 is often 
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contemporary poetics the practice and production of powerfully affective material 
is separated from the actual affective experience, or that the receipt should not be 
a shared experience. Underscoring the heterotopia of the festival as a site of excess 
enables and legitimizes the critical distance levied against performance poetry by 
categorizing excess as the anticipation of indecorous fantasy and moral decay. The 
implication commits the relationship between the festival and the theatre to a 
value distinction, one which operates antithetically to the notion of heterotopia, or 
the representation of a variegated and non-exclusive space of transformation. As I 
have argued, the contemporary non-designation of performance poetry within the 
academy finds both precedence and reinforcement in the unsuccessful attempts to 
radicalize public performance spaces during the nineteenth century. The festival, a 
heterotopic site of idealized communal and social discourse, becomes entangled 
with the diminution of ‘lower’ cultural exploits. Although twentieth-century 
conceptions of the theatre and its function in society underwent radical changes I 
contend that contemporary resistances to cultures of spoken word in the reception 
of poetry are evidence of a stigma which has not been similarly expiated, thus 
ensuring that spoken word retains a status as entertainment rather than a valuable 
pedagogical medium for receiving poetry.  
                                                          
presented as an evolutionary and triumphalist narrative. Theatrical reform, improved conditions 
within the auditorium and the re-emergence of a respectable upper- and middle-class audience, 
attracted back after the absorption of disreputable and unruly elements by the music hall, 
apparently paved the way for a theatre and a drama that could once again be taken seriously. Yet 
the evidence militates against so simplistic a narrative’ (Davis, p.94). However, they also admit that 
in line with later critical disengagement from nineteenth century theatre as discussed, the notion of 
a more communal audience did not in fact survive the period: ‘we can only be sure of one factor: 
that it continued to maintain the range and diversity, noted throughout this chapter, right up until 
the end of our period’ (Davis, p.107). 
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To contextualize such resistances a speculative comparison between 
contemporary performance poetry and contemporary theatre requires further 
examination of the spaces and spatial practices that comprise both.690 Returning to 
Primavesi’s gambit regarding the idealized social space of contemporary theatre 
(‘the creation of theatrical situations between performers and spectators is possible 
anywhere – recent work with forms of theatre that takes place outside of 
established theatre spaces has often confirmed this’691) one may readily assume a 
connection between the theatre as mutable social space and the less readily 
designated performance spaces of spoken word. However, despite the fact that as a 
working proposition the dissolution of relationships of distance and boundaries of 
exclusion between theatre and spoken word has strong precedents it does not 
communicate to the contemporary social and cultural landscape. Indeed, the two 
are viewed as discrete performance mediums. As I have argued critics such as Erika 
Fischer-Lichte propose radicalization of traditional theatre in an attempt to find 
new spaces which reconnect the theatre to the public life. This is certainly 
evidential in modern theatre practice. As the critic Gay McAuley enjoins, the 
deconstruction of the insularity of the theatre is achieved through recognition of 
the affective potential of the experience engendered by the bodily presence of the 
actors and spectators within the performance space. There is much to be argued for 
the relationship between a more modern notion of the theatre and spoken word 
performances, but it would be naive to argue that this relationship alone denatures 
                                                          
690 For further analysis of performance staging and the relationship between traditional notions of 
the theatre and contemporary performance philosophies, see: David Krasner, and David Z. Saltz, 
Staging Philosophy: Intersections of Theatre, Performance, and Philosophy (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2006). 
691 Primavesi, p.178. 
301 
 
the distinct identifications of theatre and spoken word in cultural public perception. 
Indeed, to return to Daniel Johnson’s essay ‘Phenomenology, Time and 
Performance’ (and to frame my interrogation of traditional theatre spaces) Johnson 
offers the caveat: ‘The claim is certainly not that all theatre is necessarily 
phenomenological but has the potential to be so in so far as it focuses on a truthful 
engagement with the lived subject in the process of performance’.692 Addressing 
distinctions between performance which achieves this potential and performance 
which does not relies on an understanding of how spaces are occupied differently 
within the performances. It also necessitates an examination of how both 
performers and audience engage within these spaces. The connotative relationship 
audiences share with spoken word and with theatre productions differ by 
preconditioned expectation. This is not only by dint of the position that theatre has 
occupied in the cultural consciousness but by the unique circumstances of the 
nascent re-emergence of spoken word into the same consciousness over the last 
few decades. These preconditioned expectations are of particular relevance to an 
analysis of the interaction between audience and performance within a 
performance space. This is particularly significant when considered through the lens 
of the performer, who must necessarily engage with their affective manifestations 
during the performance. In response to this element of my analysis I interviewed 
Zodwa Nyoni; a young writer and performer who has experienced working with 
both theatre and spoken word.  
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Nyoni’s writing experience is robust, both as a spoken word artist and as a 
published poet. Her page poetry has featured in numerous anthologies and journals 
including the Crocus Books Love Anthology (2013), The Warehouse Magazine (2009 
and 2010), Aesthetica Magazine: Creative Works Annual (2009), Sable Lit Magazine 
(2009), and Suitcase Book of Love Poems (2008). However, Nyoni’s primary 
engagement with poetry has been through spoken word. She has performed at the 
Venezuelan Embassy, the British Museum, the Ilkely Literature Festival, the 
Bridlington Literature Festival, the Southbank Centre, and the Nuyorican Poets Café 
in New York City – the latter being a site of near-pilgrimage for many Slam poetry 
enthusiasts. In 2005 Nyoni was selected to join the Leeds Young Authors Slam team 
competing in the Brave New Voices International Youth Poetry Festival held in New 
York. The Leeds Young Authors team were the first UK team that had been invited 
to the competition since its inception in 1998. Following on from her own 
experiences performing on the international Slam stage Nyoni worked as a poet 
coach with the 2009 Leeds Young Authors team, and her involvement was seminal 
to their success in the competition, where they placed second overall across all 
international participants. Recently Nyoni’s work has moved towards the theatre. 
Having won the Channel 4 Playwrights Scheme and subsequently held a Writer-in-
Residence position at the West Yorkshire Playhouse in 2014, her first full length 
play Boi Boi is Dead (2015) received high praise from reviewers and has prompted 
further interest in Nyoni’s next theatre projects. Nyoni is an interesting study 
because of her outspoken perspective on spoken word and the UK Slam scene in 
particular. Despite her core involvement with the scene and its development since 
2005 as a writer and performer she firmly places performance poetry in her past, 
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favouring theatre as her new preferred medium. This shift from spoken word to 
theatre is of particular interest when considering how performers negotiate the 
relationship between the two. When questioned about how her spoken word 
experiences differ from her experience in the theatre she responded:  
Where is the line? Everyone is so caught up in defining. But I do it too - I 
cringe when people call me a poet. I’m no longer committed to poetry 
in the same way I’m committed to theatre. There’s no way I’d say I’m a 
poet who writes theatre. No way, I’d be a fraud. There’s no way I could 
do poetry shows anymore because my heart isn’t in it, I don’t connect 
to it the same way anymore.693 
The difficulty of addressing the interrelationships of spoken word and performance 
is realized in Nyoni – an artist who has seemingly transitioned from one medium to 
the other. However, as Nyoni states, such a transition is problematized by the 
reluctance to define. Nyoni’s own creative framework suggests an indissoluble 
sense of proximity regardless of designation, something recognized in reviews of 
Nyoni’s more recent theatre. One Guardian reviewer commented on the poetry of 
Nyoni’s scripted language: ‘Like another playwright and poet, JM Synge, she 
grippingly connects a particular situation to the universals of shared experiences 
through a wonderfully rich, humorous and densely poetic use of language’.694 When 
                                                          
693 Zodwa Nyoni, interviewed by Jack McGowan, 11 September 2015. 
694 Claire Brennan, ‘Boi Boi Is Dead review – sprightly ease and emotional depth’, The Guardian 
Online, 22 February 2015 <http://www.theguardian.com/stage/2015/feb/22/boi-boi-is-dead-west-
yorkshire-playhouse-review> [accessed 15 September 2015]. 
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pushed on the relationship between her theatre and her spoken word material 
Nyoni offers: 
Theatre is an extension of my attempts to carve out my voice as a 
writer. Parts of it will always be poetic. I don’t want to leave my poetry, 
just do it differently. I don’t want to do Slams anymore. But Boi Boi was 
a series of poems caught between dialogue and staging. The poetry is 
still there; I’m just learning to use it differently.695 
Interrogating Nyoni on her self-imposed break from spoken word reveals a not 
unexpected, aversion to some of the elements that are commonly criticized in 
Slam.696 Although Nyoni does not devalue the affective potential of spoken word 
performances she indicates weariness towards the depersonalization of the 
performance space when it fails to manifest as honesty:  
What is the function of spoken word and have we got caught up in the 
show of it all? For me, spoken word is for something I can’t remove 
from myself, something I have to say personally. But the truth in your 
work will always have its own rhythms – in poetry I started manipulating 
that truth and had no investment. The organic feeling I lost in spoken 
word I found in theatre.697  
                                                          
695 Nyoni, interviewed by Jack McGowan. 
696One of the clearest of these elements is the critique of Slam’s focus on the competition, 
articulated in: Zusha Elinson, ‘Poetry Is Art, but Poetry Slams Are Sport, Bound by Pages of Rules’, 
The Wall Street Journal (9 April 2016) <http://www.wsj.com/articles/poetry-is-art-but-poetry-slams-
are-sport-bound-by-pages-of-rules-1460045296> [accessed 19 June 2016]. 
697 Nyoni, interviewed by Jack McGowan. 
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To examine this, what appears to be a negative analysis of performance poetry errs 
towards a more localized dissatisfaction with Slam and with the spoken word scene 
which glamorizes the performance as product at the cost of the ‘organic feeling’ of 
affective transaction. Nyoni readily admits that the manipulations of the truth in 
her poetry germinated as a response to an encroaching feeling of lost agency, 
something she not only explicitly anticipates but seems to accept as part of an 
involvement in any creative industry: ‘When I’ve exhausted theatre I’ll fall back in 
love with poetry’.698 During our discussion I countered that Slam exists as one 
(arguably, the) consumer-driven facet of contemporary spoken word, and that the 
grassroots development of a spoken word scene in the UK extends beyond this 
singular, problematized and divisive element. Although we agreed on this point, 
Nyoni’s concern that the spoken word scene could not avoid developing in tandem 
with a less radical and more consumerist approach to performance remained 
apparent: ‘Within any wave of change like spoken word is experiencing in the UK 
you have to contend with success and relevance’.699 For Nyoni the issues facing 
contemporary Slam are related to its restricted growth and development in the UK: 
Slam in the UK is young. It will allow one person on the stage, whereas 
Slam in America - what’s the word for a collection of poets? Groups of 
performance poets work together in the US, performing as troupes, 
writing together, getting booked together. The US has been doing 
spoken word since the 1980s, the UK has had less than a decade, maybe 
as little as five years. Slam’s infrastructure in the US is huge, enough to 
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accommodate booking troupes of poets. The UK doesn’t have that kind 
of infrastructure to support group work. It barely has the means to 
support individual poets who want to perform.700 
This comparison between UK and US Slam scenes rings true when considered 
alongside previous elements of my analysis of the reception of spoken word in the 
UK. The lack of engagement with performance poetry in the academy corresponds 
to the lack of an infrastructure, critical or material. Inevitably with the absence of 
such an infrastructure the corollary de-emphasis of the medium’s potential 
frustrates and hinders its development. Nyoni’s observations regarding the limited 
space afforded to UK performance poets are of particular value considering her 
dual creative identity as both performance poet and playwright.701 In describing the 
kinds of spaces occupied, and the way space is negotiated in both her poetry and 
her theatre she contends that space is used to address and to codify inclusions and 
exclusions: ‘The primary function of my writing is to talk about the spaces we 
inhabit and the spaces we inhibit’.702 The similarity of this as a methodology finds 
common ground in the heterotopia of the performance space which constantly 
resists and renegotiates identity.  
Continuing my exploration of Nyoni’s work our discussion moved towards the 
relationship Nyoni creates with her audience in both mediums, and the way this 
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701 Resonances of this relationship between performance poetry spaces and theatre spaces in the 
context of Slam poetry in particular can be found in Jean Howard’s essay ‘Performance Art, 
Performance Poetry:  The Two Sisters’. Jean Howard, ‘Performance Art, Performance Poetry:  The 
Two Sisters’, in Spoken Word Revolution: Slam, Hip-Hop, and the Poetry of a New Generation, ed. by 
Mark Eleveld (Naperville: Sourcebooks Inc., 2003), pp.64-67. 
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relationship can be analysed to pry apart the differences between the two. When 
asked whether there was a qualitative difference between the relationships derived 
from the audience-performer interaction in theatre and performance poetry Nyoni 
observed that: 
It’s always the rush of it. In the theatre my relationship with an 
audience is different. We’re in a closed room together, it doesn’t matter 
what our relationships are or might be, we’re being sucked into a world. 
We all experience it until we get to the end. It’s not the immediate one-
on-one of poetry. With performance poetry you seek the stage because 
you want to share, and the audience will share it with you because the 
space is an immediate one. The space of the theatre is different. You 
share by collaboration, not just in the process with your actors and your 
producers and everyone else who helps put the production together. 
You collaborate with your audience, and it’s a slower way to share the 
space because it’s different, and it involves different processes.703 
Nyoni’s recognition of the collaborative engagement between performer and 
audience is a tacit appreciation of the transmissions of affect which constitute 
spoken word or theatrical performances. The temporal momentariness of the 
spoken word performance is of course critical in the context of the pace of the 
medium. Unlike the theatre, which Nyoni suggests is ‘a slower way to share the 
space’704 the instantaneousness of the spoken word performance lends itself more 
                                                          
703 Nyoni, interviewed by Jack McGowan. 
704 Nyoni, interviewed by Jack McGowan. 
308 
 
intensely to engaging with the moment of affect entrainment as it is experienced by 
the body. This focus on the moment of reception can be acknowledged in the 
spatial formation of the poetry performance, where everything is centred upon the 
performer with little in the way of competing stimulus: 
Spoken word has a poet and a mic and less rules because of it. All a poet 
and a mic is asking you to do is to listen and connect with your own 
personal experiences. However far those experiences may take me as 
an audience member, when I think of how the space is configured all 
I’m left with is a poet and a mic. It’s the simplicity of it.705 
Isolating the distinctions between spoken word and theatre suggests that the 
differences can be centralized under a notion of transgression of, and resistance to, 
stimuli which might inhibit the clarity of the affect transaction. When one unpacks 
the idea of simplicity in this context there is an implicit value associated with the 
purer communication between performer and audience in spoken word. However, 
the correlative implication that theatre suffers from all the attached bells and 
whistles which may furnish the narrative or provide additional entertainment, but 
in reality get in the way of the experience, is short-sighted. Although the idea that 
performance poetry is a pure and simple distillation of the affective potential of 
poetry is an appealing one it is clearly more complicated. Theatre, especially 
modern theatre, must carry a great deal of tradition which is made manifest 
through the preconceptions which audience members hold when attending a 
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theatre performance.  Although it may lack a comparative tradition, the poetry 
performance doesn’t exist in a vacuum of pure, momentary affect either: 
Whatever problem exists in the notion of sticking to traditional forms of 
theatre you have to look at Slam’s traditions too, albeit a lot less firmly 
established. Slam traditionally grew out of the frustration of exclusion, 
so you go to working men’s clubs to find people connected to the 
poetry and the way they see the world becomes a part of the 
tradition.706 
What is of most pressing value in this postulation is the notion that the traditions of 
performance poetry are intimately linked to the spaces it traditionally inhabits. As I 
have suggested in my analysis, the occupation of heterotopic social spaces provides 
a platform for audiences to engage with performance poetry at the level of radical 
and enabling social discourse. The fact that the emerging traditions of performance 
poetry are intimately linked to the frustrations of inclusion and exclusion returns 
my analysis to the festival. In the context of spoken word development, the 
heterotopic festival is key. Of particular relevance to my examination are the 
theories of Henri Lefebvre and his principles regarding the processes by which 
spaces are produced within a society. 
 
 
                                                          
706 Nyoni, interviewed by Jack McGowan. 
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Lefebvre, representation, and festival 
 
Henri Lefebvre’s seminal 1974 text The Production of Space707 has received 
increased attention in response to the spatial turn and a re-examination of space 
and spatiality in critical thought.708 The density of Lefebvre’s prose and his 
profoundly Marxist approach to questions of space and spatial production frustrate 
applications of his theories within the context of other spatial studies which may 
afford a more leisurely pairing with the issues provoked by a critique of the 
utilization of space in performance poetry. However, I contend that Lefebvre’s 
usefulness lies in his specifically material focus, a materiality which sets him apart 
from other spatial theorists, and aligns his methodology with the French 
phenomenologists who strongly influenced his work (in particular Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty). Lefebvre’s specific understanding of phenomenology differs 
slightly from other phenomenological interpretations due to the dominance of 
Marxism within his analysis.709 However Lefebvre views space itself as a material 
                                                          
707 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1991). 
708 As the critic Christian Schmid notes: ‘Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space has undergone 
a remarkable renaissance during recent years. This is all the more surprising as it had hardly elicited 
any response when published in the early 1970s. Although Lefebvre’s texts on Marxism, on everyday 
life, and on the city were widely read at the time, his reflections on space aroused little interest. The 
problematic of space did not as yet figure on the theoretical agenda. But today, Lefebvre’s book The 
Production of Space is routinely quoted. The ‘spatial turn’ has taken hold of the social sciences and 
questions of space are accorded a great deal of attention, extending beyond geography’. Christian 
Schmid, ‘Henri Lefebvre’s Theory of The Production of Space; Towards a three-dimensional 
dialectic’, in Space, Difference, Everyday Life: Reading Henri Lefebvre, ed. by Kanishka 
Goonewardena, Stefan Kipfer, Richard Milgrom, Christian Schmid (New York: Routledge, 2008), 
pp.27-46 (p.27). 
709 For further information, see Stuart Elden, Understanding Henri Lefebvre: Theory and the Possible 
(New York: Continuum, 2004): ‘[Lefebvre’s] notion of everyday life has been usefully situated 
between the two principal movements of post-war French theory – existential phenomenology and 
structuralism. For Lefebvre, neither of these two approaches satisfactorily deals with everyday life… 
Instead, Lefebvre sees a notion of the lived as implicit in Marxism already’ (Elden, p.113). 
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product, and crucially this production is, for Lefebvre, irreducible from its social 
origins. The difference underpins Schmid’s critical interpretation of Lefebvre’s work, 
and to an extent the misconceptions which frustrated his incorporation into the 
canon of spatiality in the decades after his publication: 
(Social) space is a (social) product; in order to understand this 
fundamental thesis it is necessary, first of all, to break with the 
widespread understanding of space imagined as an independent 
material reality existing ‘in itself’. Against such a view, Lefebvre, using 
concepts of the production of space, posits a theory that understands 
space as fundamentally bound up with social reality. It follows that 
space ‘in itself’ can never serve as an epistemological starting position. 
Space does not exist ‘in itself’; it is produced.710 
In this context the social origins of spatial production are strongly suited to 
the medium of performance poetry which by virtue of its status as a spectacle of 
verbal art711 is profoundly linked to the social. The phenomenological experience of 
being an audience member is crucial to the operative mechanisms of spoken word 
performances, where affect is transmitted between bodies. When compared to a 
tradition of silent, solitary reading which abnegates the body’s relationship with 
other bodies in the reading experience, the social elements of poetry on the stage 
                                                          
710 Schmid, p.28. 
711 ‘Verbal art’ in this context recalls Richard Bauman’s definition in Richard Bauman, Verbal Art as 
Performance (Rowley: Newbury House Publishers, 1977) which separates performance from 
folklore, impelling upon the former a dual sense of action (performance) and event (performance 
situation). This definition compliments my analysis of Lefebvre’s engagement with space as it 
facilitates an understanding of performance as a simultaneous action as well as a spatially located 
event (Bauman, pp.3-5). 
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are clear and efficacious in a pedagogical context (exposed by the use of the body in 
performance). The use of the body as a monitor for interactions between performer 
and spectator implicitly underscores performance structures in the theatrical 
tradition of the spectacle. In discussing the relationship between theatrical 
composition and experience the Italian theorist and theatre director Eugenio Barba 
notes in his essay ‘Words or Presence’ that:  
I believed that composition was the capacity of the actor to create signs, 
to consciously mould his own body into a deformation which was rich in 
suggestiveness and power of association: the body of the actor as a 
Rosetta stone and the spectator in the role of Champollion.712 
The rhetoric of this striking image; the spectator as discoverer and decoder of a 
cipher represented in the body of the performer, emphasises the vitality of the 
body on stage. Compared to a spoken word performance the theatre Barba speaks 
of may or may not be a more energetic, physical presentation, and the experiential 
prominence placed on the physicality of the body in action may have 
disproportionate relevance. However what Barba reveals in the description of this 
experience is the clear link drawn between the performance as process and a bodily 
engagement with space.713 Although Barba is writing out of a critical field aligned 
                                                          
712 Eugenio Barba, ‘Words or Presence’, in The Twentieth-Century Performance Reader 3rd Edition, 
ed. by Teresa Brayshaw, Noel Witts (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), pp.46-53 (p.49). 
713 It is also important to note that Barba is careful to extend his critical perspective to the voice as 
an element of that bodily performance: ‘We began to talk of vocal actions. That which for us has 
once been a postulate – the voice as a physiological process – now became a tangible reality which 
engaged the entire organism and projected it in space. The voice was a prolongation of the body 
which, through space, hit, touched, caressed, encircled, pushed, searched far away or close by; an 
invisible hand which stretched out from the body to act in space or renounce action. And even this 
renunciation was spoken by the invisible hand. But in order that the voice might act, it must know 
where the point was toward which it was directed, who that point was and why it was addressing 
him… The whole body of the actor resounded, the room resounded, as well as something inside me 
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with the theatre I posit that the links between the analysis of mechanisms of the 
body in theatre and in spoken word are distinct, supported by Barba’s invocation of 
the voice within the compositional and performance processes. That Barba so 
profoundly remarks on the performer’s projection into the performance space is a 
compelling reinforcement of Lefebvre’s focus on the body, and of the importance of 
appropriating a critique of space in an analysis of the pedagogical implications of 
performance poetry. With this in mind, I argue that the under-representation of 
spatiality within critical thought exposes a correlative devaluation of the 
fundamental and powerful relationship with space which is inherent to 
performance poetry and its potential for educating the affective drives. In line with 
this position it is the body that is critical to Lefebvre’s theories, centralizing his 
concept of the social as a relationship between bodies not simply as sites of matter 
but as generators of imagination, ideology, and affect: 
Central to Lefebvre’s materialist theory are human beings in their 
corporeality and sensuousness, with their sensitivity and imagination, 
their thinking and their ideologies; human beings who enter into 
relationships with each other through their activity and practice.714  
In order to explore the implications of the body and the relationship with 
performance poetry it is first necessary to analyse Lefebvre’s theories of how space 
is produced. The production of space, while social in origin, stems from three 
                                                          
as I listened, provided the actor really addressed this point in space which, although invisible to my 
eyes, was concrete to him, perceptible to all his senses, present with physical features’ (Barba, p.50). 
714 Schmid, p.29. 
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dialectically organized dimensions. This conceptual triad forms the centre of 
Lefebvre’s critique. The triad is formed by the following: 
1). Spatial practice: ‘which embraces production and reproduction, and the 
particular locations and spatial sets characteristic of each social formation’.715 
2). Representations of space: ‘which are tied to the relations of production and to 
the ‘order’ which those relations impose, and hence to knowledge, to signs, to 
codes, and to ‘frontal’ relations’.716  
3). Representational spaces: ‘embodying complex symbolisms, sometimes coded, 
sometimes not, linked to the clandestine or underground side of social life’.717  
To unpack each element in turn, spatial practice relates to the perception of spaces 
(of the individual and of the collective) which frames an everyday understanding of 
the world.718 Spatial practices are thus necessary elements in the structural 
cohesion of everyday life. Their existence and continuation not only allows spaces 
to be established and set apart for different experiential practices (such as spaces 
for work and spaces for recreation) but also allows for relationships between 
practices within a space. In this respect, spatial practices delineate the material 
processes involved in social activity. This relies not on the individual practices 
themselves: the attendance of an audience at a spoken word venue, the 
                                                          
715 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p.33. 
716 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p.33. 
717 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p.33. 
718 In other words, spatial practices allow us to perceive and form an understanding of a society’s 
structure: ‘The spatial practice of a society secretes that society’s space; it propounds and 
presupposes it, in a dialectical interaction; it produces it slowly and surely as it masters and 
appropriates it. From the analytical standpoint, the spatial practice of a society is revealed through 
the deciphering of its space’ (Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p.38). 
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performer’s performance of a poem within that space - but an interrelationship 
between bisecting spatial practices: ‘the system resulting from articulation and 
connection of elements or activities’.719 The presence of these practices within the 
triad assures what Lefebvre refers to as competence and performance within a 
society: 
Spatial practice ensures continuity and some degree of cohesion. In 
terms of social space, and of each member of a given society’s 
relationship to that space, this cohesion implies a guaranteed level of 
competence and a specific level of performance.720 
Representations of spaces are conceptualized spaces. This category intimately 
connects with Lefebvre’s Marxism as the conceptualization of these spaces is, for 
Lefebvre, a construction delineated primarily by professionals such as planners, 
developers, or architects who are in the business of codifying spaces through signs 
and through objectified representation. Lefebvre refers to conceptualized space as 
‘the dominant space in any society (or mode of production)’721 because it is 
intimately tied to a society’s mode of production. Conceptualized space is present 
in Lefebvre’s triad as it allows a society to form an image and thus a definition of a 
space. Representations of space are frequently linked to the graphic and linguistic 
designations of space, and thus how a society conceives and distinguishes separate 
spaces. 
                                                          
719 Schmid, p.36. 
720 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p.33. 
721 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, pp.38-39. 
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Finally, representational spaces are directly lived spaces; the spaces that one 
inhabits or uses. Lefebvre contends that: ‘This is the dominated – and hence 
passively experienced – space which the imagination seeks to change and 
appropriate. It overlays physical space, making symbolic use of its objects’.722 This 
can be distinguished from conceptualized space as it disavows designation, rather it 
exists as the space which provides the structures of imagery and symbolism that 
sustain its inhabitants through felt rather than thought experience. The relationship 
between representations of space and representational space – how one conceives 
of space and the actual space one lives in would seem to constitute a tenable 
dialectic in relation to social spaces. However, for Lefebvre, the triad is irreducible. 
The perceived space of spatial practice forms a vital element in the inter-
relationship of the other two. As Andy Merrifield suggests in his critical examination 
of Lefebvre, ‘Henri Lefebvre; A socialist in space’:  
Lefebvre is vague about the precise manner in which spatial practices 
mediate between the conceived and the lived, about how spatial 
practices keep representations of space and representational space 
together, yet apart. One thing he’s more sure of, though, is that there 
are ‘three elements’ here not two. It’s not, he says, about a simple 
binary between lived and conceived, but a ‘triple determination’: each 
instance internalizes and takes on meaning through other instances.723 
                                                          
722 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p.39. 
723 Andy Merrifield, ‘Henri Lefebvre; A socialist in space’, in Thinking Space, ed. by Mike Crang and 
Nigel Thrift (New York and Oxon: Routledge, 2000), pp.167-183 (p.175). 
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As a dialectical process, the relationships between the triad cannot be confronted 
without contradiction, however this is in itself fundamental to Lefebvre’s theory of 
spatial production.724 To reconcile this process within the context of spatiality and 
the production of social space: space initially forms as a dimension established 
through the interconnected networks of spatial practice; social activities comprised 
of material experiences create relationships of and between these spatial practices. 
These interconnected networks of practices are conceptualized and subsequently 
codified and defined, becoming representations of space. Once codified, these 
representations can then be communicated, forming points of conceptual 
reference which enable communication to occur between them. This structure of 
communication allows users to conceive of space as an organizing principle, and 
once this organization is established it can be mapped onto actual inhabited space, 
meaning can form, and space becomes representational of social experiences and 
social norms. 
The importance of Lefebvre’s conceptual triad to the occupation of space in 
performance poetry goes further than the correlation between the three. As has 
been established, Lefebvre’s influence on a study of performance spaces is 
implicitly tied to his investment in the body (materiality) and his critique extends 
the argument to the body through the networks formed by spatial practice (the 
basis of perception). Crucially, as I have argued, the merit of phenomenological 
                                                          
724 As Christian Schmid articulates: ‘Lefebvre’s triadic dialectic posits three terms. Each of these can 
be understood as a thesis and each one refers to the other two and would remain a mere 
abstraction without the others. This triadic figure does not end in a synthesis as in the Hegelian 
system. It links three moments that are left distinct from each other, without reconciling them in a 
synthesis – three moments that exist in interaction, in conflict, or in alliance with each other. Thus 
the three terms or moments assume equal importance, and each takes up a similar position in 
relation to the others’ (Schmid, p.33). 
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experience necessitates an engagement of the material body within space. 
Although Lefebvre dismisses certain aspects of phenomenology as a critical position 
(to accommodate his Marxist interpretation)725 Schmid’s analysis of Lefebvre 
reinforces the essential relationship between body and space in his work: 
Lefebvre’s attitude towards the phenomenological version of 
perception is quite sceptical. Therefore, he combines with it the concept 
of spatial practice in order to show that perception not only takes place 
in the mind but is based on a concrete, produced materiality.726 
The three elements which co-produce social space are all demonstrated by 
Lefebvre to be irreducibly linked to material, bodily processes: 
In seeking to understand the three moments of social space, it may help 
to consider the body. All the more so inasmuch as the relationship to 
space of a ‘subject’ who is a member of a group or society implies his 
relationship to his own body and vice versa.727 
Analysis of the three elements individually proves that a materially centred process 
is a rational approach to understanding spatial production. Firstly, perceived space 
(spatial practice) has an overtly material, sensory aspect. Social practice is evidently 
comprised of sensory experience. The networks established through distinct social 
activities are materially embodied: ‘social practice presupposes the use of the 
                                                          
725 For a more in depth discussion of Lefebvre’s Marxism see: Lukasz Stanek, Henri Lefebvre on 
Space: Architecture, Urban Research, and the Production of Theory (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2011). 
726 Schmid, pp.37-38. 
727 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p.40. 
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body… This is the realm of the perceived (the practical basis of the perception of 
the outside world, to put it in psychology’s terms)’.728 Secondly, conceived space 
(representations of space) is a phenomenological invocation of bodily experience 
through the appropriation of knowledge. One cannot conceptualize a whole from 
separate elements without an act of thought, and the basis of this thought comes 
from invoking a representation of the body: ‘the body’s relations with nature and 
with its surroundings or ‘milieu’’.729 Finally, lived space (representational space) is 
often misconstrued as immaterial due to the obscurities of cultural symbolism 
which pervades lived experience. Here Lefebvre cites Judaeo-Christian traditions of 
representation: ‘The ‘heart’ as lived is strangely different from the heart as 
‘thought’ and ‘perceived’’.730 However, for Lefebvre such illusory abstractions are 
merely interventions not reflections of the everyday occupation of lived space, 
which is situated in material, bodily experience:  
This dimension denotes the world as it is experienced by human beings 
in the practice of their everyday life. On this point Lefebvre is 
unequivocal: the lived, practical experience does not let itself be 
exhausted through theoretical analysis.731 
This last point strongly reinforces the phenomenological methodology I have 
adopted. Lived experience is necessary to accurately interpret the world, just as 
lived, practical experience of poetry through the affective experience of a 
performance efficaciously informs and educates affective potential. The conclusions 
                                                          
728 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p.40. 
729 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p.40. 
730 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p.40. 
731 Schmid, p.40. 
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that can be reached from Lefebvre’s insistence on the fundamentality of the 
material body reinforce the connection between spatial production and the 
affective processes enacted in the performance space. The performance of the 
poem has material presence (in the transformations of the body via affective 
transmission) and it is this material presence which produces the social space. This 
is grounded in Lefebvre’s determined investment in the materialist basis of his 
critique: 
The perceived-conceived-lived triad (in spatial terms: spatial practice, 
representations of space, representational space) loses all force if it is 
treated as an abstract ‘model’. If it cannot grasp the concrete (as 
distinct from the ‘immediate’), then its import is severely limited, 
amounting to no more than that of one ideological mediation among 
others.732 
When considered logically, Lefebvre’s insistence on the material, bodily aspects of 
his conceptual triad becomes an inherently rational element of his premise.733 
However, as Merrifield offers in his critical analysis, Lefebvre’s use of abstraction to 
denote the non-material is not simply a clear cut denuding of approaches which 
negate the body, rather it is a specific element of his Marxist critique: ‘It ought to 
be pointed out here that Lefebvre’s emphasis on ‘abstract’ has clear Marxian 
overtones: abstract space bears close resemblance to Marx’s notion of abstract 
                                                          
732 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p.40. 
733 As Merrifield notes: ‘Relations between the conceived-perceived-lived aren’t ever stable and 
exhibit historically defined attributes and content. So it follows that Lefebvre’s triad loses its political 
and analytical resonance if it gets treated merely in the abstract: it needs to be embodied with 
actual flesh and blood and culture, with real life relationships and events’ (Merrifield, p.175). 
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labour’.734 The project undertaken in The Production of Space, and in Lefebvre’s 
analytical position as a whole cannot be separated from his Marxist thought. 
Denying this Marxist element in Lefebvre’s theory would frustrate any attempts to 
appropriate his analysis of social spaces and their production within a critique of 
performances spaces. To reconcile this with my methodological approach I contend 
that there is a direct relationship between Marxist models of production as 
articulated by Lefebvre and the affective transactions which take place within a 
spoken word performance. The conditions of Lefebvre’s triadic production of social 
space are grounded by social processes. These processes are referred to as 
exchanges, which appear to be grounded by the association of capital, product, and 
value. However, exchange as a function of social relationship can be extrapolated 
beyond the application of material resource transaction. The exchange of product 
relies upon the correspondence of the body, and of bodily experience:  
Exchange as the historical origin of the commodity society is not limited 
to the (physical) exchange of objects. It also requires communication, 
confrontation, comparison, and, therefore, language and discourse, 
signs and the exchange of signs, thus a mental exchange, so that a 
material exchange takes place at all.735 
The necessary intervention of the body brings it to the forefront of the exchange 
encounter, thus re-situating the importance of bodily interaction at the heart of 
capital production and transaction. Further to this, the efficacy of Lefebvre’s 
                                                          
734 Merrifield, p.175. 
735 Schmid, p.40. 
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emphasis on exchange also extends to the invitation of affect into his theories 
regarding space and spatial production: ‘The exchange of relationship also contains 
an affective aspect, an exchange of feeling and passions’.736 In the production of 
space (enabled by the triadic dialectic) affect and affective transmission is critical, 
and, critically, it is a transaction which can be securely located within a Marxist 
structure of analytical thought. 
Although the imperative of materiality and of the body in Lefebvrian thought 
must not be overlooked it is of course important to recognize the implication of 
simply focusing on the body in the context of a spoken word performance. While 
affect primarily negotiates an audience’s bodily response to the performance there 
is more at work in the performance space. Within a performance space the 
performance of the poem engages a material affective transaction, but the poem 
itself also carries a necessity for conceptual thought, examination, and 
understanding. Fundamental to a phenomenological approach to spatial production 
and to the interactions between individuals (spatial practices) which contribute to 
the structure of social spaces there is clearly an element of meaning creation. 
Material, bodily experience can be understood through a phenomenological 
encounter, facilitated by affect engaging practices such as the performance of a 
spoken word poem.737 The re-situation of the importance of the body in spatial 
                                                          
736 Schmid, p.40. 
737 As Schmid articulates, Lefebvre draws together both a material understanding of spatial practice 
and a vector of thought which produces lived-experience: ‘Lefebvre attempts consistently to 
maintain his dialectical materialist standpoint. In this way the epistemological perspective shifts 
from the subject that thinks, acts, and experiences to the process of social production of thought, 
action, and experience. When applied to the production of space this phenomenological approach 
leads to the following conclusion: a social space includes not only a concrete materiality but a 
thought concept and a feeling – an ‘experience’. The materiality in itself or the material practice per 
se has no existence when viewed from a social perspective without the thought that directs and 
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theory is a necessary critical movement, however it does not presuppose that 
materiality exists without referent conceptual mechanisms. It is indeed prudent to 
reinforce that the triadic structure of Lefebvre’s critique of the production of social 
spaces relies on each of the three elements and the interrelationship of these 
mechanisms: 
The pure thought is pure fiction; it comes from the world, from Being, 
from material as well as from lived-experienced Being. And pure 
‘existence’ is in the last analysis pure mysticism: it has no real – that is, 
social – existence without the materiality of the body on which it is 
based and without the thought that structures and expresses it. These 
three dimensions of the production of space constitute a contradictory 
dialectical unity. It is a threefold determination: space emerges only in 
the interplay of all three.738 
This said, the project undertaken by Lefebvre (and other critics of the spatial turn) 
to reinforce the importance of materiality in a society, and in the production of that 
society’s spaces must be accorded due significance. Although the body may be an 
equal-weighted element of the conceptual triad which underpinned Lefebvre’s 
analysis, this was not representative of the attention awarded it in critical theories 
regarding space.739 The persistence of Lefebvre’s thought thus becomes less a 
                                                          
represents them, and without the lived-experienced element, the feelings that are invested in this 
materiality’ (Schmid, pp.40-41). 
738 Schmid, p.41. 
739 In the course of his analysis, Merrifield discusses Lefebvre’s tacit self-awareness of this 
distinction: ‘Lefebvre knows too well, for example, that the social space of lived experience gets 
crushed and vanquished by an abstract conceived space. In our society, in other words, what is lived 
and perceived is of secondary importance compared to what is conceived. And what is conceived is 
324 
 
process of simply confirming the triadic structure of his dialectic, and more an 
elucidation of his attempts to renegotiate the place of the body against the 
oppression of a societal perspective fixed on the abstract and the non-material. 
With this in mind, I propose that the performance space is the site par excellence to 
establish a re-evaluation of the processes involved in the production of social space, 
reinforcing the pedagogical potential of the performance. Not only is performance 
an effective medium for educating our affective drives, it is a valuable element of 
social space creation as it readdresses the dominance of a conceived understanding 
of everyday space through a foregrounding of affectively perceived and lived 
experience. Performance poetry generates social space whilst also enabling both an 
exploration of the conceptual aspects of the poetry and a lived, bodily experience. 
Though the silent reading of poetry on the page is undoubtedly an exemplar of 
socio-cultural discourse, the vitality of the performance of poetry adds an 
additional social function to the experience by heightening740 and facilitating the 
production of social space. This relationship between creative performance and 
efficacy in spatial production can be interpreted explicitly in Lefebvre’s analysis of 
the festival. 
The festival, which I have previously identified as a heterotopic site of 
idealized communal and social discourse, contrasts to the space of the everyday 
which carries its own set of habitual experiences. Lefebvre understood the dangers 
                                                          
usually an objective abstraction, an oppressive objective abstraction, which renders less significant 
both conscious and unconscious levels of lived experience’ (Merrifield, p.175). 
740 Here it is important to stress that the vitality of performance is precisely the mechanism required 
to emancipate the everyday: ‘The world must be done in order to be experienced. The repetition of 
socially conditioned and located perceptions produce a world that can in turn be further 
transformed by acts of performance that address and disrupt the action of perception’ (Bleeker, 
p.8). 
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inherent to the compartmentalization of human practices. In his preface to 
Lefebvre’s Critique of Everyday Life741 (originally published in 1947) the critic Michel 
Trebitsch notes that Lefebvre undertakes to formulate a dialectic of experiential 
unity in response to the alienation of the everyday. Trebitsch states that in 
Lefebvrian terms: ‘Alienation thus leads to the impoverishment, to the despoliation 
of everyday life’.742 Unity for Lefebvre required a realignment of the individual, 
which, in the alienation of the modern everyday, erred towards one-sidedness: ‘The 
devaluation of everyday life by ideologies appears as one-sided and partial, in both 
senses of the word’.743 In Merrifield’s analysis of this argument he contends that:  
Overcoming one-sidedness, for Lefebvre, means recovering a ‘genuine 
humanism’… Implied herein is a more wholesome personhood and 
spatial organization. Crucial therein would be a reconciliation between 
thinking and living, between the head with the heart, between theory 
and practice, between what Lefebvre sees with what he wants. The 
reassertion of the spatialized body in critical thought is a first step 
towards this reconciliation.744 
Processes of spatial production are, for Lefebvre, insistent upon interactivity, and 
this is an interactivity which negates the alienated individual. Lefebvre favours a 
necessary initial experience of hearing and the physicality of performed gestures 
over the isolation implicated in reading practices (the decoding of signs and 
                                                          
741 Henri Lefebvre, Critique Of Everyday Life (London: Verso, 1991). 
742 Lefebvre, Critique Of Everyday Life, p.23. 
743 Lefebvre, Critique Of Everyday Life, p.87. 
744 Merrifield, p.177. 
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symbols associated not with the body but with a symbolic or grapholectic 
materiality).745 
In Merrifield’s critique he further extrapolates the basis Lefebvre laid out for the 
processes involved in dis-alienating the everyday. These are processes which 
centralize the body, affect, and crucially shared experience over private experience: 
Lefebvre wants cities to release repression. He wants them to provide 
the means for ‘free associative’ expression… He wants everyday life and 
everyday space – urban representational space – to be reclaimed for 
itself, reclaimed as a decisive ‘lived moment’. Lived moments somehow 
have to dis-alienate the everyday… indeed, they should be luminous 
‘festivals of the people’.746 
As seen in Foucault’s analysis of the festival as a heterotopic site permeated with 
potential for social transformation, Lefebvre sees the festival as the space of 
absolute social bonding. Although he notes the elements of excess and exuberance 
(which find easy analogues in the excess of affect commonly cited as a criticism of 
performance poetry) he accepts this as a necessary intensification of elements of 
the everyday life of individuals within a society: 
Certainly, right from the start, festivals contrasted violently with 
everyday life, but they were not separate from it. They were like 
everyday life, but more intense; and the moments of that life - the 
                                                          
745 As Lefebvre argues: ‘space does not consist in the projection of an intellectual representation, 
does not arise from the visible-readable realm, but that it is first of all heard (listened to) and 
enacted (through physical gestures and movements’ (Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p.200). 
746 Merrifield, p.179. 
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practical community, food, the relation with nature - in other words, 
work - were reunited, amplified, magnified in the festival. Man, still 
immersed in an immediate natural life, lived, mimed, sang, danced his 
relation with nature and the cosmic order as his elementary and 
confused thoughts 'represented' it… In his reality, he lived and achieved 
all his potential.747 
When comparing Lefebvre’s conception of the festival, resonances appear in 
the representation of the festival as holiday articulated by the German philosopher 
Martin Heidegger. In Lefebvre’s Marxist impression of the festival I trace a 
connection to Heidegger which foregrounds my phenomenological methodology 
through an approach to the relationship between spatial occupation and everyday 
life. Just as Lefebvre posits a festival that contrasts with the alienating occupation 
of space in the everyday, as Daniel Johnson argues: ‘Heidegger’s phenomenology 
notes that we tend to overlook the structure of Being-in-the-world in everyday 
lives’.748 Heidegger believed that the everyday relegates our acknowledgment of 
phenomenological experience to an undifferentiated whole:  
In phenomenological terms, temporality (in conjunction with 
historicality) is a fundamental condition for all Being. For Heidegger, 
there is nothing in our regular experience of the world that suggests 
that time is something present-at-hand.749 
                                                          
747 Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, p.207. 
748 Johnson, p.5. 
749 Johnson, p.6. 
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Johnson’s interpretation is helpful as it locates my interpretation of performance 
comfortably within Heidegger’s phenomenological position,750 particularly focusing 
on a defence of Being (the ‘lived subject’) in Heidegger’s notion of art: 
One might object that any human practice can be phenomenological in 
so far as aspects of ‘Being’ can be observed in it. But I believe that 
theatre in particular and art more generally occupies a special 
relationship to the investigation of Being. This thought is expressed in 
Heidegger’s contemplation of the work of art as revealing of truth.751 
 
 
Heidegger and the festive space 
 
 
Reading Heidegger through the lens of Julian Young’s exploration entitled 
Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art752 a clear link can be established between Heidegger’s 
position on art, and the importance of the space of the festival under a 
phenomenological enquiry. The festival offered a necessary space for sustaining 
presence and resisting destitution, a social destitution challenged by similar 
                                                          
750 This phenomenological position is not as clear cut as Johnson summarizes, but is accurate in the 
context of Heidegger’s relationship with performance and art in general. For more detailed 
explanations of Heideggerian phenomenology see: Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems Of 
Phenomenology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); or Martin Heidegger, 
Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression (London: Continuum, 2010). 
751 Johnson, p.9. 
752 Julian Young, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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oppressions of the everyday characterized in the urban space of capital production. 
Young’s discussion of a Heidgeggerian concept of the festival is grounded in the 
latter’s appreciation of Friedrich Hӧlderlin: ‘[Heidegger] was possessed by a 
profound admiration for the early Romantic German poet Friedrich Hӧlderlin, an 
admiration that had begun during his student days and remained with him until his 
death’.753 Young charts a complicated debt Heidegger owes to Hӧlderlin as thinker, 
Hӧlderlin as poet, and Hӧlderlin as educator, but Heidegger himself acknowledged 
the debt clearly in a 1966 Interview with Der Spiegel, a German publication, the text 
of which was published after Heidegger’s death: 
My thinking stands in a definitive relationship to the poetry of Hӧlderlin. 
I do not take Hӧlderlin to be just any poet whose work, among many 
others, has been taken as a subject by literary historians. For me 
Hӧlderlin is the poet who points to the future, who expects god and 
who therefore may not remain merely an object of Hӧlderlin research 
and of the kind of presentations offered by literary historians.754 
The importance of this statement for an analysis of Heideggerian concepts of the 
festival lies in Heidegger’s evaluation of Hӧlderlin as a poet who gestures towards 
the future. Complicit in this is a sense that Heidegger values Hӧlderlin’s sense of 
social responsibility, and by extension the responsibility of art to the social and to 
                                                          
753 Young, p.69. 
754 Manfred Stassen (ed.), Martin Heidegger: Philosophical and Political Writings (London and New 
York: Continuum International Publishing, 2006), p.43. 
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everyday life. For Heidegger, society faced threats from man’s modern condition, a 
state of moral distress, and impelled a need to escape spiritual poverty.755 
To understand Heidegger’s resistance to Modernity’s alienation Young 
proposes that Hӧlderlin’s later texts posit a compass point for Heidegger’s sense of 
a potential salvation: ‘What however is different in the later texts is a new, and 
richer, way of describing the spiritual poverty of our age, a description couched in 
terms of our lack of what Hӧlderlin calls ‘the festival’’.756 The nexus between 
Hӧlderlin’s presentation of the festival and Heidegger’s conceptual development is 
Hӧlderlin’s 1808 poem ‘Remembrance’.757 In the poem Heidegger identifies 
Hӧlderlin’s representation of an oneiric, memorialized space – the space of ‘city's 
festivities’ being ‘heavy with golden dreams’. 758 This space, the festival, is the site 
of Heidegger’s desired meeting between Gods and men.759 Young denudes this in 
Heidegger’s renunciation of the modern fixation with the space of work, and the 
space of material capital engagement:  
What are festivals or holidays? In the first instance, says Heidegger, to 
‘celebrate the holiday (feiern)’ means ‘setting oneself outside everyday 
(alltӓglich) activity, the cessation of work’. In the modern age this is all 
                                                          
755 Young proposes the following: ‘Modernity, Heidegger quotes Hӧlderlin as saying, is the age of the 
‘flight of the gods’ a time of ‘spiritual decline’. ‘The Gods’, Heidegger- Hӧlderlin holds, are the 
indispensable foundation of authentic community. Only by dwelling ‘in the sight of the gods’ – in the 
visible and charismatic presence of the ‘divine destinings’, that is – can ‘man… become historical, 
become, that is to say, a people’. Since individuals only find integration in community and meaning 
in commitment to communal ‘destiny’, modernity, as we have already seen, is the age of alienation 
and ‘meaningless’ (Young, pp.73-74). 
756 Young, p.85. 
757 Friedrich Hӧlderlin, Hyperion and Selected Poems, ed. by Eric L. Santer (London and New York: 
Continuum International Publishing, 2002), p.265. 
758 Hӧlderlin, p.265. 
759 Some of the roots of this relationship in Heideggerian thought can be examined further in Martin 
Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking (New York and Toronto: Harper & Row, 1975). 
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there is to the holiday. It has become a mere ‘break from work 
(Arbeitspause)… This, however, completely fails to capture the proper 
and original essence of the holiday.760 
One may posit a division in this regard between a Lefebvrian frame: where the 
threat posed by the everyday necessitates a process of dis-alienation or a 
reconciliation with everydayness, and Heidegger’s presentation of the festival as a 
space elevated out of the milieu of the everyday: ‘To step into the festive mood… is, 
a fortiori, to step out of the ‘everyday’ since, by definition, the everyday is a matter 
of drab and ‘wearisome’ care’.761 Heidegger distinguishes this rarefied space by 
drawing a comparison between essence and usefulness. In the former can be 
witnessed a connection to a spiritual mode of belonging in society (couched in 
Heidegger’s apothegm of a ‘meeting between men and Gods’). The latter 
‘usefulness’ becomes for Heidegger an explicit association with value circumscribed 
and determined by production and utility: 
The linking of ‘everydayness’, here, to ‘the perspective of usefulness’ is, 
surely, a preview of Heidegger’s later characterization of modernity as 
the age of ‘Gestell’: the world-‘enframing’ epoch defined by the fact 
that, for most people, most of the time, the beings – including human 
beings – in whose midst we find ourselves, show up as, and only as, 
‘resource’.762  
                                                          
760 Young, pp.85-86. 
761 Young, p.86. 
762 Young, pp.86-87. 
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However, Heidegger’s concept of ‘Gestell’; the enframing of the world under 
precise, knowable categories of understanding or enclosed experience (a concept 
Heidegger intimately relates to the modern condition) does not necessarily imply a 
closed binary between the everyday and the festival. As Young notes: 
Heidegger’s anticipation of Gestell in the discussions of ‘Remembrance’ 
is important because it reveals it to be simply ‘everydayness’ raised to 
epoch-defining status, everydayness unmitigated by ‘the festival’.763 
Corresponding to a negotiation between the everyday and the festival space, 
and in preparation for the re-establishment of the potential of the performance 
poet in this reconciliation, tendencies to view the festival and the everyday as 
mutually exclusive may be mediated by accepting their mutuality. This mutuality 
centres around the manner in which the performance poem, through the festival 
space, may impel upon the everyday: 
The authentic festival is, says Heidegger, a day for ‘a coming to 
ourselves’; not in the sense of becoming self-obsessed or self-indulgent, 
but in the sense of a, as we say, ‘coming to one’s senses’ or ‘putting 
things into [their proper] perspective’. The authentic holiday is 
redemptive, as we say, ‘time out’, a stepping out of all usualness into 
the ‘unusual’ or better, the ‘inhabitual’. It is not, however, a stepping 
into the exotic or ‘sensational’. Rather, ‘the opposite’.764 
                                                          
763 Young, p.87. 
764 Young, p.87. 
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In the context of the performance poem, the condition of shared occupation of a 
festival space prepares audiences to receive a re-ordering (even a re-framing) of the 
everyday. This is the tacit implication of Heidegger’s conception of the festival: ‘On 
the authentic holiday, says Heidegger, we ‘step into the… intimation of the wonder 
(Wunder) that around us a world worlds at all, that there is something rather than 
nothing, that there are things and we ourselves are in their midst, that we ourselves 
are’.765 Heidegger evinces not the experience of the new, or as Young suggests the 
‘exotic’ but the familiar of the everyday revivified in the context of the festival 
space. Crucially Heidegger writes not simply of ‘essence’ as the contrary of ‘utility’ 
in a problematic binary, but of coming to view this essence through a new 
experiential mode: ‘What has to be remembered, however, is that in the festive 
mode (mood) we stand not just in the ‘essence’ of things but also in the ‘wonder’ of 
the world’s worlding’.766  
Heidegger refers to this new experience as a re-representation of the world 
around us: the festive mood (the correlative of occupying the festive space) imbues 
the world with a ‘gleam’ (Glanz).767 For Heidegger the potency of this ‘gleam’ is that 
it elucidates a sacred order: the essentiality of the ‘essence’ contained within the 
festive. Here Heidegger explicitly refers to dance and theatre as central elements in 
the institution of the essential light of the festival, but predicates their relevance in 
                                                          
765 Young, p.86. 
766 Young, p.88. 
767 For a more detailed presentation of Heidegger’s ‘Glanz’, see: Richard Capobianco, Heidegger’s 
Way of Being (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014): ‘For the later Heidegger especially, the 
gleaming, glistening, glimmering, glittering, glowing that is the manifestness of Being to humans… 
calls forth from us wonder and astonishment and great joy; brightens, lightens, and opens us; 
inclines our thinking towards thanking; and humbles us into recognizing the limit of all our saying, 
language, meaning’ (Capobianco, p.37). 
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relation to their: ‘being bound into the hidden obedience and rule of beings’.768 
What one can infer from this is the prominence of the role art plays in this re-
representation. This is not raw affective response, but a conditioned display of 
affect permitted by the festive space. In this respect, when the performance poem 
is conditioned as art by the dimensions of the stage (alive to the reordering of 
shared affective experience in a communal occupation of space) it becomes the 
exemplar of Heidegger’s notion of the festival. What is uniquely recognized in the 
performance of poetry is the shared affective experience. This is the communal 
experience over the individual reading, a necessary element of the Heideggerian 
festival where one recognizes: ‘the essential character of any festival – the 
gathering together of community within that ‘wonder’ that happens in the work 
(the ‘communal’ condition)’.769 In the context of a phenomenological experience 
the necessary implication of such wonder is a lived experience. Daniel Johnson’s 
critique of phenomenology, time, and performance poses that Heideggerian 
phenomenology engages with the possibility of ‘uncovering the transcendental 
structures of Being and answering the question: what is necessary for there to be 
Being at all?’.770 Once again his suggestions regarding how to investigate the 
question are located in practice, through performance. 
The relevance of such phenomenological enquiry to the spatial negotiation 
enacted by performance poetry is that it enables a clearer conception of the role of 
the performer within the festival space. The ‘essence’ of the festive space is 
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769 Young, p.89. 
770 Johnson, p.3. 
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acknowledged not simply as the being of the festival detached from the everyday 
but the balance of an outward display of affect defined through the conditions of 
the performance. This balance can be recognized in Heidegger’s theory of art, 
which is delineated by the paradigm of ancient Greek Art. Clear parallels can be 
drawn between a Hegelian determination of ‘the death of art’ and Heidegger’s 
belief that the modern age had been artless; that not since ancient Greece, or the 
later Middle Ages had art been ‘great art’. Although Hegel believed in an 
irreconcilable distance between great art and the modern state of being; that great 
art must necessarily remain something in the past771, on this point Heidegger 
disagreed: ‘The truth of Hegel’s judgement has not yet been decided; for behind 
this verdict there stands Western thought since the Greeks’.772 Heidegger’s belief in 
potential salvation: ‘the possibility of the rebirth of art’773 is notably a rebirth not a 
return. Invoking the notion of balance, Heidegger underscored the problems of a 
reiteration of ancient Greek art by recalling Nietzsche’s distinction between the 
Apollonian and the Dionysian in Nietzsche’s 1872 text The Birth Of Tragedy774, 
though in the language of the dichotomy Heidegger adopts a perspective closer to 
Hӧlderlin’s poetics.775  
                                                          
771 For further information, see: G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art: Volume 1, 
trans. by T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). 
772 Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p.78. 
773 Young, p.15. 
774 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, The Birth Of Tragedy Out Of The Spirit Of Music (London: Penguin, 
1993). 
775 Young summarizes the theory quite clearly, positing that: ‘The archaic Greeks, said Heidegger, 
lacked, in a certain way, balance. Though endowed with a powerful openness to the ‘fire’, they were 
weak in their capacity for ‘clarity of presentation’. The result was that though their ‘fitting destiny’ 
was indeed already ‘assigned to them’, it appeared to them only in a ‘veiled and equivocal manner’. 
In the language of ‘The Origin’, what the archaic Greeks could not do was ‘open up’ their world, 
bring its ‘simple and essential’ features out of background inconspicuousness and into foreground 
salience’ (Young, p.96). 
336 
 
To contextualize this argument, I posit that the condition of a raw, Dionysian 
‘fire’ might manifest itself as unmediated affect. However, to re-determine balance 
‘clarity of presentation’ necessitates, rather than an aleatory degree of affective 
transmissions, the presence of a locus within the festive space; the performance. To 
return to Heidegger’s condition of art and the theatrical in the festive space: ‘being 
bound into the hidden obedience and rule of beings’776 one is impelled to 
understand art through the lens of this balance. Certainly, as Young notes, 
Heidegger’s representation of the modern state of art errs towards delimitation 
characterized in an Apollonian enframing (Gestell) of division, codification, and 
structure. In Young’s subsequent deconstruction of a Heideggerian understanding 
of art and the modern man he suggests: 
We, however, are out of balance in precisely the opposite way to the 
archaic Greeks and so our ‘task’ is exactly the reverse of theirs… We find 
ourselves pre-eminently endowed with ‘the ability to grasp and delimit’, 
to bring the veiled and confusing to the clarity of conceptual 
articulation… So alienated from the holy ‘fire’ have we become that we 
possess no measure of, or limit upon, what to do with our power.777 
One could posit that evoking balance through the language of ‘clarity’ diametrically 
opposed to ‘fire’ appears as a neat analogue for the division between page poetry 
and performance poetry, where affect becomes the factor mediating the 
opposition. Young’s description of the essential negotiation: ‘Our task, then, the 
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opposite of the Greeks’, is to recover the “fire”’778 compels us to embrace the 
affective potential of poetry, a potential made explicitly manifest in performance. 
But for Heidegger this is a poetry which is grounded, a recovery of art without a 
sacrifice of structure, a meeting of Apollonian and Dionysian frames, or as 
Heidegger suggests in his lecture ‘Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’’, a poetry that allows 
us to: ‘grasp the ungraspable’.779 More saliently perhaps, is Heidegger’s consequent 
description of this process as enabling self-knowledge through the clarity of 
presentation in the formation of frameworks (the Apollonian) but a self-knowledge 
alive to the unknown, the unknowable (Dionysian), or as Heidegger states: ‘grasping 
[our]selves in the face of what is ungraspable’.780 To elucidate, as Young argues, the 
role poetry plays for Heidegger in the process of modern man’s salvation is the 
balance between engaging the affect (the spirit, or the holy) and bringing to it not 
the world enframing of ‘Gestell’, but a reference for preservation and 
communication (my emphasis): 
In other language, poetry which ‘founds the holy’, which validates itself 
in terms not of the ‘Greek’ but rather, as I shall call it, the ‘modern 
paradigm’, is poetry which preserves and communicates ‘the 
Dionysian’.781 
For the performance poet, affect unmediated does not become poetry, and here it 
is vital that the act of the performance is contextualized first within the poem space 
                                                          
778 Young, p.97. 
779 Martin Heidegger, Hölderlin's Hymn ‘The Ister’ (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 
p.136. 
780 Heidegger, Hölderlin's Hymn ‘The Ister’, p.136. 
781 Young, p.99. 
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(the conditions of the poem) and then the performance space (the festive or social 
space where the performance is enacted). For a Heideggerian interpretation of art 
within a space, particularly the festive space, it is important to briefly reference the 
concept of ‘the Open’, which Heidegger understood as a condition of man. Being 
within the world (dasein) is being open to the world, so one should understand the 
world as being open: ‘By the opening up of a world, all things gain their lingering 
and hastening, their remoteness and nearness, their scope and limits’.782 
Heidegger’s statements in Poetry, Language, Thought on poetry, and the role of 
poetics in particular assert this connection: 
Poetry, however, is not an aimless imagining of whimsicalities and not a 
flight of mere notions and fancies into the realm of the unreal. What 
poetry, as illuminating projection, unfolds of unconcealedness and 
projects ahead into the design of the figure, is the Open which poetry 
lets happen, and indeed in such a way that only now, in the midst of 
beings, the Open brings beings to shine and ring out.783 
For Heidegger the opening of the world is inculcated in both the poetic and the 
spatial: ‘A work, by being a work, makes space for that spaciousness. ‘To make 
space for’ means here especially to liberate the Open and to establish it in its 
structure… The work as work sets up a world. The work holds open the Open of the 
world’.784 In the affective potential of the performance as art, the world is made 
                                                          
782 Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p.44. 
783 Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p.70. 
784 Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p.44. 
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manifest. Yet the Open is held open by spatial framing, and by the necessary 
correlative inquiry that comes with such a structure:  
We inquire into the nature of art… Such reflection cannot force art and 
its coming-to-be. But this reflective knowledge is the preliminary and 
therefore indispensable preparation for the becoming of art. Only such 
knowledge prepares its space for art, their way for the creators, their 
location for the preservers.785 
Space therefore is essential to the potential of affect, and the opening of the world 
inculcated in art. Further to this I posit that the relationship Heidegger advocates 
between language and the Open is uniquely suited to an argument for performance 
poetry. Heidegger’s concept of language borders upon a discussion of affect, 
whereby the role of language as a device for communication is interrogated: 
But language is not only and not primarily an audible and written 
expression of what is to be communicated. It not only puts forth in 
words and statements what is overtly or covertly intended to be 
communicated; language alone brings what is, as something that is, into 
the Open for the first time.786 
Heidegger discusses language’s function as a naming of beings; and only through 
this naming can beings come ‘to their being from out of their being’.787 The 
projection of what is brings an elucidation of its being: ‘This projective 
                                                          
785 Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p.75. 
786 Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p.71. 
787 Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p.71. 
340 
 
announcement forthwith becomes a renunciation of all the dim confusion in which 
what is veils and withdrawn itself’.788 In this context, one could argue that the 
projective announcement becomes the recognized receipt of affect, or rather the 
identification of a being’s affective potential. This certainly rings true in Heidegger’s 
elaboration of the ‘projective saying’: ‘Projective saying is poetry: the saying of 
world and earth… Poetry is the saying of the unconcealdness of what is’.789 I believe 
that a clear correlative can be drawn between the affect of the poem and the un-
concealing of what is. To recall the influence of the festive (or performance) space 
here, Heidegger argues: ‘a work is in actual effect as a work only when we remove 
ourselves from our commonplace routine and move into what is disclosed by the 
work, so as to bring our own nature itself to take a stand in the truth of what is’.790 
In essence the disclosure of the work (its affective potential) can be brought into 
one’s own nature (affective reception). This is made overt when one sanctions the 
commonplace routine791 in favour of the interruption that is presented by the 
festive space. 
Through Lefebvre, Foucault, and Heidegger I posit that there is ample ground 
to form a correlation of function between the type of festival which Lefebvre and 
Heidegger espouse and the contemporary performance poetry space. There is a 
tacit connection formed when one considers the parallelism of the spaces under a 
Foucauldian representation of heterotopias. Lefebvre notes that the traditional 
                                                          
788 Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p.71. 
789 Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p.71. 
790 Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p.72. 
791 Understood both in the sense of a commonplace understanding of language as signification 
absent affect and the routine of the commonplace or everyday space. 
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festival was a site not simply of excess but of reaffirmation of social bonds.792 This 
representation of social space bears a keen resemblance to Foucault’s propositions 
regarding the public use of heterotopic space and the importance of the educative 
impact of such transformative spaces on the social structures which occupy them. 
In the performance poetry space affective excess is experienced not only 
collectively, but contributively, through the various networks of affect transmitted 
by each individual body, to a collective body of audience members and performers. 
This exchange of affect within a performance space takes on great energetic and 
pedagogic potential. For both spectators and practitioners this potential is then 
directed outwards, outside of the performance space, to the possibilities inherent 
in potential transformations through the occupations of space in everyday life. The 
function of a performance space as a generator of potential is unequivocally 
reflected in Foucault’s sixth principle of heterotopias: ‘The last trait of heterotopias 
is that they have a function in relation to all the space that remains’.793 To quote 
Lefebvre: ‘Festival differed from everyday life only in the explosion of forces which 
had been slowly accumulated in and via everyday life itself’.794 The functional role 
of the performance space is imperatively tied to the social necessity of the affective 
bodily experience, the same experience which so amply facilitates the production of 
further social spaces. There is a clear resemblance which the performance poetry 
                                                          
792 Lefebvre discusses the traditional festival as ‘peasant celebration’, once again affirming the 
importance of class and material social structures within his thought: ‘Peasant celebrations 
tightened social links and at the same time gave rein to all the desires which had been pent up by 
collective discipline and the necessities of everyday work. In celebrating, each member of the 
community went beyond himself, so to speak, and in one fell swoop drew all that was energetic, 
pleasurable and possible from nature, food, social life and his own body and mind’ (Lefebvre, 
Critique of Everyday Life, p.202). 
793 Foucault, ‘Of Other Spaces’, p.27. 
794 Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, p.202. 
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event bears to the festival in terms of its acceptance of affective excess and its 
occupation of a similar transitional space between both institution (the 
performance as an event) and the everyday (the negotiation of the audience as 
active participants in the occupation of the social space).  
Recalling Erica Fischer-Lichte’s critique of performance and spatiality, the 
festival is established as critical to the cultural health and advancement of a 
community: ‘festivals appear to be the genre of cultural performance most capable 
of leading to the formation of new communities or the reinforcement of existing 
ones’.795 The strengthening of the connection between the performance space and 
the festival space relies upon an understanding of their mutual and vital capacity 
for production; the production of social space and, implicitly, community. This 
conception of the performance space identifies it as an exemplary heterotopia; one 
which frames the everyday of the social space, and which enables a transgression of 
the fixed, utopic space. In this manner, the performance space comes to resemble 
the festival space, which is delineated by the festive action: ‘the quintessence of a 
festive action consists in the transgression of certain rules, namely those that 
impose constraints on daily life’.796 The performance of poetry provides both 
affective transmission, and through this bodily transaction, the means to establish, 
foster, and empower social structures. These processes resemble what Fischer-
Lichte refers to in her analysis of policies of spatial appropriation as ‘strategies that 
transformed space into festival space, in which the participants felt and acted like 
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members of a community’.797 This aspect of communality which sits at the very 
heart of the experience of performance poetry is fundamental to the recession of 
alienation in everyday life which permeates through non-occupation of social 
spaces. Through the shared experience of poetry, culturally and socially determined 
as a radically heightened discursive mode, the affectively charged interaction 
gathers even greater potential. This potential allows sites of performance to be 
cultivated as spaces of significance outside of the everyday occupation of space 
(such as the experience of private reading) which carries the constant threat of 
potential alienation. 
  
                                                          
797 Fischer-Lichte, p.235. 
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Conclusion 
 
Examining the pedagogy of performance poetry in the context of affective 
and spatial enquiries elucidates the value of the medium for contemporary poetics. 
The development of performance poetry in the UK (as distinct from established US 
scenes which connect in more tangible ways with the US academy) presents an 
optimal site for attention to frameworks of pedagogy which could take advantage 
of the radical, exciting, emerging UK spoken word scene.798 However, this is not to 
obfuscate the fact that there still may be issues that frustrate this pedagogy in 
practice, and it is these issues I address in the conclusion of my investigation. 
Despite arguments for increased attention to spoken word levied by contemporary 
UK poets such as Lemn Sissay, James Fenton, and Simon Armitage, the page 
represents a seemingly inevitable future for performance poets.799 Significant 
spoken word organizations in the UK such as Apples & Snakes still reach for print 
publication as a means of buttressing performance poetry produced by their 
                                                          
798 In a March 2016 article entitled ‘Why Does London Dominate The UK Poetry Scene?’ Kyra Hanson 
suggests that the answer to her own question is firmly and profoundly linked to the increased 
popularity of spoken word and the increased opportunities to experience performance poetry in 
London specifically. Kyra Hanson, ‘Why Does London Dominate The UK Poetry Scene?’, Londonist, 03 
March 2016 <http://londonist.com/2016/01/london-dominates-the-uk-hammer-and-tongue-
national-poetry-slam> [accessed 09 August 2016]. 
799 For further discussion of this see Susan B. Somers-Willett’s The Cultural Politics of Slam Poetry, 
particularly chapter four: ‘” Commercial Niggas Like Me”: Spoken Word Poetry, Hip-Hop, and the 
Racial Politics of Going Mainstream’ (Somers-Willett, pp.96-133) where Somers-Willett describes the 
propensity of spoken word artists to use their success on the stage as a springboard for launching 
more conventional print careers.   
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affiliated artists.800 This desire to subscribe to the page relates to issues of 
permanency, as Don Cusic argues in his text The Poet as Performer:  
The poet / performer is subject to a dichotomy in the world of poetry. 
The performances provide an income, an audience response to poetry, 
and a chance to take poetry to the public and achieve some popularity. 
On one hand the poet/performer must contend with critics who tend to 
evaluate poetry solely by the written word. On the other hand, it is the 
literature that is immortal. The poet dies, the poem lives on; the 
performance vanishes, the book remains.801  
The perpetuity of the page poem versus the temporality of the performance poem 
is an issue which I have touched on in the course of my analysis of the lingering 
affective quality of a performance. Certainly the artefact of the book contrasts the 
live nature of a performance, however with the advent of online video hosting sites 
such as YouTube, Vimeo, and Vine the permanence of the performance poem may 
be reconsidered. The way in which contemporary spoken word is predominantly 
accessed and consumed has been profoundly influenced by the proliferation of 
spoken word videos available to watch online.  Analysis of spoken word 
performances benefit from this evidence of the performance in the form of 
recordings, and sites such as YouTube provide a platform for certain pedagogical 
enquires. This being said, the focus of my research has highlighted the affective and 
spatial qualities of performance poetry, elements which are contingent upon live 
                                                          
800 For instance, see: Maja Prausnitz, Gretchen Ladish, and Geraldine Collinge (eds.), Velocity: The 
Best of Apples & Snakes (London: Black Spring Press, 2003). 
801 Cusic, p.107. 
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performance, where the evidence of the poem is configured not as text or recorded 
media but as a trace left upon the body.802  
As I have argued throughout my thesis, the strength of the relationship 
between poem and page (and the cultural cachet that this relationship carries) 
need not be obstructive; space must simply be opened to consider UK spoken word 
alongside text-based modes of reception.803 To do so, I suggest a recalibration must 
occur surrounding certain audience preconceptions of the potential of affect and 
the use of social spaces as argued in my previous chapters. On a practical level also, 
preconceptions exist regarding the nature of the poet as performer. Though dated, 
Francis Berry’s 1962 Poetry and the Physical Voice articulates an enduring 
resistance to the idea of separating the performance from the individual voice.804 
The opening interrogative lines of Berry’s text firmly establishes the nature of his 
enquiry: 
What vocal sound does a reader hear, with his inner ear, when he 
silently peruses a poem or passage of poetry? If what he hears 
corresponds with the actual physical voice of the poet, how does the 
                                                          
802 While spatial and affective relationships to a particular performance do in essence necessitate a 
physical, bodily presence in the performance space, there are clearly arguments to be made 
suggesting that online videos can still produce bodily responses in their recipients. This removes the 
transactional relationship between poet and audience, but it does offer the potential for videos of 
spoken word to produce feelings which can contribute to the education of affective drives. A 
contemporary example of this would be the recent vogue for ‘ASMR’ videos (Autonomous Sensory 
Meridian Response) which attempt to stimulate certain bodily responses from their viewers by 
performing ‘triggers’ such as tapping noises, soft speaking, or using props to simulate certain 
physical sensations. For more information on this phenomenon, see: Nick Highman, ‘ASMR: The 
videos which claim to make their viewers 'tingle'’, BBC News Online, 11 December 2014 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-30412358> [accessed 29 July 2016]. 
803 This space is certainly being opened globally by critical examinations such as: Julia Novak, Live 
Poetry: An Integrated Approach to Poetry in Performance (New York and Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011), 
and Cornelia Graebner, Performing Poetry: Body, Place and Rhythm in the Poetry Performance (New 
York and Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011). 
804 Francis Berry, Poetry and the Physical Voice (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962). 
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poet create this awareness of his personal voice in the mind of the 
reader, a voice which the reader must – presumably – imitate, or 
attempt to imitate, when he renders the poem, or the passages of 
poetry, aloud?805 
Berry proceeds to analyse the voices of a series of famous dead white male poets in 
an attempt to capture what made their voices distinct. 806 Although, as I have 
argued at length, I believe that the body (and by extension the physical voice) of the 
performer is crucial to the engagement of performance poetics I see dangers in a 
sort of rhetoric which seeks to ascribe the value or the affective potential of spoken 
word performance to individuals of certain skill, integrity, or value. No doubt this 
plays a part in what constitutes the affective experience of the performance, but to 
follow the lines of Berry’s argument is to invite the kind of elitism which hallmarks 
certain strands of academic association with poetics, as previously discussed. In 
clearer terms, the notion Berry seems to be articulating in the safe context of a 
particular literary canon is that certain writers escape the complications of being 
placed on a pedestal (these are the voices one ‘should’ try to emulate). Whereas 
this seems to be the status quo of text based hermeneutics and canon building, it 
becomes an odious manifestation of celebrity-culture in the context of the spoken 
word performer.807 A dichotomy of this kind fails to acknowledge the potential of 
                                                          
805 Berry, p.3. 
806 Namely: Tennyson, Shelley, Milton, Shakespeare, Marlowe, and a small concessionary chapter 
entitled ‘Some Recent Voices’ (Berry, pp.177-189) which predictably discusses W.B. Yeats, T.S. Eliot, 
W.H. Auden, and no women or poets of colour at all.  
807 Don Cusic addresses this very issue in the conclusion to his text The Poet as Performer: ‘The 
concept of celebrity is another red flag for those in English departments and others in the literary 
world in regards to poets and poetry. There seems to be an underlying belief that whatever is 
popular is crass, whatever is commercially successful is aesthetically suspect. Therefore, the notion 
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spoken word by forestalling enquiry into it out of a suspicion of its popular 
appeal.808  
This sort of rhetoric need only receive a simple response. Fear of the popular, 
celebrity performance poet damaging the quality of UK poetics with irreverent 
showmanship and shallow verse does not engage with the fact that performance 
poetry is not just beneficial in an affective or a socio-spatial sense, it may also 
benefit the quality of the poet’s writing. In my examination of I. A. Richards’ 
practical approach to the business of poetry criticism this kind of value was alluded 
to, but I further contend that the performance of a poem is a continuation of its 
composition. The critic Donald Hall articulates a complex and not entirely 
favourable relationship with spoken word in his essay ‘The Poetry Reading: Public 
Performance / Private Art’.809 However he does not maintain a consistent criticism 
of the poetry reading or performance in his essay, also noting that:  
                                                          
of a poet seeking any kind of celebrity-status causes many to shudder. Yet it is the reputations of 
people that often determines our interest in them and their work’ (Cusic, p.107). 
808 This sort of argumentation common, evidenced by critical enquiries such as Roberta Berke’s 
Bounds Out of Bounds, where Berke argues that: ‘far too many poets are tempted by the need to 
entertain an audience… readings often degenerate into cabaret, with the poet just another 
“personality on parade”’ (Berke, p.66). 
809 Hall comments on the value of the private reading as a moment of contemplation: ‘The poetry 
reading deprives us of civilization’s inwardness. Obviously any performance deprives us of the 
opportunity to supply our own sound and gesture. Performance makes passivity… Poet and reader, 
alone together, find an intimacy that crowds inhibit or prevent. The private art-poet in solitude 
finding and shaping the only word, carving it like alabaster; not poet as gregarious talker improvising 
the moment’s eloquence – finds in silent reading its appropriate publication: its public is a series of 
intense privacies’. Donald Hall, ‘The Poetry Reading: Public Performance / Private Art’, in American 
Scholar, Volume 54. Issue 1 (1984-85), pp.63-77 (p.72). There is of course an argument to be made 
for the moment of the private reading, but here Hall is falling into the trap of producing exclusive 
binaries between page and stage poetry instead of producing space for both. 
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While the reading can encourage bad habits, it can also lead to revision. 
It holds poets to the record of past work. Reading old things aloud, 
perforce one becomes scholar of old errors.810  
Hall ultimately cannot square his criticism of spoken word with the profoundly 
affective, social elements of the poetry performance: ‘In the poetry reading the 
relationship between poet and audience is clear and instantaneous… Present 
community can become palpable in the poetry reading’.811 This community benefits 
the poet by offering a sounding board for their composition: ‘at the best moments, 
like great theatre when actor and audience merge, the poet, saying lines laboured 
over in solitude, reads them returning on the faces of the audience’.812 This is an 
argument which Don Cusic reinforces: 
the greatest benefit public readings hold for a poet is that it provides a 
forum for the poetry which lets the poet know immediately what works 
and what doesn’t. It is hard to imagine an audience when you write 
alone; performing poetry puts the audience in the same room. Perhaps 
this is the major advantage of being a poet/performer.813  
Such a perspective supports the pedagogical potential of performance poetry which 
I have presented. It engages with the multi-directional capacities of affect 
transmission, while also recognizing that the performance itself can encourage re-
evaluation of the quality of a poem. In a 1976 edition of American Scholar the 
                                                          
810 Hall, p.75. 
811 Hall, p.77. 
812 Hall, p.77. 
813 Cusic, p.9. 
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literary critic Samuel Hazo published an essay addressing the relationship between 
poetry and the public which posited three points in defence of performance 
poetics: 
There are more reasons for encouraging the revitalization of the oral or 
bardic tradition than for remaining indifferent or opposed to it. First, it 
seems by definition essential to the appreciation of the poem – and this 
holds true whether the reciter of the poem is the poet himself or 
another person. Second, it is beneficial to poets simply to hear 
themselves say their poems; frequently their ears detect flaws that their 
eyes missed. Third, poetry readings quite literally create audiences that 
would not otherwise exist and, in so doing, make the appreciation of 
poetry an active rather than a passive activity – that is, listeners must 
make a conscious effort to respond, to participate by their very 
attention to what they are hearing.814  
Hazo’s second point affirms the dynamic value of performing poetry for the poet 
and his third point acknowledges the value of creating an audience for poetry. As I 
have argued the return to a halcyon ideal of oral poetics is attenuated by the 
complications of a post-literate cultural community. However, a reconnection with 
the core virtues of orality (its affective and socio-spatial elements) could do great 
                                                          
814 Samuel Hazo, ‘Poetry and the American Public’, in American Scholar, Volume 45. Issue 2 (1976), 
pp.278-290 (p.290). 
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things for the contemporary poetic landscape.815 Ultimately, as the critic Don Cusic 
avers, the poet as a performer is critical to the future of contemporary poetics: 
The poet who is a performer makes poetry significant beyond the walls 
of academe and reaches an audience with an interest in poetry but 
without a lifelong passion (or occupation) with it. In many ways, the 
poet/performer is the layer between the poet and the public and, 
though many would argue that widespread public acceptance and 
consumption would denigrate poetry, the simple fact remains poetry 
needs a public.816  
Although the idea of making poetry ‘significant’ beyond traditional, conventional 
audiences is doubtless more complex than Cusic proposes, there is an unassuming 
virtue to Cusic’s idea of the performer and their relationship with the public which 
cannot be overlooked. Despite the problems encountered when spoken word is 
brought into contemporary UK poetics, the fact indeed remains that poetry does 
need a public, and performance poetry presents itself as an apt medium which not 
only brings public and poetry together, but enlivens, enriches, and educates.  
 
  
                                                          
815 The shift from oral to literary receipt of poetry is captured quite succinctly in Jacob Drachler and 
Virginia R. Terris’s 1969 text The Many Worlds of Poetry: ‘Not until the eighteenth century did books 
become a major vehicle for the communication of poetry… Then, in the era of the book and 
magazine, the art of poetry underwent a highly conscious literary development – not all of it good, 
of course. But at its best, poetry never lost its closeness to the breath, the voice, the ear – to the 
nature of singing speech’. Jacob Drachler, and Virginia R. Terris, The Many Worlds of Poetry (New 
York: Knopf, 1969), p.241. 
816 Cusic, p.109 
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